•  29
    According to Franz Brentano, every mental act includes a representation of itself. Hence, Brentano can be described as maintaining that: reflexivity, when it occurs, is included as a part in mental acts; and reflexivity always occurs. Brentano’s way of understanding the inclusion of reflexivity in mental acts entails double intentionality in mental acts. The aim of this paper is to show that the conjunction of and is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. To that end, the theories of two med…Read more
  •  11
    Si pour Trendelenburg les catégories aristotéliciennes sont rattachées au discours, et ensuite par le biais des notions aux choses, il en va différemment pour une part non négligeable du commentarisme médiéval du treizième et du début du quatorzième siècle. Pour cette part, un présupposé réaliste est à l’œuvre : les catégories semblent d’abord ramener aux choses, puisque ce sont des choses. Dans cette optique, l’antique question de la détermination du skopos des Catégories, ou de leur enjeu, se …Read more
  •  9
    Venezia: “Peter Abelard’s Logic and Its Network”
    Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 65 443-450. 2023.
  •  8
    “No Change for Relatives”: The Strategy of Initial Presence
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 26 (1): 54-78. 2023.
    In the Physics, Aristotle says that there is no change associated with the category of relatives. In this paper, I examine a widespread but neglected strategy that medieval thinkers use to understand Aristotle’s claim. According to this strategy, which I label initial presence, if there is no change in the category of relatives, it is because the relation-properties are already present in their subject as soon as the properties on which relation-properties are founded exist. Appreciating the imp…Read more
  •  4
    Si pour Trendelenburg les catégories aristotéliciennes sont rattachées au discours, et ensuite par le biais des notions aux choses, il en va différemment pour une part non négligeable du commentarisme médiéval du treizième et du début du quatorzième siècle. Pour cette part, un présupposé réaliste est à l’œuvre : les catégories semblent d’abord ramener aux choses, puisque ce sont des choses. Dans cette optique, l’antique question de la détermination du skopos des Catégories, ou de leur enjeu, se …Read more
  •  1
    L'objet du Liber sex principiorum d'après ses commentateurs (c. 1230-1337)
    Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 86 (1): 97-140. 2019.
    The article deals with four questions that are, in general, present at the beginning of commentaries to the Book of six principles : 1. To what discipline does the treatise belong ? 2. What is the subject of the treatise and under what mode is it considered ? 3. Why is this treatise set apart from Aristotle’s Categories ? 4. Why speak of “principles” there ? Commentaries of the second half of the thirteenth century and of the beginning of the fourteenth century are taken under consideration (une…Read more
  • Les catégories d'action et de passion dans le Livre des Six principes et quelques-uns de ses commentaires
    Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 27 239-271. 2016.
    The categories of acting and undergoing are not really examined in the Aristotelian treatise. This article aims at showing how the anonymous author of the Book of six principles analyses them in trying to fill this void. By doing so, the article underlines how this analysis philosophically relates to some technical problems discussed in the neo-platonician exegetic tradition of Aristotle’s Categories. It makes reference to some thir-teenth- and fourteenth- centu…Read more
  • The Realm of entia rationis and its Boundaries: Hervaeus Natalis on Objective Being
    Recherches de Théologie Et de Philosophie Médiévales 87 (2): 349-369. 2020.
    Hervaeus Natalis distinguishes two types of items that can have esse obiective in the intellect: objects of acts of intellection (man, this cat, etc.) and properties unapprehended by these acts, or background properties (being a species, being a particular, etc.), that are beings of reason. Yet, his conception of the esse obiective of objects evolved. First, he had a neutral conception of esse obiective: items presenting themselves to the intellect are cognized, transparently, without being alte…Read more
  • Universals in Gregory of Rimini’s Sentences Commentary
    In Fabrizio Amerini & Laurent Cesalli (eds.), Universals in the Fourteenth Century. pp. 241-266. 2017.
    The chapter aims at reconstructing Gregory of Rimini's view on universals in absence of the full-bodied treatment Gregory himself promised in his work. According to Gregory, there is nothing universal outside the mind, and universal concepts are made-up on the basis of prior cognitions. In absence of Gregory's explicit statements of the matter, I argue that these concepts must most probably be qualities in the mind that are really distinct from acts of cognition and remain in the mind even if th…Read more