C. R. Braida

The aim of this paper is to defend a theory of artifacts based on the concept of field of action, as an alternative to functional, intentional and double-nature theories. The proposed theory is realistic about the existence of entities that are artifacts, and praxiological about the nature of such entities. The basis of the theory is the concept of action; from this concept, the concepts of field of action and participants in a field of action, namely, agents and objects, are introduced. An artifact is defined as an object that has a part and role in the achievement of an action.

O objetivo é apresentar e discutir algumas propostas de explanação da estrutura predicativa por meio da explicitação da estrutura de papéis temáticos a partir de conceitos semânticos primitivos. A sugestão será a de retomar a teoria dos papéis temáticos para justificar a estrutura predicativa, e assim recuperar a noção de conteúdo semântico estruturado, fundamentando-a no plano pragmático. Para isso, será necessário recusar duas suposições gerais comumente aceitas: que a significatividade das expressões linguísticas baseie-se na conceitualização prévia do mundo, e que a única fonte de conteúdo semântico seja a percepção. A ideia alternativa sugerida será conceber os papéis temáticos como funções discursivas primitivas, nas quais reflete-se não uma conceitualização primitiva do mundo, mas antes a estrutura da situação de interação cooperativa de agentes engajados em atividades comuns.

This book is a reflection on contemporary arts and techniques, with the purpose of rethinking the terms in which they are thought and presented in philosophical contexts, with the art of dance as the plumb line by which theorizations are evaluated. The approach is based on the thesis that the artistic is directly anchored in action and interagency. The aim is to think of works of art no longer as objects, but rather as triggers of action and interaction that require, above all, active and cooperative agents. The main criticism of the philosophies of art concerns the apprehension of works of art under the concept of aesthetic object and semantic object by which the artistic is reduced to a property or relation of static and inactive particular objects and artifacts. The positive thesis consists in thinking of the arts and techniques as modulations of agency with potential for ontological transformation. Arts and techniques would indicate ways in which the human completes himself in what he is, by differentiating himself in relation to nature. All arts and techniques, the mastery of which requires attention to materials and rules, free us from nature and emancipate us for artefactual life. The main theoretical review consists in the affirmation of ontological pluralism applied to technical and artistic artifacts, in the sense that arts and techniques belong to different categories of action and technical and artistic artifacts to different ontological categories. Works of art and technique do not belong to a single category and neither do they belong to a single story. As with languages, there is a diversity of arts and techniques and a plurality of histories and ramifications. Since the arts and techniques are at the base of the establishment of the world, ontological pluralism focuses on the human being himself. Arts and techniques are forms of action and agency; the works are agents that trigger effects; artistic and technical actions are performative interagencies through which worlds are established in which the agents themselves are constituted in their form of existence and way of being. In addition to aesthetic and semantic, formal and material effects, the arts and techniques, as acts and artifacts, establish effects of reality and thus have anthropological and ontological efficacy.

The texts gathered here were written to serve as an introduction to hermeneutical studies for a wide audience. The guiding idea was to present the concepts and theories that structure the paradigm of hermeneutic thinking from everyday and common experiences. Embedded in this strategy is the thesis that theoretical terms are abstractions from concrete practices and experiences of individuals and communities. In the case of basic hermeneutical terms such as "sense", "expression", "meaning", "interpretation" and "understanding" this is both evident and problematic, as it is difficult to grasp the theoretical concepts that these words designate in each theory hermeneutics without confusing them with the non-theoretical notions associated with them in their daily and living use of language. In the following texts, I have attempted to clarify its use in hermeneutic theories, but always with the aim of presenting basic concepts on which the different hermeneutic theories will build their theses and intelligibility schemes. The strategy for this was to refer its use to practical contexts and basic actions, as this is where sense and meaning take place and acquire consistency.

The essays gathered here are guided by the need to eliminate from the hermeneutic theory any idealistic and transcendental remnants, under the assumption of the historicity and practicality of the experience of meaning. What is tested is the double hypothesis that the concept of meaning, having and making sense of something, act, object or situation, is based primarily on acting and not feeling, and that this concept does not imply that what makes and has sense is linguistic or sign. For this, I distanced myself from some theses characteristic of the hermeneutic philosophical tradition, although with this departure I wanted, a contrario, to reinforce and explain the hermeneutic character of our experiences and actions. In the firelight lit by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, I assume the effective agency and the effectiveness of the effects of things done as the only basis for the experience of meaning: the scope of meaning is made up in the field of action of situated active (inter) agents.

Analysis and reconstruction of the concepts of artifact and performative agency, under an ontological perspective, in order to understand the phenomena of interactivity and mutual constitution between agents and artifacts. The focus of the investigation is the agency and effectiveness of technological and artistic artifacts as they make up the world in which they can have effects and shape the agents that produce and use them. The intentionality and the agency of the intentional agents will be understood as founded on the condition established by the artifacts that, although they are their creation, simultaneously impose restrictions and enhance their action and conscience. Performative action based on artifacts and artifices, in the sense of actions by which the agent is constituted as an intentional agent, establishes new modes of cooperative interaction and provides other forms of existence.

Nesse texto são apresentadas as propostas de Davidson e de Puntel sobre o conteúdo semântico sentencial e o conceito de predicado. Na ortodoxia semântica, a função semântica dos predicados é distinta da função semântica dos designadores, o que implica que uma sentença expresse um conteúdo semântico estruturado. As propostas de Davidson e de Puntel são ambas reelaborações da proposta de Tarski, pela qual as expressões predicativas são derivadas do conceito mais primitivo de sentença aberta, e do primado da verdade sentencial sobre os demais conceitos semânticos. A consequência de ambas as teorias é a eliminação do conceito de predicado e também a dispensa da tese da estruturalidade do conteúdo semântico. Sugere-se a recusa dessas propostas sob o argumento de que elas são incompatíveis com as melhores teorias tanto linguísticas e quanto formais. O ponto crítico está na eliminação da diferença lógica e gramatical entre indicar um objeto sem determiná-lo e indicar um objeto por meio de uma determinação ou classificação, diferença essa refletida na distinção entre termo singular e termo geral na semântica tarskiana, os quais ambos são necessários para compor um termo sentencial que pode ser verdadeiro ou falso.

A situação humana no mundo dos aparatos maquínicos e das formas tecnológicas de relação e subsistência exige uma revisão da autocompreensão humanista. A tecnologia moderna estabelece uma ruptura com os modos de vida milenares baseados em artefatos pré-científicos, mas isso não implica uma perda ou destruição da essência natural e menos ainda humana. Pois, a existência humana não é antes poética e depois por acidente técnica; e também não é antes carente e indeterminada e por isso técnica, e muito menos prioritariamente desejo natural e então derrelição tecnológica. O humano instaurou-se poética e tecnologicamente ao conformar o mundo pelo uso de artefatos: o seu ter mundo é sempre um perfazer mundo por meio do artifício.

O texto apresenta uma análise da noção de consciência na obra tardia deNietzsche. Confrontando-se diretamente com a concepção moderna, aconsciência é pensada por Nietzsche como dependente, não-transparentepara si mesma e sem auto-determinação. O consciente é concebido comosintoma que traveste e esconde os reais motivos e impulsos corporais ebiológicos. As vivências conscientes são concebidas como resultados deprocessos de interpretação e de incorporação. Ademais, a consciência é descritacomo um sintoma derivado e supérfluo em relação ao corpo vivo que, porisso, pode tornar-se doentio. A consciência torna-se um mal quando a relaçãode dependência é invertida e instala-se um desarranjo fisiológico em que ocorpo vivo torna-se cativo de processos e regimes contrários à sua natureza.The text presents an analysis of the notion of conscience in the last works ofNietzsche. Collating itself directly with the modern conception, the conscienceis thought by Nietzsche as dependent, not-transparent for itself and withoutself-determination. The conscientious states are conceived as symptom thattraveste and hides the real corporal and biological impulses. The conscientiousexperiences are conceived as resulted of incorporation and interpretationprocesses. The conscience is described as a symptom derived and superfluousin relation to the alive body that, therefore, can become unhealthy. Theconscience is unhealthy when the dependence relation is inverted and installsa physiological disarrangement where the alive body becomes captive ofprocesses and rules contrary to its nature

Nesse artigo eu proponho, partindo da distinção entre conceitos semânticos e conceitos ontológicos, a separação entre descrição semântica e postulação de entidades. A postulação de uma entidade implica o fornecimento de um critério de identificação, isto é, a verdade de uma asserção de identidade entre dois dispositivos de designação. Isso parece indicar que a existência da entidade seria garantida pela simples existência de um critério de identificação. Porém, esta é uma condição de significatividade para um termo referencial: que ele codifique ou esteja associado a uma descrição identificadora. Tal descrição identificadora não pode, de modo algum, ser confundida com uma condição de existência para a entidade em questão

This text analyzes the structure, source and content of analytical truths in order to show the legitimacy of this concept. Traditionally the concept of analytical truth is associated with the notions of a priori knowledge, a necessary proposition, and unrestricted validity. However, such truths can be conceived without this correlation. This way of conceiving the sentences whose truth is attainable by analysis will be defended and explored here. The aim is to show that this notion is legitimate and operational, although not for the purposes that gave rise to it, because its content is the very structure of linguistic significance.