Chantal Bax

In this article I argue that Levinas can be read as a critic, not just of Heideggerian being, but also of being-with. After pointing out that the publication of the Black Notebooks only makes this criticism more interesting to revisit, I first of all discuss passages from both earlier and later writings in which Levinas explicitly takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that there is no self outside of a specific socio-historical community. I then explain how these criticisms are reflected in Levinas’s own account, arguing that Levinasian subjectivity and alterity are precisely defined by their not belonging to a larger unity; to the extent that they partake in a multi-personal collectivity, this does not take the form of a traditional community. In the final section, I look into a different and seemingly opposing argument Levinas makes against Heidegger: on the basis of the latter’s reflections on death, he argues that Dasein is anti-social rather than overly immersed in the socio-historical. Arguing that this rests on a misreading of Being and Time, I use this opportunity to raise questions about Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger and his “otherwise than being-with” more generally, for Levinas’s account runs into several problems as well. Yet as I will conclude, this in fact offers a valuable insight, not just for the present-day reception of Heidegger, but also for thinking community today. It indicates that a radical break with human situatedness does not automatically fare better than a firmly enrooted account of existence.

This volume explores the issues at the center of many historical and contemporary reflections on community and sociality in Continental philosophy. The essays reflect on the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, Arendt, Derrida, Badiou, Fanon, Baldwin, Nancy, Agamben and Laruelle. Continental Perspectives on Community brings the different approaches of these thinkers into conversation with each other. It discusses the possibility of how the concept of community can extend beyond the one and beyond any sense of unity and totality. Additionally, the book shows how notion of community in plurality is at the heart of ethical and political reflections on alterity and race, of political philosophical reflections on the exception, and of ontological reflections on what it means for humans to be social. In this way, it offers an important contribution to the examination of how a community can be thought today. This book will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on social, political, and cultural issues in Continental philosophy.

In philosophy, or in philosophy of the continental kind, “1968” has come to represent a specific type of thinking. Or, rather, it has come to mark the decline of one type of theorizing in favor of another, namely, the kind that is suspicious of all-embracing theories.1 Though the philosophers associated with the Paris upheavals are figures like Jean-Paul Sartre and Herbert Marcuse, around the same time several thinkers entered onto the stage (such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard) who were to make an entire career out of undermining the theoretical constructions of their predecessors. These then up-and-coming…

This article describes my VENI project on the reconceptualization of community. It argues that the idea of a socially situated subject has not become obsolete in times of globalization, but that a rethinking of the concept of community is now required: how to account for the simultaneous transience and persistence of belonging? It then explains that by staging a conversation between Jean-Luc Nancy and Stanley Cavell, an account can be developed that meets both criteria for thinking community today.

Although Wittgenstein is famously skeptical about the possibility of making substantial philosophical claims, he can be said to offer significant insights into the difference between inner and outer as well as the difference between self and other.1 He consistently reminds us that inner and outer are intimately connected instead of only causally related, as well as that the self—far from being a wholly independent entity—always already finds itself constituted by its relationships with others. In thus contesting the Cartesian view on subjectivity, however, Wittgenstein may appear to simply reduce the inner to the outer and the self to the other..

A significant part of Wittgenstein's later writings deal with psychological phenomena. Again and again he tries to show that thoughts, feelings, etc., cannot be understoodas objects or processes in some private inner realm. According to Wittgenstein the souldoes not reside inside of us, but should rather be located in between of us. Thus offering a new way of portraying several dichotomies (such as those between the inner and the outer, the public and the private, and the self and the other), Wittgenstein can be said to rethink our concept of the subject. Or should we rather say that he proposes to reduce the soul to the body, the personal to the communal — in other words, that he in fact tries to 'unthink' subjectivity? To answer this question, this article confronts Wittgenstein's 'psychology' with his 'theology'. For contrary to what he writes on the psyche, Wittgenstein stresses in his writings on religion the individual instead of the collective and the private instead of the public. By showing that Wittgenstein's theology is actually compatible with his psychology, it is argued that Wittgenstein cannot besaid to proclaim the 'death' of the subject