Celso de Oliveira Vieira

Heraclitus uses paradoxical language to present the relationship between opposites in his worldview. This mode of expression has generated much controversy. Some take the paradoxes as evidence of a contradictory identity of opposites (Barnes), while others propose a dynamic union through transformation without identity that avoids the contradiction (Graham). By examining B88 and B62, I seek to identify the stronger and weaker points of such readings. The contradictory identity reading thwarts the transformation between opposites. The dynamic reading offers a plausible alternative. However, it skips a characterization of how Heraclitus conceives of the transformation between opposites in physical terms. To fill this gap, I consider Heraclitus’ use of what I call the anti-cognate internal object in B62. I argue that ‘living the death and dying the life’ is a case of change as mixture, a popular conception among the early Presocratics. Upon closer examination, the anti-cognate internal object suggests that real contradictions belong to Heraclitus conception of change. The details reveal a philosophically compelling view.

The chapter presents the prototyping of a thinking routine designed to foster good inference habits in children ages 6 to 11. The prototyping was developed at Ninho, an educational project for children from underprivileged households in Brazil. The thinking routines by Ritchhart and colleagues (2006) served as our starting point. Following a Virtue Education (VE) approach, we supposed that the repeated application would conduce to habituation. In addition, to increase peer-to-peer interactions, the teacher applying the routines worked as a facilitator in a Community of Inquiry (CI). After six months of application, the results were partially successful. We identified that the repeated exposition to the magic question “What makes you say that?” made children more aware of the evidence supporting their assumptions. Furthermore, the interactions between peers made them recognize different perspectives. However, we also identified some shortcomings. Most of them seemed to arise from cognitive biases. At the individual level, belief perseverance kept children too attached to their first assumptions. They preferred self-serving rationalizations instead of accepting a counter-argument. At the group level, we identified problems of social contagion such as information cascades. The effects of a first opinion rhetorically voiced were hard to efface. Since none of the steps on the previous routines addressed these biases, we prototyped a routine to start filling this gap. Following Critical Thinking (CT) theorists, we added a step of structured instruction concerning one specific reasoning technique - the inference to the best explanation. Moreover, the recommendation of cognitive psychologists motivated the inclusion of some extra features to avoid groupthink biases. For instance, a visual table that juxtaposes contrasting arguments should facilitate comparative evaluations. Also, a star-based evaluation scale should help different individuals to discuss their assessments based on a common ground. As described in the end, the prototype with elements from VE, CI and CT presented promising results.

In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in Metaphysics Γ and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in Metaphysics K and Physics V. There, after re-stating several points that appear in Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression ‘living the death/dying the life’ in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive.

In the Cratylus, Plato criticizes the traditional rendering of Hades’ name as the ‘in-visible’ while in the Phaedo he endorses it. Despite this conflict, in both cases, the etymologies are used to oppose the negative characterization of this god by the tradition, just as prescribed in the Republic. Furthermore, both dialogues convey a similar description of Hades as an intellectual realm. Thus, there is an underlying conceptual coherence and a use of conflicting etymologies serving the same practical prescription. This article will verify if this scenario constitutes an instance of the serviceable lies presented in the Republic. Taking Hades’ different etymologizations as a case study, we will be able to better understand the justification for the pedagogical use of lies based on the complex interaction between souls with true and false beliefs. Two types of pedagogical lies emerge. Syrup lies characterize situations in which some true information is conveyed through an illegitimate but attractive cover such as etymologization or tales. In this way, they can capture the attention of souls who are hostage to false beliefs. Moreover, there is also the case for vaccine lies in which the illegitimate method used to convey some information has in itself a self-eroding element. Thus, those who receive the information are also encouraged to question the method in due course. After these determinations, it will be possible to evaluate how such a conception of lying scores morally.

The paper attempts to reconstruct Vlastos’ method of research into the history of philosophy using his Degrees of Reality as a case study. To do so, I rely on the extensive materials available in the Vlastos Archive. Through the palimpsest of superimposed revisions in his documents as well as the letters exchanged with his colleagues, I will go through the gestation of a whole new perspective in dealing with Plato’s conception of the reality of abstract objects. Furthermore, the focus on the process rather than on the results will provide an inside view on Vlastos’ ground-breaking use of analytical tools in developing research in the field of history of philosophy.

Dividido em duas partes o artigo tem o objetivo de determinar qual a função das sensações no processo de conhecimento prescrito por Heráclito. Essa primeira parte é dedicada ao uso direto dos sentidos, aquele sem nenhum tipo de mediação entre a coisa percebida e quem a percebe. Após o exame de fragmentos abordando principalmente os sentidos do olfato, paladar e tato são encontrados os requisitos para obtenção de uma sensação direta apropriada. Tudo começa na coisa percebida que para ser reconhecida propriamente dever ser percebida por um órgão apropriado. Esta apropriação é medida pela capacidade do órgão de distinguir a coisa segundo sua própria natureza. A sensação direta seria responsável pela etapa distintiva no processo de conhecimento que permitiria a identificação de opostos necessária à sua posterior união. O animal em que o órgão se encontra também é relevante no processo pois há indicações de que as sensações são geradas de acordo com a necessidade de cada espécie, um certo tipo de teleologia. Neste ponto o caso dos humanos torna-se particular pois a capacidade de alguma teoria da mente lhes permite identificar as diferenças percebidas em diferentes animais. Assim é introduzido um modo de indiretividade na sensação, ver o que os outros estão sentindo. Isto leva à segunda parte do artigo onde as sensações indiretas são examinadas

The article starts with two uses presented by Plato concerning the etymology of Hades' name. In the Phaedo, he follows the tradition and interprets the name as the 'in-visible'. In the Cratylus, on the other hand, he proposes a new reading of Hades as the 'all-knowing'. Despite this inconsistency, there is an anterior coherence in regard to the project of extinguishing the fear of death in the tradition. To understand these differences and similarities we recur to the Republic. In this dialogue, there is a political motivation to extinguish the fear of death amongst citizens. Fearing death would be prejudicial for their brave behaviour in battles. We also found a concession to the manipulative use of the etymologies in order to correct illusory beliefs of the people. These are taken as evidence that the superficial variation on the use of the etymologies of Hades is consistent if read under the framework of a political project. Nevertheless, this is not exempt from moral questions. One may ask if this kind of manipulation remains to be seen as wrong, who would be allowed to do it and in which cases. It follows an attempt to find Plato's answer to these questions and a discussion with the contemporary literature on the subject.

A proposta do texto é delinear como Heráclito e Platão lidaram com o problema de usar a linguagem para falar do movimento. A perspectiva ontológica de que eles partem é quase oposta. Heráclito vê o mundo como movimento contínuo enquanto, para Platão, o que está em movimento participa, em alguma medida, das Ideias estáticas. É deste ponto de vista que no Teeteto Sócrates encarrega os Heraclitianos de criarem um novo discurso caso queiram falar da sua concepção de mundo. A observação tem um tom crítico, mas não parece estar muito errada se consultarmos os fragmentos do pré-socrático. Em B1 Heráclito declara discorrer segundo a natureza. Utilizando isso como justificativa tomo B67 como um paradigma de como o Efésio repete a ordem do mundo na ordenação dos seus discursos. A primeira palavra, deus, seria o unificador, enquanto os pares de opostos subsequentes citados sem uso de conectivos demonstrariam esta união. Uma vez construída esta concepção retorno ao Teeteto onde Platão oferece outra estratégia de uso da língua para falar do movimento. Ao contrário de Heráclito, ele recorre aos sincategoremas para unir os opostos. Um mobilista deveria falar que algo é 'assim' e 'não assim' mostrando, desta maneira, o estatuto ambíguo das coisas. Como este estatuto não é reconhecido por Platão trata-se de uma crítica à ontologia mobilista. O passo final é ver como Platão usa a linguagem para falar da sua ontologia particular. O discurso usado para se referir às Ideias repete a estratégia de recorrer aos sincategoremas uma vez que a Ideia de algo é dita ser algo 'em si'. A conclusão é que enquanto Heráclito tenta suprimir sua linguagem das palavras que não têm referente além do discurso Platão recorre exatamente a elas para precisar sua referência

This article aims to throw light on a recurrent structural feature of Heraclitus' style that, it will be argued, serves as a tool to enrich interpretation of his fragments. Named after the bow image used by the philosopher in B51, the ‘bow composition’ will be presented as a narrative technique developed by Heraclitus to reveal his conception of the world. In B51 we read: οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαϕερόμενον ἑωυτῶι ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης (‘They don't understand how what is in variance agrees with itself, a reciprocal stretching harmony as in the bow and the lyre’). Following an assumption that will be defended later, I argue that Heraclitus attempts through his text to demonstrate how ‘what is in variance agrees with itself’. One of his strategies to this end would be the bow composition, a way to structure his statements in which its first and last terms share the same root but have subtle suffix or prefix differences in order to depict that while being related (ὁμολογέει) they still maintain some difference (διαϕερόμενον). By means of employing such structure to describe reality Heraclitus would imitate the world order in his word order by providing his audience with an analogy that once perceived in the text would teach them how to correctly interpret nature itself.