My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes only if a proper definition of a priori is to be worked out such as to cover blue being opposite to yellow as invariant fact of perceptual knowledge
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept another alternative analytic in Bolzano and Austrian School sense; to be combined with the difference between formal and material ontology
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view A justification process should be construed as grounded on the subject's refusal/acceptance of what it is not possible that appear to a her given some phenomenal conditions which on the objective side are constrained by which things gain access to the phenomenal world. Having a blu spot located in the visual field requires de re a surface and rules out it to become yellow in a smooth way.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism It is not matter of having real or mental properties but of gaining access to invariances (object-side) through trasformations induced either merely by perceptual-motor activities or by methodically constrained procedures
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept both
Mental content: internalism and externalism The question is too unclear to answer It depends upon what is meant by "content" and which sorts of conditions of truth/satisfaction it is identified with.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept another alternative phenomenologial realism as the way a Sachverhalt looks like to an agent suggesting way of action and constraints about what it is possible to be carried out (see Wertheimer on ethics axioms and structural contexts of experience)
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept another alternative Non conceptual and phenomenally grounded judgement tuned with structural and interactive conditions of mutual cooperation (nozick + gestalt theory)
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Reject all Phenomenological realism (as Epstein-Hatfield dubs the phenomenological explanation of perception in the Gestaltist tradition)
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: biological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death The question is too unclear to answer
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Agnostic/undecided
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible