•  12
    The objective stance and the boundary problem
    European Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  2
    Complicità e responsabilità reciproca
    Società Degli Individui 69 10-25. 2020.
  • The spring of action: in butō improvisation
    In Routledge Handbook Philosophy of Improvisation in the Arts, Routledge. forthcoming.
    This chapter discusses butō dance as an example of improvisation that challenges not only the extant philosophical definitions of improvisation, but also some fundamental presumptions about self-government and agency that are current in action theory. In the first part of the chapter, I identify the main features of butō improvisation, with regard to the nature of its basic movement, and the kind of subjectivity implicated in its generation. I then raise some questions regarding the philosophica…Read more
  • Repliche
    Notizie di Politeia 139 (36): 145-150. 2020.
    Replies to my critics.
  • One Among Many: responsibility and alienation in mass action
    In Chiara Valentini Teresa Marquez (ed.), Collective Action, Philosophy and the Law, Routledge. forthcoming.
    This chapter argues that some paradigmatic cases of collective action, called mass-action, build upon alienation. Individual alienation qualifies as a coordinative mechanism, which explains collective actions performed by large groups. Alienation requires individuals to detach from their personal stance, and bracket their personal attachments and motivations. Differently from strategic and normative coordinative devices, alienation bypasses strategic normative regulations, such as law and enforc…Read more
  •  1
    According to a traditional account, moral cognition is an achievement gained over time by sharing a practice under the guidance and the example of the wise, in analogy with craft and apprenticeship. This model captures an important feature of practical reason, that is, its incompleteness, and highlights our dependence on others in obtaining moral knowledge, coherently with the socially extended mind agenda and recent findings in empirical psychology. Insofar as it accords to exemplars dec…Read more
  •  1
    The practical significance of the categorical imperative
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7. forthcoming.
    On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. By contrast, this chapter argues for the practical significance of the CI centering on Kant’s account of the dynamics of incentives. This approach avoids some widespread misconceptions about how the CI operates and false expectations about what it promises and delivers. In particular, it explains how it differs from deductive practical inferences…Read more
  • Disclaiming responsibility, voicing disagreements, negotiating boundaries
    Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7. forthcoming.
    This essay introduces the novel category of “disclaimers” – distinctive normative acts which challenge third-party attributions of responsibility in a community governed by norms of mutual accountability. While the debate focuses on evasive and wrongful refusals to take responsibility for one’s wrongs, this essay argues that disclaimers are fundamental modes of exercising normative powers, whose main functions are demanding recognition, responding to wrongs, voicing disagreement, exiting alienat…Read more
  •  11
    Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation (edited book)
    with Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton, and Wojciech Załuski
    Springer Verlag. 2018.
  •  19
    Theoria, EarlyView.
  •  10
    According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is loving attention. Her view calls into question the Kantian account of the standard of moral authority, and ultimately denies that reason might provide moral discernment, validate moral experience, or drive us toward moral progress. Like Kant, Murdoch defines the moral experience as the subjective experience of freedom, which resists any reductivist approach. Unlike Kant, she thinks that this free agency is unprincipled. Some of her a…Read more
  •  1
    Reasons in Moral Philosophy
    In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer Verlag. pp. 35-46. 2018.
    The concept of reason is pervasive in our ordinary practices, but there is a large and divisive disagreement about their role in the foundation and explanation of morality. Such disagreement depends on three related issues, which concern the definition of “moral reasons,” their sources and functions. This chapter first takes into account material and formal definitions of moral reasons and clarifies the role of reasons in the explanation and justification of intentional action. Second, it addres…Read more
  •  3
    Values
    In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer Verlag. pp. 139-171. 2018.
    ValuingValuing is an important and ordinary endeavor, which pervades all our practices, activities, and institutions. The nature and criteria for valuing decisively depend on the alleged nature of values. First of all, are there values? If so, how to access them, and how do they inform our choices? Second, what kinds of value are there, and how do we identify them conceptually? Sections 1–2 identify these problems, which are the core of debates in meta-ethics and substantive theory, respectively…Read more
  • Autonomy, Emotional Vulnerability and the Dynamics of Power
    In Sandrine Bergès & Alberto Siani (eds.), Women Philosophers on Autonomy, . pp. 208-225. 2018.
    Traditionally, philosophers have focused on whether and how emotions threaten autonomy, insofar as they lie outside the sphere of rational agency. That is, they have conceptualized emotional vulnerability as passivity. Second, they have considered how emotions are insensitive to rational judgment, focusing on cases in which emotions are dissonant or recalcitrant. Third, in recognizing the motivational force of emotions, philosophers have tracked their negative impact on rational deliberation. In…Read more
  • This chapter accounts for the epistemic role of constitutive norms of practical rationality from a Kantian constructivist perspective.
  • This essay is a constructivist account of the role of desires in practical reasoning.
  • Kant on Recognition
    Handbuch Anerkennung Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. 2020.
    This entry concerns Kant's conception of moral recognition, mutual recognition, and dignity.
  • Il paradigma dell’osservatore responsabile
    Notizie di Politeia 35 ( 136): 157-167. 2019.
    This paper addresses the issue of the responsibilities associated with the observer's stance.
  • Rational agents often make progress by revisiting their previous judgments about what to believe and what to do. In fact, practical reasoning in general may be thought to be a complex activity by which we bring what matters into view. On this construal of practical reasoning, the process of revision takes center stage, and it often includes (even though it is not limited to) rethinking and re-describing the facts of the matter. Sensitivity to facts is thus an important aspect of practical and th…Read more
  • Contemporary moral philosophers and philosophers of the emotions widely agree that Kant’s discussion of compassion is an unfortunate byproduct of his rationalistic and legalistic account of ethics. In fact, Kant departs from the solid established rationalist tradition not only in distancing himself from dogmatic and perfectionist rationalism but also in claiming that there is a practical use of reason, which commits him to acknowledge that reason directly guides rational agents by furnishing the…Read more
  • According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is the recognition of others, and this is the experience of loving attention. Love is an independent source of moral authority, distinct from the authority of reason. It is independent because it can be attained through moral experiences that are not certified by reason and cannot be achieved by rational deliberation. This view of love calls into question a cluster of concepts, such as rational agency and principled action, which figure…Read more
  • In this chapter, I compare and contrast Kant’s and Sidgwick’s arguments in defense of moral cognition as objective practical knowledge. Kant focuses on practical truths in terms of practical laws governing the mind in action, while Sidgwick is concerned with practical truths about action. I argue that this is a crucial difference in the understanding of practical knowledge, which is matched by a different understanding of moral phenomenology and of the significance of subjective experience in ac…Read more
  • Love’s Luck-Knot. Emotional vulnerability and symmetrical accountability
    Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 1 (25): 1-25. 2020.
    Spurred by Judith Butler’s seminal work, Pamela Anderson finds herself challenged to rethink her ontological assumptions, away from the traditional conceptions of the self. This essay is an attempt to face this challenge upfront, and come to terms with the kind of vulnerability that Anderson wants to vindicate. I start with distinguishing different contrastive but interlocking pairs of concepts of vulnerability: the ontological and the ethical, the pathogenic and the self-enhancing, the inherent…Read more
  •  1
    Practical Knowledge, Equal Standing, and Proper Reliance on Others
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science. forthcoming.
    The analogy with craft suggests that moral development is similar to non-moral apprenticeship in some crucial ways: it is both an individual and a social achievement, resulting from one’s participation in social practices guided by the exemplary character of the wise. Moral cognitions are the object of practical reason, but practical reason is importantly incomplete: to be endowed with rational and emotional capacities is not sufficient to grasp and articulate true moral cognitions. Such capacit…Read more
  •  4
    On Richard Moran's Authority and estrangement. Author's reply
    with Josep E. Corbi, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Josep L. Prades, Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo, and Richard Moran
    Theoria 22 (58). 2007.
  •  133
    The Mafioso Case: Autonomy and Self-respect
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5): 477-493. 2009.
    This article argues that immoralists do not fully enjoy autonomous agency because they are not capable of engaging in the proper form of practical reflection, which requires relating to others as having equal standing. An adequate diagnosis of the immoralist’s failure of agential authority requires a relational account of reflexivity and autonomy. This account has the distinctive merit of identifying the cost of disregarding moral obligations and of showing how immoralists may become susceptible…Read more
  •  1327
    Constructivism in Ethics (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2013.
    Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new a…Read more
  •  63
    Hume Studies Referees 2005–2006
    with Kate Abramson, Donald Ainslie, Lilli Alanen, Julia Annas, Margaret Atherton, Donald Baxter, Martin Bell, Richard Bett, and Colin Bird
    Hume Studies 32 (2): 391-393. 2006.
  •  9
    Pamela Anderson argues for liberating love and vulnerability from the myths of the Western philosophical imaginary that tie them to fragility, subjection, and dependency. Spurred by Judith Butler’s work, Anderson finds herself challenged to rethink her ontological assumptions, away from the Kantian conception of the self as morally and ontologically invulnerable. In support of Anderson’s agenda, I distinguish different contrastive pairs of concepts of vulnerability, and argue for the relevance o…Read more