Cecilia Tohaneanu

The paper attempts to outline the actual academic debates around the concept of PR ethics. The first part aims to show the intimate link between professionalism and ethics as well as their bearing on the reputation of the PR field. Whether and how ethical public relations are possible is the main issue analyzed in the second part of the article. The two paradigms of public relations, “the attorney-adversary system” and “the two-way symmetrical model”, are put face to face in order to better understand the arguments of their proponents as to the way of approaching to the ethical matters. A main concern of the third part is to answer the question if something is wrong with situational ethics. The problem is approached in the light of virtue ethics, which is itself situational in Aristotel’s sense of the term. In the final part, the paper suggests the possibility to use W. D. Ross’s pluralist deontology as a conceptual structure from which to build a practical model for the analysis of moral dilemmas in the PR practice.

There is an obvious parallel between foundationalism, which ignores history in working out the conditions of knowledge, and radical relativism, which contends that by virtue of its own historical character there is no way to choose among different interpretations, all of which are “equally good.” Might it not be, rather, that the recent historicist attack on the very idea of rationality is as damaging as foundationalist objections against the plurality of conceptual schemes or frameworks? Can philosophy maintain the traditional distinction between the form and content of knowledge, between rationality and historicity _ between doxa and episteme?

No matter how it is viewed, as a plausible version of anti-utilitarianism or of non-consequentialist, or even as a plausible version of deontology, the theory of prima facie duties certainly makes W. D. Ross one of the most important moral philosopher of the twentieth-century. By outlining his pluralistic deontology, this paper attempts to argue for a positive answer to the question of whether Ross’s theory can offer a solution to the issue of conflicting duties. If such a solution is convincing, as I believe it is, it would indicate the possibility to justify within the deontological framework, i.e., without committing to the principle of good-maximizing, those “hard cases” where people should break a promise or other (prima facie) duty in order to prevent a disastrous outcome. The theory of prima facie duties might then suggest that deontology and utilitarianism would likely be reconcilable.

The traditional split between rationality and historicity, concept and intuition, the form and content of knowledge has brought about an inappropriate approaching to humanities and social sciences. Presenting the main effects of such split, this paper aims at arguing the need to consider both the “empiric” and the “interpretive” as equally relevant for understanding our human world. It is eventually a meta-theoretical pleading for reconciling epistemology and ontology within a theory of humanities and social sciences able to avoid the two kinds of reductionism, foundationalist and textualist, related to traditional (empiricist) epistemology and respectively, to postmodernist hermeneutics.

Analyzing the constitutionality of a law is a process of constitutional interpretation which does not limit itself to comparing two texts in order to see whether they are concordant or not. The nature of constitutional interpretation is the subject of this article, a subject that is dealt with from the perspective of the dispute between originalism and non-originalism (interpretivism) prevalent within the contemporary philosophy of law, especially the American one. The article offers a synthetic view on some of the most controversial issues pertaining to the theory and methodology of contemporary constitutional interpretation, such as: whether the interpretation of the Constitution is guided by the founders’intentions or by the text’s own words; whether the meaning of the Constitution is determined by the intentions, aims or values of the founders’ generation or by those of the contemporary generation? What are the grounds that justify the authority of the constitutional text, in other words, does this authority derive from its constraining capacityorfromitsabilitytobestowdemocraticlegitimacy?Constitutional interpretation must concentrate on the text or on the interpreter? Do the judges discover or build the constitutional meaning? In other words, is it the past or the present that guides the interpretation? Is the original interpretation the legitimate one or are legitimate the later interpretations of the constitutional text?

This paper aims at emphasizing the relevance of scrutinizing the link between Heidegger’s theory of Being and his Nazi commitment. Significant investigations of such a link, beginning with that of Victor Farias, have challenged the „official” view that Heidegger’s theory of Being is politically neutral. That this theory could not have been deprived of political intentions is proven by Heidegger’s own view on philosophy as a search that stems from life and ends in life, namely as a Dasein’s way of life. Since fundamental ontology (theory) and existential analytic (practice) cannot be separated, exploring the relationship between them is even more necessary.