My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Other Yes, but only of trivial (logical) truths. And also trivial (logical) truths can only be known a priori.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Other Once again whether to adopt an internalist or externalist view about knowledge will depend on knowledge of what. If it is scientific knowledge then an externalist view, if knowledge of the truth of moral claims then an internalist view (although if the foundational metaphysical position is that of moral realism then I think moral knowledge should be externalist and be shown to be untenable).
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: skepticism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: libertarianism My 'leaning'here is pre-philosophical only. In terms of philosophical positions, to choose here, given how philosophers would justify their choice, seems like a metaphysical (speculative) commitment which is best left unattended.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism I accept atheism but also accept that this position is probably as difficult to rationally/empirically justify as theism. It is therefore a belief held by me, which is epistemically challenged.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Other Given the wide range of types of knowledge claims (e.g claims about electrons and claims about moral value) there is certainly not just epistemological position that can or should answer questions about knowledge. So, for instance, relativism only applies sometimes. And so on.
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: Humean Definitely Humean - provided that his view is read as an epistemological position (i.e. skepticism) and not metaphysical.
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept both I think the choice between classical and non-classical systems (of logic and knowledge) are dependent on context and the area of investigation. I do not think such systems are warranted in such a manner as to provide absolute organisation for our thought and knowledge seeking enterprises. The choice of one over another is a pragmatic and/or conventionalist issue.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Other To choose between internalism and externalism, given how philosophers would justify their choice, seems like a metaphysical (speculative) commitment which is best left unattended.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism My 'leaning'here is pre-philosophical only. In terms of philosophical positions, to choose between physicalism and a non-physicalism, given how philosophers would justify their choice, seems like a metaphysical (speculative) commitment which is best left unattended.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue I am not entirely convinced by the usefulness of thought experiments, so have tended to avoid literature which strongly requires these for argumentative purposes. Perhaps this is an oversight on my part. Not sure.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Other This is metaphysical question of the type which philosophers should abandon. It is to be resolved by empirical sciences.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Other Unless it is the concept of identity being discussed and not actual identity, to choose from the above option, given how philosophers would justify their choice, seems like a metaphysical (speculative) commitment which is best left unattended.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Skip
Time: A-theory and B-theory Other To choose between A-theories or B-theories, given how philosophers would justify their choice, seems like a metaphysical (speculative) commitment which is best left unattended.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Skip
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: epistemic
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Skip