•  4
    Prior's Theory of Propositions
    Analysis 37 (3): 104-112. 1977.
  •  77
    Mathematical Relativism
    with Hugly Philip and Sayward Charles
    History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1): 53-65. 1989.
    We set out a doctrine about truth for the statements of mathematics?a doctrine which we think is a worthy competitor to realist views in the philosophy of mathematics?and argue that this doctrine, which we shall call ?mathematical relativism?, withstands objections better than do other non-realist accounts
  •  48
    Assertion and belief
    Philosophical Studies 17 (5). 1966.
    This paper is written in opposition of various antecedent discussions of Moore’s paradox. It concludes that one cannot make an honest and primary truth-claim by producing ‘p, but I believe not-p’.
  •  385
    Bound Variables and Schematic Letters
    Logique Et Analyse 95 (95): 425-429. 1981.
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
  •  10
    Notes and Discussions
    Dialectica 57 (3): 315-322. 2003.
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind
  •  137
    Quantifying over the reals
    Synthese 101 (1). 1994.
    Peter Geach proposed a substitutional construal of quantification over thirty years ago. It is not standardly substitutional since it is not tied to those substitution instances currently available to us; rather, it is pegged to possible substitution instances. We argue that (i) quantification over the real numbers can be construed substitutionally following Geach's idea; (ii) a price to be paid, if it is that, is intuitionism; (iii) quantification, thus conceived, does not in itself relieve us …Read more
  •  1
    Nagel, Internalism, and Relativism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 309-319. 1991.
    In this paper we (1) give a new interpretation to Thomas Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism, and (2) use that account to show how internalism and anti-relativism are compatible, despite appearances to the contrary.
  •  84
    Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics
    with George Englebretsen
    continuum. 2010.
    This title introduces students to non-classical logic, syllogistic, to quantificational and modal logic. The book includes exercises throughout and a glossary of terms and symbols. Taking students beyond classical mathematical logic, "Philosophical Logic" is a wide-ranging introduction to more advanced topics in the study of philosophical logic. Starting by contrasting familiar classical logic with constructivist or intuitionist logic, the book goes on to offer concise but easy-to-read introduct…Read more
  •  26
    Is Any Economic System Unjust?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (2): 17-23. 1989.
    The morality of an economic system characterized as an Adam Smith type system is compared with one characterized by central planning. A prima facie case is made that, while the latter has attributes that satisfy a necessary condition for having moral attributes, the former does not and, as a result, has no moral attributes. But then a deeper look at the situation reveals that the directed systems really do not satisfy the necessary condition either. Both the directed and undirected systems end u…Read more
  • Preface
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 27-29. 2006.
  •  69
    Williams’ Definition of ‘X is true’
    Analysis 30 (3): 95-97. 1970.
    C. J. F, Williams proposed ‘for some p ___ states that p & p’ as a satisfactory analysis of ‘___ is true’. This paper takes issue with this claim.
  •  91
    Do we need quantification?
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25 (4): 289-302. 1984.
    The standard response is illustrated by E, J. Lemmon's claim that if all objects in a given universe had names and there were only finitely many of them, then we could always replace a universal proposition about that universe by a complex proposition. It is because these two requirements are not always met that we need universal quantification. This paper is partly in agreement with Lemmon and partly in disagreement. From the point of view of syntax and semantics we can replace a universal prop…Read more
  •  363
    Pragmatics and indexicality
    Pragmatics Microfiche 1 (4). 1975.
    A conception of pragmatics distinguishes pragmatics from semantics proper in terms of indexicality: semantics is conceived as the quest for a truth definition for languages without indexical expressions; pragmatics is conceived as a quest for a truth definition for languages with indexical expressions. I argue that indexicality is not a feature that can be used to capture anything like what Morris and Carnap had in mind.
  •  16
    Do Moral Explanations Matter?
    Philosophy Research Archives 14 137-142. 1988.
    In a recent paper Nicholas Sturgeon claims moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. The correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize other anti-realist views? I argue that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanations is consistent with moral relativism.
  •  173
    True Propositions: A Reply to C.J.F. Williams
    Analysis 32 (3): 101-106. 1972.
    This paper replies to points Williams makes to his reply to Sayward’s criticism of Williams’s proposal of ‘for some p ___ states that p & p’ as an analysis of ‘___ is true’.
  •  638
    Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
  • Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 100 (397): 137-139. 1991.
  •  36
    Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
  • Strawson on Categories
    Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3): 83-88. 1978.
  •  644
    The Internal/External Question
    Grazier Philosophishe Studien 47 31-41. 1994.
    For Rudolf Carnap the question ‘Do numbers exist?’ does not have just one sense. Asked from within mathematics, it has a trivial answer that could not possibly divide philosophers of mathematics. Asked from outside of mathematics, it lacks meaning. This paper discusses Carnap ’s distinction and defends much of what he has to say
  •  92
    A conversation about numbers
    Philosophia 29 (1-4): 191-209. 2002.
    This is a dialogue in which five characters are involved. Various issues in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Among those issues are these: numbers as abstract objects, our knowledge of numbers as abstract objects, a proof as showing a mathematical statement to be true as opposed to the statement being true in virtue of having a proof.
  • Chapter 1: Introduction
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 35-42. 2006.
  •  124
    Prior’s Theory of Truth
    Analysis 47 (2): 83-87. 1987.
    This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
  •  91
    Relativism and ontology
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148): 278-290. 1987.
    This paper deals with the question of whether there is objectivist truth about set-theoretic matters. The dogmatist and skeptic agree that there is such truth. They disagree about whether this truth is knowable. In contrast, the relativist says there is no objective truth to be known. Two versions of relativism are distinguished in the paper. One of these versions is defended.
  •  27
    A fregean principle
    History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3): 125-135. 1998.
    Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds
  •  24
    Minds, substances, and capacities
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (2): 213-225. 1983.
    This paper pushes to the claim that the following is Descartes’s fundamental thesis: something has self-presenting states and self-presenting states only. Were he to have established this he would have revamped our worldview in essentially the manner he wished to revamp it. From this proposition one can get an argument for the substance view of the mind in Descartes’s writings.
  •  67
    Paradox and Semantical Correctness
    Analysis 39 (4): 166-169. 1979.
    In a series of papers R. L. Martin propounds a theory for dealing with the semantical paradoxes. This paper is a criticism of that theory.
  •  23
    Eternal sentences
    with Stephen H. Voss
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1). 1976.
    The paper argues that two apparently attractive conceptions of an eternal sentence are defective. An alternative conception is presented which the authors think allows greater insight into the nature of semantic concepts.
  •  216
    Kripke on necessity and identity
    Philosophical Papers 27 (3): 151-159. 1998.
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.