•  55
    In this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be stated as follows: Causation:c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon H iff a) c is process-connected to e, and b) e security-depends on c within H. More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events – the cause c and…Read more
  •  61
    Hasteners and delayers: why rains don’t cause fires
    Philosophical Studies 175 (7): 1557-1576. 2018.
    We typically judge that hasteners are causes of what they hasten, while delayers are not causes of what they delay. These judgements, I suggest, are sensitive to an underlying metaphysical distinction. To see this, we need to pay attention to a relation that I call positive security-dependence, where an event E security-depends positively on an earlier event C just in case E could more easily have failed to occur if C had not occurred. I suggest that we judge that an event C is a cause of a late…Read more
  •  77
    Hasteners and delayers: why rains don’t cause fires
    Philosophical Studies 1-20. 2017.
    We typically judge that hasteners are causes of what they hasten, while delayers are not causes of what they delay. These judgements, I suggest, are sensitive to an underlying metaphysical distinction. To see this, we need to pay attention to a relation that I call positive security-dependence, where an event E security-depends positively on an earlier event C just in case E could more easily have failed to occur if C had not occurred. I suggest that we judge that an event C is a cause of a late…Read more