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2Epistemological NaturalismsIn Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Wiley. 2016.Epistemological naturalism has often been taken to be inimical to a priori knowledge, armchair knowledge, and epistemic normativity. This chapter argues that the relationship between epistemological naturalism and these other commitments is in fact considerably subtler than it is widely assumed to be. The chapter begins with a brief classificatory sketch of different kinds of naturalism, then focuses on forms of naturalism that have been especially significant in epistemology. Finally, one form …Read more
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174Knowledge and ExplanationCanadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 137-164. 2006.Craig casts doubt upon the project of trying to give the traditional sort of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p. He interprets the inadequacy of existing analyses of knowledge as evidence that our concept of knowledge is complex and diffuse, and concludes that we should aim to understand it by thinking about the rôle the concept plays in our lives, rather than by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of knowledge ascriptions.There is surely somethin…Read more
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44The importance of being designated: a comment on Caret and CotnoirAnalysis 68 (3): 244-247. 2008.No Abstract
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Naturalistic challenges to the a prioriIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. 2013.
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57The Truth Fairy and the Indirect Epistemic ConsequentialistIn Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press. pp. 344-360. 2020.Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter a…Read more
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25Intuition, ‘Intuition’, Concepts and the A PrioriIn Booth Anthony Robert & P. Rowbottom Darrell (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. 2014.This chapter attempts to put structure on some of the different philosophical uses of ‘intuition’. It argues that ‘intuition’-hood is associated with four bundles of symptoms: a commonsensicality bundle; an a prioricity and immediacy bundle, and a metaphilosophical bundle. Tentatively suggesting that the word ‘intuition’ as used by philosophers is best regarded as ambiguous, the chapter offers a much simpler view concerning the meaning of ‘intuition’ in philosophy. With some of the attacks on ‘i…Read more
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97Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague ObjectsThought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4): 278-283. 2018.Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes–Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes–Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliv…Read more
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99Liar-like paradox and object language featuresAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1). 2008.We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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40'Addicted'? To 'Love'?Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1): 93-96. 2017.Earp et al. offer a very interesting summary of, and ethical commentary on, recent multidisciplinary research suggesting that at least some cases of what we call ‘romantic love’ involve phenomena that physically and/or psychologically resemble cases of what we call ‘addiction.’ They draw a conceptual distinction between what they call ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ concepts of addiction. On the narrow conception, only extreme, harmful, or abnormal cases of love would count as addiction. On the broad conce…Read more
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38Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self‐Reporting and the Science of LovePhilosophical Issues 26 (1): 226-242. 2016.
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208What Is Love? An Incomplete Map of the MetaphysicsJournal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2): 349--364. 2015.ABSTRACT:The paper begins by surveying a range of possible views on the metaphysics of romantic love, organizing them as responses to a single question. It then outlines a position, constructionist functionalism, according to which romantic love is characterized by a functional role that is at least partly constituted by social matters, although this role may be realized by states that are not socially constructed.
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273Serious Verbal Disputes: Ontology, Metaontology, and AnalyticityJournal of Philosophy 111 (9-10): 454-469. 2014.This paper builds on some important recent work by Amie Thomasson, wherein she argues that recent disputes about the existence of ordinary objects have arisen due to eliminiativist metaphysicians’ misunderstandings. Some, she argues, are mistaken about how the language of quantification works, while others neglect the existence and significance of certain analytic entailments. Thomasson claims that once these misunderstandings are cleared away, it is trivially easy to answer existence questions …Read more
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218Boghossian and Epistemic AnalyticityCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1): 113-127. 2008.Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, I resist Ebert’s reasons for think…Read more
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20A PrioriIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 274. 2013.
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110Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up CallPhilosophia Mathematica 13 (2): 194-201. 2005.This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken
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286Disposition ImpossibleNoûs 46 (4): 732-753. 2012.Are there dispositions which not only do not manifest, but which could not manifest? We argue that there are dispositions to Ф in circumstances C where C is impossible, and some where Ф is impossible. Furthermore, postulating these dispositions does useful theoretical work. This paper describes a number of cases of dispositions had by objects even though those dispositions are not possibly manifest, and argues for the importance of these dispositions.
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123The traditional conception of the a prioriSynthese 192 (9): 2725-2746. 2015.In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition as they might seem at first glance
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53The mystery of the disappearing diamondIn Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. pp. 302--319. 2009.Addresses the question of why we find Fitch's knowability 'paradox' argument surprising.
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485Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?The Monist 94 (2): 267-276. 2011.The article explores the irreflexivity of metaphysical dependence in the physical structure of reality. It stresses that the word dependence denotes quasi-ireflexivity which affects the metaphysical relations of a physical structure. It focuses on the view that irreflexivity assumption has been made without discussion of the dependence relations on the structure of reality.
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86Anti-realism and Epistemic AccessibilityPhilosophical Studies 132 (3): 525-551. 2007.I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal app…Read more
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122Justification magnetsPhilosophical Studies 164 (1): 93-111. 2013.David Lewis is associated with the controversial thesis that some properties are more eligible than others to be the referents of our predicates solely in virtue of those properties’ being more natural; independently, that is, of anything to do with our patterns of usage of the relevant predicates. On such a view, the natural properties act as ‘reference magnets’. In this paper I explore (though I do not endorse) a related thesis in epistemology: that some propositions are ‘justification magnets…Read more
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271Modal knowledge, counterfactual knowledge and the role of experiencePhilosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 693-701. 2008.In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more epistemic…Read more
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264Entitlement and rationalitySynthese 157 (1): 25-45. 2007.This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialis…Read more
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87What Love Is: And What It Could BeBasic Books. 2017.This book unpicks the conceptual, ideological, and metaphysical tangles that get in the way of understanding romantic love. Written for a general audience, What Love Is And What It Could Be explores different disciplinary perspectives on love, in search of the bigger picture. It presents a "dual-nature" theory: romantic love is simultaneously both a biological phenomenon and a social construct. The key philosophical insight comes in explaining why this a coherent—and indeed a necessary—position …Read more
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117The nature of normativityAnalysis 69 (1): 156-166. 2009.This is a big-picture book, 2 written with a breadth of focus which I find admirable. It exhibits what's come to be known as the ‘intersubdiscplinary’ approach to philosophy, which is not restricted by traditional boundaries within the discipline but rather proceeds with an eye to all sorts of areas of philosophy where relevant arguments, results, analogies and strategies might be lurking. I approve of this way of doing philosophy; it seems to me that all too often that wheels are reinvented, or…Read more