Carlo Brentari

This is the second article in a series of review articles addressing biosemiotic terminology. The biosemiotic glossary project is designed to integrate views of members within the biosemiotic community based on a standard survey and related publications. The methodology section describes the format of the survey conducted July–August 2014 in preparation of the current review and targeted on Jakob von Uexküll’s term ‘Umwelt’. Next, we summarize denotation, synonyms and antonyms, with special emphasis on the denotation of this term in current biosemiotic usage. The survey findings include ratings of eight citations defining or making use of the term Umwelt. We provide a summary of respondents’ own definitions and suggested term usage. Further sections address etymology, relevant contexts of use, and related terms in English and other languages. A section on the notion’s Uexküllian meaning and later biosemiotic meaning is followed by attempt at synthesis and conclusion. We conclude that the Umwelt is a centerpiece phenomenon, a phenomenon that other phenomena in the living realm are organized around. To sum up Uexküll’s view, we can characterize an Umwelt as the subjective world of an organism, enveloping a perceptual world and an effector world, which is always part of the organism itself and a key component of nature, which is held together by functional cycles connecting different Umwelten. In order to pay respect to Uexküll’s work, we must move from notion to model, from mention of Uexküll’s Umwelt term to actual application of it.

In the work of Lorenz we find an initial phase of great concordance with Uexkülls theory of animals’ surrounding-world (Umweltlehre), followed by a progressive distance and by the occurrence of more and more critical statements. The moment of greater cohesion between Lorenz and Uexküll is represented by the work Der Kumpan, which is focused on the concept of companion, functional circles, social Umwelt. The great change in Lorenz’ evaluation of Uexküll is marked by the conference of 1948 Referat über Jakob von Uexküll, where Lorenz highlights the vitalist position of Uexküll. In the works of the years after World War II, the influence of the Estonian Biologist greatly diminishes, even though Lorenz continues to express his admiration for particular studies and concepts of Uexküll. References to Uexküll’s work are less and far in between, while the difference is highlighted between the uexküllian theoretical frame (vitalistic) and Lorenz’s one (Darwinian and evolutionist). The two main critical lines of argument developed by Lorenz in this process are the biological and the epistemological one: on the biological side Lorenz heavily criticizes Uexküll’s vitalism and his faith in harmonizing forces and supernatural factors (which leads to concepts such as the perfect fusion of all biological species in their environment and the absence of rudimentary organs). On the epistemological side, Lorenz, arguing from the point of view of the critical realism, accuses Uexküll of postulating the separateness of all living beings, a separateness which is due to the Kantian idea that every subject of knowledge and action is imprisoned in the transcendental circle of its representations and attitudes.

In twentieth-century continental philosophy, German philosophical anthropology can be seen as a sort of conceptual laboratory devoted to human/animal research, and, in particular, to the discontinuity between human and non-human animals. Its main notion—the idea of the special position of humans in nature—is one of the first philosophical attempts to think of the specificity of humans as a natural and qualitative difference from non-human animals. This school of thought correctly rejects both the metaphysical and/or religious characterisations of humans, and the positivistic gradualism, that sees the human being as an animal endowed with a greater degree of certain faculties. At the same time, German philosophical anthropology still takes it for granted that such natural-qualitative novelty is unique in the realm of the living, that in correspondence with humans there is the hiatus, the discontinuity par excellence. The semiotic side of this view is the distinction between signs and symbols developed by Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer: animal signs would be mere proxies for perceptive elements or stimuli, whereas only human symbols could convey complex representation of objects and situations. The goal of this contribution is to criticise the alleged uniqueness of the hiatus and its semiotic implications through the opposite approach of the diffuse discontinuities. This approach that focuses on the semiotic traits of different species-specific environments can be traced back to Jakob von Uexküll’s biosemiotical phenomenology, which thinks of discontinuities as a normal phenomenon of animal life.

This paper focuses on the links between Jakob von Uexküll’s theoretical biology and Adolf Portmann’s conception of organic life. Its main purpose is to show that Uexküll and Portmann not only share a view of the living being as an autonomous and holistically organized entity, but also base this view on the seminal idea of the subjectivity of the organism. In other words, the respective holistic principles securing the autonomy of the living being—the Bauplan, for Uexküll; the Innerlichkeit, for Portmann—share an essentially subjective character. Such principles, indeed, express themselves in a centrally directed and formative way; moreover, in organisms endowed with a central nervous system, they also extend their influence on the overt behavioral sphere and on the organism’s capacity to give meaning to the surrounding reality. The conclusion of the article will show how, though starting from this common background, the two authors develop divergent positions on the issue of the anthropological difference. If Portmann emphasizes the special status of the relationship between the human animal and the world, Uexküll tends to see a substantial continuity in the biosemiotic processes through which human and non-human animals constitute their species-specific worlds of experience.

The problem of teleology is one of the major challenges for theoretical biology and, in general, for every philosophy of life. The debate about the nature of the organism and its difference from inorganic matter cannot come to terms with, at one point or another, the problem that arises from the unavoidable impression of teleology exhibited by the living itself. In this respect, the advantages that a systematic thinker such as Hartmann can offer to the philosophical analysis of life are remarkable. The first discussion by Hartmann on the problem of causality can be found in Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie (1912), a work which, however accurate, takes a predominantly Kantian and neo-Kantian approach, and cannot rely on the original and fecund tools of Hartmann’s mature stratified ontology. Therefore, the present contribution will focus on Hartmann’s ontological works, in particular his Philosophie der Natur: Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre (1950), in order to highlight and discuss the theoretical advantages they present. In particular, the validity of Hartmann’s ontological approach will be revealed by three key points: 1) a careful categorial distinction between different forms of determination, and even of causality, present in nature; 2) the refusal of vitalism, with the resolute limitation of finality in the proper sense to human conscious action; and 3) a great openness to the possibility that the living could be a third realm, governed by an autonomous modality of determination whose nature has yet to be discovered.

The book is a comprehensive introduction to the work of the Estonian-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll. After a first introductory chapter by Morten Tønnessen and a second chapter on Uexküll's life and philosophical background, it contains four chapters devoted to the analysis of his main works; they are followed by a vast eighth chapter which deals with the influence Uexküll had on other philosophers and scientists, and by a conclusions focused on the possibility of updating Uexküll's work. The monograph combines a careful reconstruction of the historical context in which the Uexküllian concepts emerged (the debate between mechanism and vitalism, contemporary scientific studies) and a thorough analysis of the philosophical contents of the Uexküllian views. As far as the key issue is concerned, Uexküll's notion of Umwelt refers to the perceptive and operative world which surrounds animal species; it is a subjective species-specific construction which provides living organisms with great security and behaviour stability. Moreover, the relationship that the animal carries out with its environment proves to be a complex system of semiotic interactions: its behaviour is not a set of mechanical reactions, but the result of a spontaneous attribution of meaning to the outside world, whose environmental elements are actively interpreted by the subject. The environment of animal species becomes a field of meaning, an exceedingly complex subjective elaboration; this can lessen the distance between animals and men, crediting both with the cognitive ability to grasp meanings and to use signs.

The present contribution aims at offering an exposition and a critical evaluation of the philosophical-anthropological theory of the origin of language developed by the American philosopher Susanne K. Langer (1895–1985). Langer’s theory traces human language and, in particular, its denotative and communicative functions, back to the expressive vocal utterances of the pre-human beings from which humanity would have derived. In her inquiry, Langer refers in particular to the article “The festal origin of the human speech” (1891–92), written by the psychologist J. Donovan. In his study, Donovan outlines a possible scenario of the birth of language out from pre-linguistic utterances: the spontaneous gatherings that hominids would have dedicated to emotionally relevant events and objects (the death of a conspecific, a killed predator or enemy). Langer refers to Donovan’s study (which she considers as a sort of fecund thought experiment) in order to highlight some basic anthropological, evolutionary, and semiotic requisites that a plausible theory on the origin of language has to fulfil. Langer’s own proposal for such a theory bases on the assumption that the functions of language (expression, denotation, communication) are separately conveyed by the different elements of the ritual situation: collective vocalizations, the festal objects themselves, and the inner images that individuals retain of the ritual experience. In its final part, the paper includes an evaluation of Langer’s theory, in particular of its semiotic and anthropological-philosophical relevance among the contributions that support (at least partially, as we will see) the thesis of the social origin of language.

Questo volume affronta lo sviluppo della teoria filosofica e antropologica di Susanne Langer, mettendo in evidenza l’importanza che in essa riveste un evento particolare della filogenesi della specie umana: la nascita della coscienza simbolica. Il nucleo del concetto di coscienza simbolica è costituito dall’idea di un’organizzazione mentale basata sull’utilizzo di rappresentazioni simboliche e strumenti linguistici, che dischiudono all’uomo inaudite possibilità di esperienza. L’ambito in cui si muove questo libro è quindi in primo luogo quello cognitivo, con particolare riferimento alla differenza qualitativa che separa l’uomo dagli altri animali e che non si lascia ricondurre a un mero perfezionamento delle capacità animali di interazione con l’ambiente. Va però sottolineato che i problemi incontrati da Langer non possono non portare a frequenti sconfinamenti nei territori della psicoanalisi, della psicologia e dell’etica. L’autore dedica una particolare attenzione alla ricostruzione langeriana dello sviluppo assieme, psichico e morale e alla preoccupazione dell’autrice per l’eccessiva logicizzazione e per lo spietato disincantamento della simbolic mentality della modernità (elementi che Langer considera come una vera e propria crisi evolutiva). Questo aspetto della sua riflessione permette di accostare Langer a quei pensatori che, da Cassirer a Max Weber, da Carl Gustav Jung a Leroi-Gouhran, manifestano una forte inquietudine di fronte alla perdita radicale non solo della mentalità mitica delle culture premoderne, ma anche e soprattutto del sistema di valori che orientava l’esperienza quotidiana e la condotta etica degli individui.