• Indexical expressions
    Yehoshua Bar-Hillel
    Mind 63 (251): 359-379. 1954.
  • A new framework for semantics
    Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 233-240. 2008.
    No Abstract
  • Grounding, dependence, and paradox
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1). 1982.
  • Reference and paradox
    Claire Ortiz Hill
    Synthese 138 (2). 2004.
    Evidence is drawn together to connect sources of inconsistency that Frege discerned in his foundations for arithmetic with the origins of the paradox derived by Russell in Basic Laws I and then with antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, riddles associated with modal and intensional logics. Examined are: Frege's efforts to grasp logical objects; the philosophical arguments that compelled Russell to adopt a description theory of names and a eliminative theory of descriptions; the resurfacing of i…Read more
  • A note on the liar paradox
    Keith S. Donnellan
    Philosophical Review 66 (3): 394-397. 1957.
  • Believing in sentences
    John Bigelow
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1). 1980.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  • Can every modifier be treated as a sentence modifier?
    Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 241-275. 2008.
    No Abstract
  • 'Now' and 'Then' in Tense Logic
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2): 229-247. 2009.
    According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators “now” and “then” are ineliminable in quantified tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that “now” and “then” are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operat…Read more
  • Truth, definite truth, and paradox
    Stephen Yablo
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (10): 539-541. 1989.
  • I am not here now
    Analysis 58 (2). 1998.
  • Indexicals and intensionality: A Fregean perspective
    Philosophical Review 96 (1): 3-31. 1987.
  • Believing in semantics
    John C. Bigelow
    Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1): 101--144. 1978.
    This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to impossible worlds, or other points of reference which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, quotational theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own semantic struct…Read more
  • Open quotation revisited
    François Recanati
    Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 443-471. 2008.
    This paper — a sequel to my 'Open Quotation' (Mind 2001) — is my reaction to the articles discussing open quotation in the special issue of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics edited by P. De Brabanter in 2005
  • Attitudes and relativism
    Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 527-544. 2008.
    Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a more plausible story to tell than contextualists …Read more
  • Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom.A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to chall…Read more
  • A Berry and a Russell without self-reference
    Keith Simmons
    Philosophical Studies 126 (2). 2005.
    In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell’s paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.
  • Naive semantics and the liar paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (9): 479-497. 1982.
  • Review (review)
    M. J. Cresswell and John C. Bigelow
    Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (3): 289-295. 1978.
  • Indexicals and utterance production
    Philosophical Studies 150 (3): 331-348. 2010.
    We distinguish, among other things, between the agent of the context, the speaker of the agent's utterance, the mechanism the agent uses to produce her utterance, and the tokening of the sentence uttered. Armed with these distinctions, we tackle the the ‘answer-machine’, ‘post-it note’ and other allegedly problematic cases, arguing that they can be handled without departing significantly from Kaplan's semantical framework for indexicals. In particular, we argue that these cases don't require ado…Read more