•  61
    Presentation
    with Tobies Grimaltos
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2): 125-132. 2006.
    BIBLID [0495-4548 21: 56; pp. 125-132]
  •  59
    Naturalism and normativity
    Theoria 11 (3): 239-240. 1996.
  •  47
    Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito c…Read more
  •  46
    En la concepcion de Davidson, las explicaciones de la accion en terminos de razones incluyen dos aspectos o condiciones independientes entre si: una condicion de racionalidad o justificacion racional y una condicion causal. La satisfaccion de la primera depende de relaciones logicas apropiadas entre las descripciones de la razon y de la accion. La segunda exige unicamente la existencia de un vinculo causal entre razon y accion. Es esta independencia entre las dos condiciones la que, en nuestra o…Read more
  •  44
    We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility. Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility,…Read more
  •  44
    Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action - by Maria Alvarez (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2): 245-247. 2011.
  •  43
    Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief
    Philosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  41
    A Proposal About Intentional Action
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 55-63. 2000.
    In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The proposal recommends it…Read more
  •  36
    In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2. After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzi…Read more
  •  33
    On the very idea of a robust alternative
    Critica 43 (128): 3-26. 2011.
    According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding…Read more
  •  33
    Content, meaning and truth
    with Tobies Grimaltos
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2). 2009.
    No abstract
  •  33
    La Nau Del coneixement
    Theoria 19 (3): 357-359. 2004.
  •  29
  •  29
    Alvarez. 2010. Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 26 (2): 245-247. 2011.
  •  27
    Alternativas, responsabilidad Y respuesta a razones
    Ideas Y Valores 58 (141): 45-65. 2009.
    El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (ppa) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a éste, inspirados en el que diseñó, hace ya cuarenta años, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras secciones resumen el estado de la cuestión. A partir de la cuar..
  •  25
    Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility
    Critica 38 (114): 3-20. 2006.
    In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which they w…Read more
  •  24
    Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2): 245-247. 2011.
  •  22
    Naturalism and Normativity (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (3): 239-240. 1996.
  •  22
    La nau del coneixement (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3): 357-359. 2004.
    Tras su prematura muerte, se ha escrito mucho sobre la personalidad filosófica y política de Josep Lluís Blasco. Siendo sin duda importantes y admirables estos aspectos, para mí fue sobre todo una persona amiga, buena y amable, en el sentido literal de este término, y cuya pérdida me ha producido un desconsuelo irreparable. Así, la redacción de estas líneas no es para mí un mero ejercicio profesional, sino un deber de gratitud y afecto.
  •  22
    Creencia, significado y escepticismo
    Ideas Y Valores 53 (125): 23-47. 2004.
    Davidson’s antisceptical considerations, like Putnam’s, are transcendentalin character: they start from facts that the sceptic has to accept, and areintended to show that those facts would not be such if the scepticalhypotheses were true. It is doubtful that these considerations are finallysuccessfu..
  •  22
    On Action
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 498-500. 1991.
  •  18
    Alternatives, Responsibility and Reasons-Responsiveness
    Ideas Y Valores 58 (141): 45-65. 2009.
    This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections provide a summary of the state of the art. In the remaining sections, the counterexamples to pap o Widerker’s and Pereboom’s are successively presented and discussed. We hold that both examples breach at least one otwo conditions that are required in order to refute pap, namely, th…Read more
  •  17
    Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism
    with Tobies Grimaltos
    Philosophical Issues 10 (1): 386-394. 2000.