•  4
    On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects
    Princeton University Press. 2009.
    Caspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present."…Read more
  •  8
    A Puzzle about Other-directed Time-bias 1
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 269-277. 2008.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? ‘Sometimes yes, sometimes no’—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
  •  19
    Risk and radical uncertainty in HIV research
    Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (2): 87-89. 2017.
  •  47
    On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 2003.
    In this dissertation I spell out, and make a case for, egocentric presentism, a view about what it is for a thing to be me. I argue that there are benefits associated with adopting this view. ;The chief benefit comes in the sphere of ethics. Many of us, when we think about what to do, feel a particular kind of ambivalence. On the one hand we are moved by an impartial concern for the greater good. We feel the force of considerations of the form: 'all things considered, doing...will make things be…Read more
  •  58
    Torture – Does Timing Matter?
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4): 385-394. 2014.
  •  19
    Review of Saul Smilansky, Ten Moral Paradoxes (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5). 2009.
  •  4
    Notes
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 99-106. 2009.
  •  71
    A puzzle about other-directed time-bias
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2). 2008.
    Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
  •  286
    Take the sugar
    Analysis 70 (2): 237-247. 2010.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  5
    References
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 107-110. 2009.
  •  76
    The ethics of morphing
    Philosophical Studies 145 (1). 2009.
    Here's one piece of practical reasoning: "If I do this then a person will reap some benefits and suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits outweigh the costs. So I ought to do it." Here's another: "If I do this then one person will reap some benefits and another will suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits to the one person outweigh the costs to the other. So I ought to do it." Many influential philosophers say that there is something dubious about the second piece of reasoning. They say t…Read more
  •  97
    Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time
    Journal of Philosophy 104 (7): 350-373. 2007.
    This is about the metaphysics of the self and ethical egoism. It can serve as a preview for my manuscript-in-progress below.
  •  153
  •  329
    This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.
  •  115
    Should We Wish Well to All?
    Philosophical Review 125 (4): 451-472. 2016.
    Some moral theories tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an interaction with a …Read more
  •  76
    Rationality and the distant needy
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2). 2007.
    This is my argument for the claim that morality is very demanding indeed. In a nutshell: being consistent is harder than you think.
  • Introduction
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press. 2009.
  •  4
    Acknowledgments
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press. 2009.
  •  45
    The Limits of Kindness
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Caspar Hare presents a bold and original approach to questions of what we ought to do, and why we ought to do it. He breaks with tradition to argue that we can tackle difficult problems in normative ethics by starting with a principle that is humble and uncontroversial. Being moral involves wanting particular other people to be better off
  •  4
    7 Skepticism and Humility
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 91-98. 2009.
  •  128
    Obligations to Merely Statistical People
    Journal of Philosophy 109 (5-6): 378-390. 2012.
  •  107
    Realism About Tense and Perspective
    Philosophy Compass 5 (9): 760-769. 2010.
    On one view of time past, present and future things exist, but their being past, present or future does not consist in their standing in before‐ and after‐relations to other things. So, for example, the event of the signing of the Magna Carta is past, and its being so does not consist in, or reduce to, its coming before the events of 2010.In this paper I discuss arguments for and against this view and view in its near vicinity, perspectival realism. I suggest that perspectival realism is a bette…Read more
  •  7
    Index
    In On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, Princeton University Press. pp. 111-114. 2009.