Cecilia Trifogli

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Introduction to the Metaphysical Thought of John Peckham by Franziska van BurenCecilia TrifogliVAN BUREN, Franziska. An Introduction to the Metaphysical Thought of John Peckham. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2022. 138 pp. Paper, $20.00John Peckham was a prominent philosopher and theologian of the second half of the thirteenth century. His work, however, [End Page 370] has not yet attracted the attention it deserves. Franziska van Buren’s book marks a substantial step in the direction of filling this gap in the scholarship by making available in English translation and with a detailed commentary some important philosophical writings of Peckham. They deal with fundamental aspects of his metaphysical thought and provide clear evidence of the sophistication and subtlety of his philosophical mind.The texts translated are a selection of questions from Peckham’s Quodlibeta and the whole short treatise Summa de esse et essentia. The selection from the Quodlibeta consists of questions 2.7 and 2.8, on angelic cognition; question 1.3, on human cognition; question 4.1, on matter; question 3.13, on membership in a genus; question 4.36, on membership in a species; question 4.15, on matter in angels. The topics covered in the Summa are: matter and form; the being of the thing; the unity of first matter; the cause of individuation; seminal reasons; the universals; the twofold genus: logical and natural. The English translation is accompanied by the Latin text on the facing page. For the Quodlibeta, the Latin text is the critical edition of Delorme and Etzkorn and for the Summa the transcription of Delorme.The translation is prefaced by two introductory chapters: the first devoted to a concise presentation of the figure of John Peckham and the second to an extensive presentation of the translated texts.Chapter 1 opens with some basic biographical information about Peckham: his entering the Franciscan Order at Oxford and the great influence that two major figures, Roger Bacon and Robert Grosseteste, exerted on him at an early stage of his scholarly career; his move to Paris to study theology with Bonaventure and his disputes with Thomas Aquinas; his position as Archbishop of Canterbury from 1279 until his death in 1292. The second section of the chapter, “The Problem of Aristotelianism,” criticizes the traditional view according to which Peckham was hostile to Aristotle’s philosophy. As van Buren points out, the selection of translated texts clearly shows that Peckham relies on Aristotle in crucial contexts. Decisive evidence of Peckham’s Aristotelianism—discovered by van Buren herself—is that he wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics (preserved in a Florence manuscript but not yet studied). The third and last section of the chapter is about the most relevant background of Peckham’s philosophical thought: the teaching of Bonaventure. Van Buren’s presentation focuses on topics in Bonaventure’s philosophy that are of special importance for the understanding of the translated texts by Peckham: universal hylomorphism, universality of forms, individuation, and plurality of forms.Chapter 2 gives a very helpful overview and explanation of the main points of Peckham’s discussion in the translated texts. It is divided into two main parts: the first about the Quodlibetal questions and the second about the Summa.In the following paragraphs, I will give a brief overview of van Buren’s treatment of the Quodlibetal questions and of the Summa. [End Page 371]Questions 2.7–8 are about angelic cognition—they deal with the specific issue of how angels are able to cognize particulars. The problem here is that particulars are not the kinds of things that can affect the angelic mind, which, unlike the human mind, is in pure actuality. In van Buren’s reconstruction, Peckham solves this problem by defining a special role of particulars in angelic cognition: While they do not affect the angelic mind, they provide it with the occasion for the formation of the similitude required for their cognition starting from the cognition of the universal and of matter that the angelic mind already has in itself.Question 1.3 is about human cognition of universals. The problem here is about how the human mind can form an intelligible species...

"Geoffrey of Aspall, who died in 1287 and was master of Arts by 1262, was active at Oxford in the years 1255 to 1265. He wrote commentaries on several Aristotelian works, and was certainly a major protagonist of the introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford. In particular, he produced a very extensive question-style commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which contains important discussions of the fundamental topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy, like matter, form, natural agency, causes, change, the infinite and the continuum, time, the eternity of the world, self-movers. Aspall's Physics commentary shows the influence of Grosseteste's metaphysics of light and of Roger Bacon's view on the physical role of intentional species, as well as a strong inclination to ontological realism. Aspall's commentary on Aristotle's Physics is edited here in two volumes, which together form the first critical edition of this work. The Latin text is accompanied by a facing English translation, and the text is extensively cross-referenced and provided with scholarly apparatus. The detailed introduction guides the reader through the intricacies of the textual transmission of Aspall's commentary, and also presents the main topics discussed in this commentary. The appendix to the edition makes available alternative versions of some sections of Aspall's commentary." --

Geoffrey of Aspall, who died in 1287 and was master of Arts by 1262, was active at Oxford in the years 1255 to1265. He wrote commentaries on several Aristotelian works, and was certainly a major protagonist of the introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford. In particular, he produced a very extensive question-style commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which contains important discussions of the fundamental topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy, like matter, form, natural agency, causes, change, the infinite and the continuum, time, the eternity of the world, self-movers. Aspall's Physics commentary shows the influence of Grosseteste's metaphysics of light and of Roger Bacon's view on the physical role of intentional species, as well as a strong inclination to ontological realism.Aspall's commentary on Aristotle's Physics is edited here in two volumes, which together form the first critical edition of this work. The Latin text is accompanied by a facing English translation, and the text is extensively cross-referenced and provided with scholarly apparatus. The detailed introduction guides the reader through the intricacies of the textual transmission of Aspall's commentary, and also presents the main topics discussed in this commentary. The appendix to the edition makes available alternative versions of some sections of Aspall's commentary.

This report is divided into two main parts, devoted to the Aristoteles Latinus and to the Editions of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle. The report on the Aristoteles Latinus sheds light on recent research on medieval Latin translations of Aristotle’s works. Among other things, it discusses the editions published in the context of the Aristoteles Latinus , and some recent studies and collective volumes on individual texts and translators. The report on Editions of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle gives information for each edition of a commentary on Aristotle that has been published in the last five years and on those editions that are about to be published or are in preparation or are planned to start within the next five years

Walter Burley is the author of a treatise, entitled De primo et ultimo instanti, which is regarded as the most popular medieval work on the problem of assigning first and last instants of being to permanent things. In this paper, however, the author does not deal with this treatise directly. She looks instead at Burley’s Physics commentary to see how he applies the ideas presented in De primo et ultimo instanti to the solution of an Aristotelian puzzle about the ceasing to be of the present instant. In Burley’s interpretation, the relevant question raised by the puzzle is whether the present instant ceases to be when it is or when it is not. While Aristotle’s argument quickly dismisses the first alternative as absurd, Burley defends it by appealing to the ‘expositions’ of sentences about ceasing. Given that the sentence ‘this instant ceases to be’ has two expositions— ‘this instant now is and immediately afterwards will not be’ or ‘this instant now is not and immediately beforehand was’ —Burley maintains that the sentence is true in exposition but not true in exposition, so that an instant ceases to be when it is and not when it is not.

In a passage of De Anima II, chapter 12, Aristotle makes a general claim about the senses, which is condensed in the formula that the senses are receptive of the sensible forms without the matter. While it is clear that this formula must play an important theoretical role in Aristotle’s account, it is far from clear what it exactly means. Its interpretation is still a focus of controversy among contemporary scholars. In this article the author presents the exegeses of this formula proposed by the two most authoritative commentators on De anima from the second half of the thirteenth century, namely, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Both commentators assume that with this formula and in particular with the qualification “without the matter” Aristotle intends to characterize an “intentional” reception of a form, and to contrast it with a “natural” reception, but they give different accounts of intentionality.

In his Physics commentary, Thomas Wylton reports and rejects an opinion about time that posits the existence of minimal times conceived of as indivisible parts of time. This opinion is in contrast with the view that time is continuous, the predominant view in the late Middle Ages. In this paper I first explain the notion of minimal time. I then focus on the relation between the existence of minimal times and the existence of minima naturalia in the extension of natural bodies. In particular, I present the two ways in which the author of the opinion in question deduces the existence of minimal times from the existence of minima naturalia in the extension of natural bodies. I also briefly present the reaction of Wylton against this opinion. I finally explain how in this opinion the position of minimal times is relevant to the problem of the existence of time. The Appendix to the paper contains Wylton's report of the opinion about minimal times

Giles of Rome maintains that the senses are passive powers and more specifically receptive powers, that is, powers to receive something from sensible objects. The items that the senses receive from sensible objects are intentional species of the corresponding sensible forms. This paper deals with Giles’s account of the cognitive role of intentional species in sense perception. The central question is how the intentional species of red received in the eyes is related to the act of seeing a red apple. Is such a species the act itself of seeing a red apple or rather something distinct from the act and causally related to it? And in the latter case, what kind of causality is involved? We shall see that Giles changed his mind on this subject, so that we have an early view and a mature view. His early view is that the intentional species is distinct from the corresponding sensory act and a cause of it, more precisely a formal cause. His mature view is that in the case of the external senses the intentional species is the same as the sensory act itself, whereas in the case of the internal senses two kinds of intentional species are involved, that is, that which is the same as the sensory act and another one that acts as a proxy for the sensible object.

Giles of Rome maintains that the senses are passive powers and more specifically receptive powers, that is, powers to receive something from sensible objects. The items that the senses receive from sensible objects are intentional species of the corresponding sensible forms. This paper deals with Giles’s account of the cognitive role of intentional species in sense perception. The central question is how the intentional species of red received in the eyes is related to the act of seeing a red apple. Is such a species the act itself of seeing a red apple or rather something distinct from the act and causally related to it? And in the latter case, what kind of causality is involved? We shall see that Giles changed his mind on this subject, so that we have an early view and a mature view. His early view is that the intentional species is distinct from the corresponding sensory act and a cause of it, more precisely a formal cause. His mature view is that in the case of the external senses the intentional species is the same as the sensory act itself, whereas in the case of the internal senses two kinds of intentional species are involved, that is, that which is the same as the sensory act and another one that acts as a proxy for the sensible object.

Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), or Averroes, is widely known as the unrivalled commentator on virtually all works by Aristotle. His commentaries and treatises were used as manuals for understanding Aristotelian philosophy until the Age of the Enlightenment. Both Averroes and the movement commonly known as 'Latin Averroism' have attracted considerable attention from historians of philosophy and science. Whereas most studies focus on Averroes' psychology, particularly on his doctrine of the 'unity of the intellect', Averroes' natural philosophy as a whole and its influence still remain largely unexplored. This volume aims to fill the gap by studying various aspects of Averroes' natural philosophical thought, in order to evaluate its impact on the history of philosophy and science between the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period.