•  68
    The coupling-constitution fallacy: Much ado about nothing
    with Aaron Kagan
    Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (1): 178-192. 2013.
    The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate that appeals to coupling-constitution worries are …Read more
  •  63
    Implicit racial bias and epistemic pessimism
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2): 79-101. 2017.
    Implicit bias results from living in a society structured by race. Tamar Gendler has drawn attention to several epistemic costs of implicit bias and concludes that paying some costs is unavoidable. In this paper, we reconstruct Gendler’s argument and argue that the epistemic costs she highlights can be avoided. Though epistemic agents encode discriminatory information from the environment, not all encoded information is activated. Agents can construct local epistemic environments that do not act…Read more
  •  32
    Sham Epistemic Authority and Implicit Racial Bias
    Social Epistemology 33 (1): 42-60. 2019.
  •  26
    How to Power Encultured Minds
    Synthese 197. 2020.
    Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers — which holds that powers are causally-efficacious and empirically-discoverable — fits the bill. After an introduction to the major conc…Read more
  •  10
    In this paper, I develop a view about machine autonomy grounded in the theoretical frameworks of 4E cognition and PF Strawson’s reactive attitudes. I begin with critical discussion of White, and conclude that his view is strongly committed to functionalism as it has developed in mainstream analytic philosophy since the 1950s. After suggesting that there is good reason to resist this view by appeal to developments in 4E cognition, I propose an alternative view of machine autonomy. Namely, machine…Read more
  •  10
    Embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended theorists do not typically focus on the ontological frameworks in which they develop their theories. One exception is 4E theories that embrace New Mechanism. In this paper, we endorse the New Mechanist’s general turn to ontology, but argue that their ontology is not the best on the market for 4E theories. Instead, we advocate for a different ontology: causal powers realism. Causal powers realism posits that psychological manifestations are the product o…Read more
  •  10
    Arational belief convergence
    Synthese 198 (7): 6329-6350. 2019.
    This model explores consensus among agents in a population in terms of two properties. The first is a probability of belief change. This value indicates how likely agents are to change their mind in interactions. The other is the size of the agents audience: the proportion of the population the agent has access to at any given time. In all instances, the agents converge on a single belief, although the agents are arational. I argue that this generates a skeptical hypothesis: any instance of purp…Read more
  •  7
    Implicating without intending on the Gricean account of implicature
    Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 4 (2): 199-215. 2012.
  •  5
    Diversity and Resistance to Change: Macro Conditions for Marginalization in Post-industrial Societies
    with Vinai Norasakkunkit, Benjamin Shuman, and Tuukka Toivonen
    Frontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.
  •  4
    How to power encultured minds
    Synthese 197 (8): 3507-3534. 2020.
    Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers—which holds that powers are causally-efficacious and empirically-discoverable—fits the bill. After an introduction to the major concepts…Read more