•  640
    Sinopsis de "El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico"
    Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1): 83-89. 2018.
    Précis of El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico En este libro nos hemos planteado varios objetivos. En primer lugar, ofrecer al lector una guía o mapa que le oriente en el complejo territorio del debate sobre el libre albedrío. En segundo lugar, abogar por una determinada concepción del libre albedrío, a saber, el libertarismo, frente a otras posibles, en especial el compatibilismo. En tercer lugar, defender la existencia del libre albedrío frente a diversos desafíos, de tipos también diverso…Read more
  •  375
    Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?
    Journal of Philosophy 104 (9): 475-486. 2007.
    This paper is a critical comment on an article of David Widerker which also appeared in the Journal of Philosophy. In this article, Wideker held, against positions previously defended by him, that in was possible to design effective counterexamples, in the line initiated by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, to the so-called “Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. The core of my criticism of Widerker is to deny that agents, in his putative counterexamples, are morally responsible for their decisions, ow…Read more
  •  361
    Respuestas a los comentaristas
    Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1): 127-147. 2018.
    Replies to commentators Respuestas a los comentarios críticos de Carlos Patarroyo, Mirja Pérez de Calleja y Pablo Rychter.
  •  296
    A Modest Argument Against Scepticism
    Quaderns de Filosofia 7 (1): 33-43. 2020.
    In this paper we don’t intend to show, against the sceptic, that most of our everyday beliefs about the external world are cases of knowledge. What we do try to show is that it is more rational to hold that most of such beliefs are actually cases of knowledge than to deny them this status, as the external world sceptic does. In some sense, our point of view is the opposite of Hume’s, who held that reason clearly favours scepticism about the independent existence of an external world rather than …Read more
  •  295
    Libertad, responsabilidad y razones morales
    Isegoría 17 59-71. 1997.
    Sila elección está causada por factores ajenos a la voluntad del agente, la libertad y la responsabilidad moral parecen perder su base. Pero si la elección carece de causas, se convierte en un acto irracional y, con ello, irresponsable. La salida de este dilema consiste en advertir la importancia de las razones morales en la deliberación práctica. De acuerdo con la tesis central del presente trabajo, la sensibilidad hacia las razones morales es una condición necesaria de la libertad y la respons…Read more
  •  281
    Davidson’s famous 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” contains, in nuce, the main lines of Davidson’s philosophy of action and mind. It also contains the seeds of some major problems of Davidson’s thought in these fields. I shall defend, following Davidson, that rationalization or reasons explanation is a species of causal explanation, but I will be contending, against Davidson’s approach, that causality is best viewed, in this kind of explanation, as an integral aspect of justification it…Read more
  •  276
    Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility
    Critica 38 (114): 3-20. 2006.
    In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which they w…Read more
  •  244
    Justificación, causalidad y acción intencional
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 13 (2): 349-365. 1998.
    Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito c…Read more
  •  236
    In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2. After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzi…Read more
  •  233
    Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism
    Philosophical Issues 10 (1): 386-394. 2000.
    In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification does not have the sceptical consequences that Fumerton sees into it. We think Hookway is right in holding this. However, after commenting on his main considerations for this thesis, we shall develop an independent line of argument which reinforces the same conclusion.
  •  220
    SECCIÓN MONOGRÁFICA: Knowledge, Memory and Perception. Presentation
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2): 125-132. 2010.
    This paper is a presentation and critical introduction to the monographic section “Knowledge, Memory and Perception”. Three of the papers included in this section deal with questions concerning the sources and forms of empirical knowledge. Two of them (Olga Fernández, Jordi Fernández) focus on the problem of the intentional content of perception and of episodic memory, respectively. Manuel Liz, in turn, intends to develop a stable version of direct realism about perception. Murali Ramachandran, …Read more
  •  219
    Free Will and Open Alternatives
    Disputatio 9 (45): 167-191. 2017.
    In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence acco…Read more
  •  186
    On the very idea of a robust alternative
    Critica 43 (128): 3-26. 2011.
    According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding…Read more
  •  156
    Sentimientos y teoría de la acción
    Isegoría 25 19-40. 2001.
    En el presente trabajo sostenemos que la concepción de la intencionalidad en la teoría de la acción más ampliamente aceptada en la actualidad hace difícil una comprensión adecuada del papel de las emociones en la génesis e interpretación de la acción. La asimilación de las emociones a actitudes intencionales descuida lo que cabría llamar su contenido emocional y pasa por alto importantes diferencias entre su contenido intencional y el de las actitudes intencionales paradigmáticas, como creencias…Read more
  •  141
    My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a recent Frankfurt case, Pereboom's "Tax Evasion". After presenting the essentials of my defense of PAP and applying it to this case, I go on to consider several objections that have been (or might be) raised against it and argue that they don't succeed. I conclude…Read more
  •  131
    Was Descartes an Individualist? A Critical Discussion of W. Ferraiolo's" Individualism and Descartes"
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2): 77-85. 1997.
    In his article 'Individualism and Descartes' (Teorema, vol. 16, pp. 71-86), William Ferraiolo puts into question the widely accepted interpretation of Descartes as an individualist about mental content. In this paper, I defend this interpretation of Descartes thought against Ferraiolo's objections. I hold, first, that the interpretation is not historically misguided. Second, I try to show that Descartes’s endorsement of anti-individualism would lead either to depriving skeptical hypotheses of th…Read more
  •  125
    Boghossian's reduction of compatibilism
    Philosophical Issues 9 243-251. 1998.
    In his paper “What the externalist can know a priori”, Paul Boghossian rejects the compatibility between self-knowledge and content externalism by arguing that compatibilists are committed to the absurd view that a subject can know, by reasoning purely a priori, substantive truths about the world, such as that water exists. In this paper I try to show that Boghossian’s incompatibilist argument does not succeed. According to Boghossian, it is enough, for an externalist to reach the undesired conc…Read more
  •  118
    Creencia, significado y escepticismo
    Ideas Y Valores 53 (125): 23-47. 2004.
    Davidson’s antisceptical considerations, like Putnam’s, are transcendental in character: they start from facts that the sceptic has to accept, and are intended to show that those facts would not be such if the sceptical hypotheses were true. It is doubtful that these considerations are finally successful. However, I do not think that Davidson was really interested in a detailed refutation of scepticism. His interest focused instead on the context which gives rise to it: the Cartesian image of th…Read more
  •  106
    Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content
    In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind, Csli Publications. pp. 773-800. 2003.
    In this paper I address the question whether self-knowledge is compatible with an externalist individuation of mental content. Against some approaches, I consider self-knowledge as a genuine cognitive achievement. Though it is neither incorrigible nor infallible, self-knowledge is direct, a priori (no based on empirical investigation), presumptively true and authoritative. The problem is whether self-knowledge, so understood, is compatible with externalism. My answer will be affirmative. I will …Read more
  •  106
    Memoria y justificación: Hookway y Fumerton sobre el escepticismo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 203-210. 2000.
    En su artículo de 2000, Hookway pretende argumentar que el principio de justificación inferencial de Fumerton no tiene las consecuencias escépticas que Fumerton observa en él. Nosotros consideramos que Hookway está en lo cierto. Sin embargo, después de hacer algunos comentarios acerca de sus principales consideraciones a favor de esta tesis, desarrollamos una línea argumentativa independiente que refuerce esa misma conclusión.
  •  95
    Naturalism and Normativity (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (3): 239-240. 1996.
    Review of E. Villanueva (ed.), Naturalism and Normativity, Atascadero, Ridgeview, 1993
  •  94
    Belief, Content, and Cause
    with Tobies Grimaltos
    European Review of Philosophy 2. 1997.
  •  82
    Belief, content, and cause
    with Tobies Grimaltos
    European Review of Philosophy 2 159-171. 1997.
    In some important papers, and especially in his 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', John Perry has argued that we should draw a clear distinction between two aspects of belief: its causal role in action, on the one hand, and its semantic content (the proposition that is believed), on the other. According to Perry, beliefs with the same semantic content (with the same truth conditions) may have a very different causal influence on the subject¿s action. In this paper, we show that Perry's ar…Read more
  •  66
    Naturalism and normativity (review)
    Theoria 11 (3): 239-240. 1996.
  •  55
    We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility. Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility,…Read more
  •  55
    This new textbook is an exceptionally clear and concise introduction to the philosophy of action, suitable for students interested in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of social sciences. Moya begins by considering the problem of agency: how are we to understand the distinction between actions and happenings, between actions we perform and things that happen to us? Moya outlines and examines a range of philosophical responses to this problem. He also develops his own original view, treat…Read more
  •  52
    Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief
    Philosophical Explorations 12 (2). 2009.
    Research on moral responsibility and the related problem of free will is among the liveliest areas in contemporary analytical philosophy. Traditionally, these problems have been dealt with in conne...
  •  47
    Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action - by Maria Alvarez (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2): 245-247. 2011.
  •  42
    A Proposal About Intentional Action
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 55-63. 2000.
    In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The proposal recommends it…Read more