Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Skip
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Skip
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Skip
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Skip
God: theism and atheism Accept: theism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Skip
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Skip
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Skip
Mental content: internalism and externalism Skip
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept an intermediate view Lean toward: hylomorphism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Skip
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Skip
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Skip
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: further-fact view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Skip
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Skip
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible