•  959
    Swinburne on the Simplicity of Theism
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2). 2011.
    This paper argues that (1) Richard Swinburne’s general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties, (2) Swinburne’s main argument in ’The Christian God’ for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly …Read more
  •  347
    The ethics of shareholding
    Journal of Business Ethics 37 (2). 2002.
  •  222
    Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilities of Business
    Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (4): 431-443. 1994.
    This paper discusses the normative ethical theory of the business firm advanced principally by William E. Evan and R. Edward Freeman. According to their stakeholder theory, the firm should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: indeed, management has a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders to act as their agent. In this paper I seek to clarify the theory by discussing the concept of a stakeholder and by distinguishing stakeholder theory from two varieties of stockholder theory-I call the…Read more
  •  219
    Reply to Oppy on God, the Best and Evil
    Sophia 50 (1): 211-219. 2011.
    My reply corrects one misstatement in Oppy’s summary of my book, abandons a footnote in the light of one of Oppy’s criticisms, and argues that Oppy’s other criticisms do not succeed in showing either that my claims are mistaken or that the arguments by which I supported them are defective
  •  49
    Locke and the relativisation of identity
    Philosophical Studies 27 (6). 1975.
    Arc there cases in which an object x is thc same F as an object y but x is not the same G as y, cvcn though x is a G? A11 aihrmativc answer will have drastic repercussions 011 0ne’s account of identity and on one’s quantification theory. For suppose that the expression ‘x is the same F as y’ can be understood as ‘x is an F and y is an F and x is identical with y’, and that ‘x is not the same G as y’ can be understood as ‘it is not the case that x is a G and y is a G and x is identical with y’. T…Read more
  •  48
    The Prospects for the Free Will Defence
    Faith and Philosophy 27 (2): 142-152. 2010.
    The main conclusion of the paper is that the prospects for a successful Free Will Defence employing Alvin Plantinga’s basic strategy are poor
  •  42
    Identity and spatio-temporal continuity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2): 184-189. 1972.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  42
    Properly unargued belief in God
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3). 1989.
  •  40
    Hume, Probability, Lotteries and Miracles
    Hume Studies 16 (1): 67-74. 1990.
    Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails
  •  37
    God, the Best, and Evil
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    God, the Best, and Evil is an original treatment of notable problems about God and his actions towards human beings. Bruce Langtry examines implications of divine omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness for God's providence; the apparent fact that God could have created a better world than this one; and the problem of evil.
  •  34
    Miracles and principles of relative likelihood
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3). 1985.
    I EXAMINE VARIOUS SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR WEIGHING TESTIMONY TO PAST EVENTS AND IDENTIFY ONE WHICH SEEMS TO BE BOTH TRUE AND ROUGHLY IN THE SPIRIT OF DAVID HUME’S ESSAY. I ARGUE THAT HUME FAILS TO PROVIDE GOOD REASONS FOR SAYING THAT THIS PRINCIPLE, WHEN APPLIED TO REPORTS OF MIRACLES PURPORTING TO SUPPORT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, WILL ALWAYS LEAD US TO REJECT THE OCCURRENCE OF THE MIRACLE
  •  27
    Guest Editor’s Introduction
    Business and Professional Ethics Journal 21 (3/4): 2-4. 2002.
  •  26
    The main issue in this paper has been whether appeal to greater goods can explain why God, if he exists, is justified in refraining from ensuring that there is little or no evil. I have argued that in principle it can. I have not defended the plausibility of the view that there actually are greater goods for whose sake God’s actions are planned; nor have I attempted to identify candidate goods performing the role envisaged. However those tasks form part of my larger project. Well beyond my reach…Read more
  •  25
    The maximin rule argument for Rawls's principles of justice
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1). 1985.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  24
    Wiggins' defence of essentialism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (4): 459-469. 1975.
  •  23
    Young on decisions concerning medical aid
    Theory and Decision 8 (4): 377-379. 1977.
  •  21
    God and the Best
    Faith and Philosophy 13 (3): 311-328. 1996.
    The paper reaches two main conclusions: Firstly, even if there are one or more possible worlds than which there are none better, God cannot actualise any of them. Secondly, if there are possible worlds which God can actualise, and than which God can actualise none better, then God must actualise one of them. The paper is neutral between compatibilist and libertarian views of creaturely freedom
  •  20
    Review of Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (review)
    Sophia 54 (2): 227-229. 2015.
  •  20
    Perception and corrigibility
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3): 369-372. 1970.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  17
    HUME, "ENQUIRY X" ARGUES: EVERY ALLEGED MIRACLE ’M subscript 1’ , WHOSE OCCURRENCE WOULD BE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF A GIVEN RELIGION ’R subscript 1’ IS SUCH THAT ITS OCCURRENCE WOULD BE EVIDENCE AGAINST ANY CONTRARY RELIGION ’R subscript 2’ . MOREOVER, CONSIDER TESTIMONY ’T subscript 1’ IN FAVOR OF THE OCCURRENCE OF ’M subscript 1’ : ’T subscript 1’ IS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE OCCURRENCE OF ANY MIRACLE ’M subscript 2’ WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE EVIDENCE FOR ’R subscript 2’. ONE SHOULD DISTINGUISH TWO SENSE…Read more
  •  14
    Mackie on miracles
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (3). 1988.
    J L MACKIE, IN "THE MIRACLE OF THEISM", CHAPTER 1, ARGUES THAT "IT IS PRETTY WELL IMPOSSIBLE THAT REPORTED MIRACLES SHOULD PROVIDE A WORTHWHILE ARGUMENT FOR THEISM ADDRESSED TO THOSE WHO ARE INITIALLY INCLINED TO ATHEISM OR EVEN TO AGNOSTICISM." I ARGUE THAT MACKIE FAILS TO ESTABLISH THIS CONCLUSION. ALL THAT MACKIE CAN SHOW IS THAT THOSE WHO ARE INITIALLY INCLINED TO THEISM OR AGNOSTICISM MAY BE JUSTIFIED IN PREDICTING THAT THE NEXT MIRACLE REPORT THEY EXAMINE WILL NOT BE SUCH AS TO FORM THE BA…Read more
  •  14
    This is a response to Richard M. Gale’s review of my book God, the Best, and Evil, Clarendon Press 2008. The review was published on-line in May 2009, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  •  13