•  306
    The limits of public reason
    Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 5-26. 1994.
  •  82
    Review of Sumner, *Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics* (review)
    Philosophical Review 107 (2): 309. 1998.
    Despite being co-opted by economists and politicians for their own purposes, ‘welfare’ traditionally refers to well-being, and it is in this sense that L. W. Sumner understands the term. His book is a clear, careful, and well-crafted investigation into major theories of welfare, accompanied by a one-chapter defense of “welfarism,” the view that welfare is the only foundational value necessary for ethics. Sumner himself is attracted to utilitarianism, but he makes no commitment to it in this work…Read more
  •  55
  •  44
    Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology
    International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1): 107-108. 2004.
  •  33
    Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology-Stephen Hetherington
    International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1; ISSU 173): 107-107. 2004.
  •  30
    The Limits of Public Reason
    Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 5-26. 1994.
  •  25
    Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant
    Philosophical Review 105 (2): 267. 1996.
    The notion that some things have intrinsic value, independently of whether they are valued or would be valued under certain conditions, is puzzling not only to noncognitivists and skeptics, but to theorists who understand value in terms of what would be accepted by rational preference, in a social contract, or under conditions of vivid imagination. Written in the tradition of Roderick Chisholm’s Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Noah Lemos’s Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant is unlikely to dimini…Read more
  •  24
    Virtue concepts and ethical realism
    Journal of Philosophy 85 (12): 675-693. 1988.
  •  18
    Intrinsic Value (review)
    Philosophical Review 105 (2): 267-269. 1996.
    The notion that some things have intrinsic value, independently of whether they are valued or would be valued under certain conditions, is puzzling not only to noncognitivists and skeptics, but to theorists who understand value in terms of what would be accepted by rational preference, in a social contract, or under conditions of vivid imagination. Written in the tradition of Roderick Chisholm’s Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Noah Lemos’s Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant is unlikely to dimini…Read more
  •  10
    Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1): 107-108. 2004.
  •  8
    Virtue Concepts and Ethical Realism
    Journal of Philosophy 85 (12): 675. 1988.
  • Wittgenstein and Relativism
    Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 3. 1978.