Bryan Hall

Hans Vaihinger, in the late nineteenth century, posed a now famous trilemma for Immanuel Kant's theory of affection: If things-in-themselves are the affecting objects, then one must apply the categories beyond the conditions of their application . If one holds that appearances are the affecting objects, then one must hold that these appearances which are the effects of affection are themselves the causes of affection. If one holds that things-in-themselves affect the noumenal self in parallel with appearances affecting the empirical self, then that which is a representation for the noumenal self must serve as a causally efficacious thing-in-itself for the empirical self's production of an empirical representation of the very same object

This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant's different conceptions of substance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by examining the development of Kant's conception of substance in his final work, the Opus postumum.

In a 1798 letter to Christian Garve, Kant claims that without a transition [Übergang] from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics there will be a ‘gap’ in the Critical philosophy. He does not make clear, however, exactly what this gap is or how the transition is supposed to fill the gap. The Übergang section of Kant's Opus postumum has received considerable attention of late due to the many drafts it contains of Kant's Ether Deduction. Commentators have also hoped to find a solution there to the gap problem. Little attention has been paid, however, to Kant's project in Convolut 10 of the OP which he began in August 1799 immediately after completing the Übergang section. Assuming that the Ether Deduction is sound and proves a priori the existence of a transcendental material condition for experience, Convolut 10 discusses what changes would have to be made to the transcendental formal conditions of experience in their empirical function given the addition of this transcendental material condition. Kant claims in Convolut 10 that these changes are necessary to finally effect a transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics and, as I will argue, such a transition will be tantamount to bridging the gap in the Critical philosophy mentioned in the letter to Garve

A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) comprises John Locke’s mature thoughts on religious toleration. In it, Locke offers three political arguments against state religious coercion. He argues that it is impossible, impermissible, and inadvisable for the civil magistrate to enforce ‘true religion,’ which Locke defines as the ‘inward and full persuasion of the mind’ (Works, 6:10). Notwithstanding the various internecine conflicts within Christianity, conflicts which motivated Locke’s concern with toleration, all of the many-splendored sects of Christianity nonetheless share the notion that orthodoxy (correct belief) is required for salvation. Since the early days of Christianity, orthodoxy has represented the lowest-common-denominator obligation of adherents to Christianity. Locke’s political arguments in the Letter, at least in their first instance, assume an orthodox definition of “true religion.” This is likewise true of those who have either defended or criticized Locke’s arguments in the secondary literature. In contrast to Locke and his commentators, we will argue that the dominant characterization of “true religion” globally and throughout history does not concern correct religious belief as much as it concerns correct religious practice, or orthopraxy. Even though it has not received as much attention in the literature, Locke does discuss orthopraxy–what he calls ‘outward worship’–at length in the second half of the Letter (Works, 6:29-39). We will demonstrate how versions of all three political arguments for toleration can be redeployed to constrain the power of the magistrate within an orthoprax conception of true religion.

In this book, Bryan Wesley Hall breaks new ground in Kant scholarship, exploring the gap in Kant’s Critical philosophy in relation to his post-Critical work by turning to Kant’s final, unpublished work, the so-called _Opus Postumum._ Although Kant considered this project to be the "keystone" of his philosophical efforts, it has been largely neglected by scholars. Hall argues that only by understanding the _Opus Postumum _can we fully comprehend both Kant’s mature view as well as his Critical project. In letters from 1798, Kant claims to have discovered a "gap" in the Critical philosophy that requires effecting a "transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics"; unfortunately, Kant does not make clear exactly what this gap is or how the transition is supposed to fill the gap. To resolve these issues, Hall draws on the _Opus Postumum_, arguing that Kant’s transition project can solve certain perennial problems with the Critical philosophy. This volume provides a powerful alternative to all current interpretations of the _Opus Postumum_, arguing that Kant’s transition project is best seen as the post-Critical culmination of his Critical philosophy. Hall carefully examines the deep connections between the _Opus Postumum_ and the view Kant develops in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, to suggest that properly understanding the post-Critical Kant will significantly revise our view of Kant’s Critical period.