•  1037
    Synesthesia vs. crossmodal illusions
    In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New Essays on Synaesthesia, Oxford University Press. pp. 45-58. 2017.
    We can discern two opposing viewpoints regarding synesthesia. According to the first, it is an oddity, an outlier, or a disordered condition. According to the second, synesthesia is pervasive, driving creativity, metaphor, or language itself. Which is it? Ultimately, I favor the first perspective, according to which cross-sensory synesthesia is an outlying condition. But the second perspective is not wholly misguided. My discussion has three lessons. First, synesthesia is just one of a variety o…Read more
  •  433
    Senses as Capacities
    Multisensory Research 34 233-259. 2021.
    This paper presents an account of the senses and what differentiates them that is compatible with richly multisensory perception and consciousness. According to this proposal, senses are ways of perceiving. Each sense is a subfaculty that comprises a collection of perceptual capacities. What each sense shares and what differentiates one sense from another is the manner in which those capacities are exercised. Each way of perceiving involves a distinct type of information gathering, individuated …Read more
  •  338
    Object Perception: Vision and Audition
    Philosophy Compass 3 (4): 803-829. 2008.
    Vision has been the primary focus of naturalistic philosophical research concerning perception and perceptual experience. Guided by visual experience and vision science, many philosophers have focused upon theoretical issues dealing with the perception of objects. Recently, however, hearing researchers have discussed auditory objects. I present the case for object perception in vision, and argue that an analog of object perception occurs in auditory perception. I propose a notion of an auditory …Read more
  •  308
    Seeing what you hear: Cross-modal illusions and perception
    Philosophical Issues 18 (1): 316-338. 2008.
    Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which …Read more
  •  276
    Sounds and events
    In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 26--49. 2009.
    I argue that sounds are best conceived not as pressure waves that travel through a medium, nor as physical properties of the objects ordinarily thought to be the sources of sounds, but rather as events of a certain kind. Sounds are particular events in which a surrounding medium is disturbed or set into wavelike motion by the activities of a body or interacting bodies. This Event View of sounds provides for a uni- ?ed perceptual account of several pervasive sound phenomena, including transmissio…Read more
  •  262
    Perception and Multimodality
    In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists of perception by custom have investigated individual sense modalities in relative isolation from each other. However, perceiving is, in a number of respects, multimodal. The traditional sense modalities should not be treated as explanatorily independent. Attention to the multimodal aspects of perception challenges common assumptions about the content and phenomenology of perception, and about the individuation and psychological nature of sense modalities. Mu…Read more
  •  252
    Perceiving the locations of sounds
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1): 123-140. 2010.
    Frequently, we learn of the locations of things and events in our environment by means of hearing. Hearing, I argue, is a locational mode of perceiving with a robustly spatial phenomenology. I defend three proposals. First, audition furnishes one with information about the locations of things and happenings in one’s environment because auditory experience itself has spatial content—auditory experience involves awareness of space. Second, we hear the locations of things and events by or in hearin…Read more
  •  238
    Multisensory evidence
    Philosophical Issues 30 (1): 238-256. 2020.
    It is tempting to think that one’s perceptual evidence comprises just what issues from perceiving with each of the respective sensory modalities. However, empirical, rational, and phenomenological considerations show that one’s perceptual evidence can outstrip what one possesses due to perceiving with each separate sense. Some novel perceptual evidence stems from the coordinated use of multiple senses. This paper argues that some perceptual evidence in this respect is distinctively multisensory.
  •  228
    Echoes
    The Monist 90 (3): 403-414. 2007.
    Echo experiences are illusory experiences of ordinary primary sounds. Just as there is no new object that we see at the surface of a mirror, there is no new sound that we hear at a reflecting surface. The sound that we hear as an echo just is the original primary sound, though its perception involves illusions of place, time, and qualities. The case of echoes need not force us to adopt a conception according to which sounds are persisting object-like particulars that travel through space
  •  210
    Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2009.
    Sounds and Perception brings together original essays on auditory perception and the nature of sounds - an emerging area of interest in the philosophy of mind and perception, and in the metaphysics of sensible qualities. The essays discuss a wide range of issues, including the nature of sound, the spatial aspects of auditory experience, hearing silence, musical experience, and the perception of speech; a substantial introduction by the editors serves to contextualise the essays and make connecti…Read more
  •  209
    Against hearing meanings
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245): 783-807. 2011.
    Listening to speech in a language you know differs phenomenologically from listening to speech in an unfamiliar language, a fact often exploited in debates about the phenomenology of thought and cognition. It is plausible that the difference is partly perceptual. Some contend that hearing familiar language involves auditory perceptual awareness of meanings or semantic properties of spoken utterances; but if this were so, there must be something distinctive it is like auditorily to perceptually e…Read more
  •  198
    The world of sounds
    The Philosophers' Magazine 45 (45): 63-69. 2009.
    Audition, like vision, is a rich source of information about the environment, and we learn a great deal through hearing. Hearing helps us to negotiate oursurroundings, to a degree that is obscured by preoccupation with the visual. Hearing sounds allows us to access music and spoken language, and thus holds strong emotional and communicative interest for humans.
  •  191
    Objects for multisensory perception
    Philosophical Studies 173 (5): 1269-1289. 2016.
    Object perception deploys a suite of perceptual capacities that constrains attention, guides reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for perception—perceptual objects—are the targets of such capacities. Characterizing perceptual objects for multisensory perception faces two puzzles. First is the diversity of objects across sensory modalities. Second is the unity of multisensory perceptual objects. This paper resolves the puzzles. Objects for perception…Read more
  •  188
    Lessons from beyond vision (sounds and audition)
    Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 143-160. 2011.
    Recent work on non-visual modalities aims to translate, extend, revise, or unify claims about perception beyond vision. This paper presents central lessons drawn from attention to hearing, sounds, and multimodality. It focuses on auditory awareness and its objects, and it advances more general lessons for perceptual theorizing that emerge from thinking about sounds and audition. The paper argues that sounds and audition no better support the privacy of perception’s objects than does vision; that…Read more
  •  186
    Sounds: a philosophical theory
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    ... ISBN0199215928 ... Abstract: Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science traditionally has focused on a visual model. This book presents a systematic treatment of sounds and auditory experience. It demonstrates how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships among multiple sense modalities enriches our understanding of perception. It articulates the central questions that comprise the philosophy of sound, and p…Read more
  •  148
    Not all perceptual experience is modality specific
    In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities, Oxford University Press. pp. 133-165. 2015.
    This paper presents forms of multimodal perceptual experience that undermine the claim that each aspect of perceptual experience is modality specific. In particular, it argues against the thesis that all phenomenal character is modality specific (even making an allowance for co-conscious unity). It concludes that a multimodal perceptual episode may have phenomenal features beyond those that are associated with the specific modalities.
  •  139
    XIII—Hearing Properties, Effects or Parts?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3): 375-405. 2011.
    Sounds are audible, and sound sources are audible. What is the audible relation between audible sounds and audible sources? Common talk and philosophy suggest three candidates. The first is that sounds audibly are properties instantiated by their sources. I argue that sounds are audible individuals and thus are not audibly instantiated by audible sources. The second is that sounds audibly are effects of their sources. I argue that auditory experience presents no compelling evidence that sounds a…Read more
  •  126
    Speech Perception
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Is speech special? This paper evaluates the evidence that speech perception is distinctive when compared with non-linguistic auditory perception. It addresses the phenomenology, contents, objects, and mechanisms involved in the perception of spoken language. According to the account it proposes, the capacity to perceive speech in a manner that enables understanding is an acquired perceptual skill. It involves learning to hear language-specific types of ethologically significant sounds. According…Read more
  •  126
    The Multisensory Character of Perception
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (10): 551-569. 2015.
    My thesis is that perceptual awareness is richly multisensory. I argue for this conclusion on the grounds that certain forms of multisensory perceptual experience are incompatible with the claim that each aspect of a perceptual experience is associated with some specific sensory modality or another. First, I explicate what it is for some feature of a conscious perceptual episode to be modality specific. Then, I argue based on philosophical and experimental evidence that some novel intermodal fea…Read more
  •  119
    Intermodal binding awareness
    In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 73-103. 2014.
    It is tempting to hold that perceptual experience amounts to a co-conscious collection of visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory episodes. If so, each aspect of perceptual experience on each occasion is associated with a specific modality. This paper, however, concerns a core variety of multimodal perceptual experience. It argues that there is perceptually apparent intermodal feature binding. I present the case for this claim, explain its consequences for theorizing about perceptual…Read more
  •  118
    Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a flute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have
  •  114
  •  110
    On Privations and Their Perception
    Acta Analytica 26 (2): 175-186. 2011.
    Despite its admirable bottom-up methodology, Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things (OUP, 2008) raises difficult theoretical questions concerning the metaphysics and perception of absences. Metaphysical difficulties include how to individuate, count, locate, and classify absences, and what determines their features. Perceptual difficulties include how to distinguish experiences of absences and presences, especially when nonveridical, and what subjects contribute to perceptual experience according to …Read more
  •  109
    Perception
    In W. Ramsey & K. Frankish (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science, Cambridge University Press. 2012.
    To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish
  •  99
    Grades of Multisensory Awareness
    Mind and Language 32 (2): 155-181. 2017.
    Psychophysics and neuroscience demonstrate that different sensory systems interact and influence each other. Perceiving involves extensive cooperation and coordination among systems associated with sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. Nonetheless, it remains unclear in what respects conscious perceptual awareness is multisensory. This paper distinguishes six differing varieties of multisensory awareness, explicates their consequences, and thereby elucidates the multisensory nature of percept…Read more
  •  96
    Constructing a Theory of Sounds
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5 247-270. 2010.
    Vision has dominated philosophical thinking about perceptual experience and the nature of its objects. Color has long been the focus of debates about the metaphysics of sensible qualities, and philosophers have struggled to articulate the conditions on the visual experience of mind-independent objects. With few notable exceptions, "visuocentrism" has shaped our understanding of the nature and functions of perception, and of our conception of its objects. The predominant line of thought from the …Read more
  •  95
    Sensing, the Senses, and Attention
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 485-491. 2017.