Bruce Nerenberg

Radical behaviorism abides, maintaining its influence in spite of numerous critiques which have clearly demonstrated its failings and contradictions, especially in terms of its fundamental commitment to antimentalism. The question then arises: "Given these devastating criticisms, why and from whence does radical behaviorism derive its recognition and support as a continuing influence within North American Psychology?" ;The present analysis begins by understanding Skinner's antimentalism as denying originative agency to human activity. That subjective factors are so emphatically denied in the face of decisive criticism as well as our self-testimony--though they are covertly employed within the foundations of its theory as shown in the master's thesis preceding this dissertation--strongly suggests that there is an ideological component to the insistent clinging to strict behavior analysis. ;This study then probes beyond epistemological arguments, exploring the deeper issues of social-economic and cultural interests and values which are reflected in radical behaviorism, yet whose influence on the theory is explicitly denied by Skinner and other radical behaviorists. This requires an analysis along the lines of critical theory which critically examines how radical behaviorism reflects as well as legitimates the prevailing dominant interests within the current socio-economic order. ;The historical development of behaviorism from its initial experimental thrust in the late 19th century through Watson's behavioristic challenge, and finally to Skinner's radicalization of behaviorist thought is shown to both reflect and support changing historical, socio-economic, and psychological circumstances. Questions are raised with respect to the way radical behaviorism characterizes human nature with a view to controlling behavior, especially in regard to controlling emotions. This study also explores radical behaviorism's implicit structuring of its animal studies on the basis of human social circumstances and subsequent naive claim that these experiments demonstrate laws of behavior for animals which must be taken as equally valid for human beings. ;This study is undertaken in the hope that a critical understanding of radical behaviorism and its implications will elucidate repressive aspects of the current social reality, thereby providing insight and incentive for the transformation of society along emancipatory lines

The point of departure for this dissertation is an enquiry into the relationship of theoretical and practical reason in Kant. This enquiry confirms that Kant's statement that reason always remains one and the same, differing only in its employment. This is to say, there is an essential structural identity between theoretical and practical reason in Kant. Furthermore, this conception of reason is held to be paradigmatic for all of modern thought. ;This conception of reason, namely, that it is one and the same, is then elaborated and explicated by way of a comparison with the Greek view. This is done not only in terms of their respective notions of reason, but also in terms of the realms in which reason is engaged, such realms being those of science and ethics. Here, the nature of reason in its modern conception--a nature which is decidedly different from the classical view of reason--is disclosed. ;Reason, in its modern conception is a univocal, spontaneous, methodical activity. It embodies and enacts a poietical activity. This view sees reason as a "craftsman" of objective and certain truth; it is a projecting-productive process. In a sense, reason now embodies the Cartesian rules which were to direct the mind, enacting them, functioning according to their univocal method. ;In this characterization of reason, especially in its poietical character, the origin of technology can be found. Technology here means the projective activity of research and experimentation, i.e., it refers to that view of knowledge whereby reason is a projective activity which constructs that which is known. In this way, reason is seen to embody the idea of technology. ;Having disclosed reason to be one and the same, its sameness residing in its constant and univocal poietical activity, the implications of this view are examined. The main difficulty resulting from this is the following: since science, ethics, and technology are projects of one and the same rational activity, an essential, rational-deductive critique of science or technology by ethics is not possible. Reason would find itself unable to undertake such a critique without coming into conflict with itself. Here, reason, as always one and the same, is one-legged. The move of one employment of reason against another would cause the whole argument collapse, leaving the critique no leg to stand on. ;Without proposing any definite solutions, the dissertation ends with other implications of this modern view and attempts to suggest a new direction thought might take in order to avoid or resolve these dilemmas