•  73
    Mathematical Relativism
    with Philip Hugly
    History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1): 53-65. 1989.
    We set out a doctrine about truth for the statements of mathematics?a doctrine which we think is a worthy competitor to realist views in the philosophy of mathematics?and argue that this doctrine, which we shall call ?mathematical relativism?, withstands objections better than do other non-realist accounts
  •  147
    A problem about conversational implicature
    Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1). 1979.
    Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves why it is that what the speaker …Read more
  •  189
    Must Synonymous Predicates be Coextensive?
    Logique Et Analyse 95 (95): 430-435. 1981.
    Two cases are distinguished. In one case two predicates belong to distinct languages. A straight-forward argument is presented that the predicates might be synonymous without being coextensive. In the second case the predicates belong to the same language. Here the issue is more involved, but the same conclusion is reached.
  •  50
    Prior on Propositional Identity
    Analysis 36 (4): 182-184. 1976.
    Let A, B, C stand for sentences expressing propositions; let A be a component of C; let C A/B be just like C except for replacing some occurrence of A in C by an occurrence of B; let = be a binary connective for propositional identity read as ‘the proposition that __ is the very same proposition as …’. Then authors defend adding ‘from C = C A/B infer A = B’ to Prior’s rules for propositional identity, appearing in OBJECTS OF THOUGHT.
  •  184
    The structure of type theory
    with Stephen H. Voss
    Journal of Philosophy 77 (5): 241-259. 1980.
    Formal principals are isolated to reveal a structure embedded in a wide range of studies, each of which partitions a domain of individuals into types and categories. It is thought that any reasonable theory of types should include these principles.
  •  63
    Quine's relativism
    Ratio 3 (2): 142-149. 1990.
    A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.
  •  551
    What Truth is there in Psychological Egoism?
    Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2): 145-159. 2006.
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
  •  5
    Geach on Generalization
    Dialogue 41 (2): 221-240. 2002.
    RÉSUMÉ: Il y a des objections plausibles contre une approche substitutionnelle de la généralisation, dont certaines peuvent être contrées par un appel à une version de l'approche substitutionnelle qui a été proposée par Peter Geach il y a presque quarante ans. Il n'est pas clair que la conception substitutionnelle de Geach vaille pour tous les phénomènes de généralisation, mais on s'emploie ici à montrer que c'est une conception qui est tout à fait digne de considération et qu'elle donne bel et …Read more
  •  484
    Null Sentences
    Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48 23-36. 1999.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
  •  38
    Understanding sentences
    Philosophical Investigations 23 (1). 2000.
    Doubts are raised about the claim that on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules we are prepared to understand a potential infinitude of sentences. One doubt is about understanding a potential infinitude of sentences. A second doubt is about the assumption that understanding a sentence must be a matter of figuring out its meaning from an antecedent knowledge of the meaning of its words and applying rules.
  •  60
    Classical logic and truth-value gaps
    Philosophical Papers 21 (2): 141-150. 1992.
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends this approach is …Read more
  •  41
    Definite Descriptions, Negation and Necessitation
    Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 13 (1): 36-47. 1993.
    The principal question asked in this paper is: in the case of attributive usage, is the definite description to be analyzed as Russell said or is it to be treated as a referring expression, functioning semantically as a proper name? It answers by defending the former alternative.
  • Editor's Introduction
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 11-21. 2006.
  •  44
    Taking actions seriously
    Behavior and Philosophy 23 (24): 51-60. 1995.
    Two kinds of functionalism are distinguished: intensional and extensional. The former is argued to be superior to the latter. The former is also defended against two objections independently put forth by Ned Block and John Searle.
  •  96
    Theories of truth and truth-value gaps
    Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6). 1993.
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible.
  •  117
    Does scientific realism entail mathematical realism?
    Facta Philosophica 5 173-182. 2003.
    Hilary Putnam suggests that the essence of the realist conception of mathematics is that the statements of mathematics are objective so that the true ones are objectively true. An argument for mathematical realism, thus conceived, is implicit in Putnam's writing. The first premise is that within currently accepted science there are objective truths. Next is the premise that some of these statements logically imply statements of pure mathematics. The conclusion drawn is that some statements of pu…Read more
  •  36
    Are there infinitely many sorts of things?
    Philosophia 8 (1): 17-30. 1978.
    An argument is given for Fred Sommers's thesis that the number of sorts of things, that is, the number of types or categories, discriminated by any natural language is always infinite.
  • Chapter 4: The Peano Axioms
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 105-128. 2006.
  •  72
    The disquotational theory of truth is false
    Philosophia 22 (3-4): 331-339. 1993.
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
  •  65
    Anarchism and Rights Violations
    Critica 14 (40): 105-116. 1982.
    The justification of the existence of the state should precede the justification of any particular organization of the state. The paper tries to give a clear argument facing anyone who sets out to do the first thing, which is to justify the existence of the state. The problem facing such a person is to identify which premise of the argument is false and explain why it is false.
  • Chapter 7: Arithmetic and Rules
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 183-211. 2006.
  •  76
    On some much maligned remarks of Wittgenstein on gödel
    Philosophical Investigations 24 (3). 2001.
    In "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics" Wittgenstein discusses an argument that goes from Gödel’s incompleteness result to the conclusion that some truths of mathematics are unprovable. Wittgenstein takes issue with this argument. Wittgenstein’s remarks in this connection have received very negative reaction from some very prominent people, for example, Gödel and Dummett. The paper is a defense of what Wittgenstein has to say about the argument in question.
  •  3
    Quine' way out
    Analysis 36 (1): 28-37. 1975.
  •  41
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically…Read more
  •  83
    Malcolm on criteria
    Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2): 349-358. 2004.
    Consider the general proposition that normally when people pain-behave they are in pain. Where a traditional philosopher like Mill tries to give an empirical proof of this proposition (the argument from analogy), Malcolm tries to give a transcendental proof. Malcolm’s argument is transcendental in that he tries to show that the very conditions under which we can have a concept provide for the application of the concept and the knowledge that the concept is truly as well as properly applied. The…Read more
  •  8
    Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 41 (1): 151-173. 1991.
  •  286
    What is the Logic of Propositional Identity?
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1): 3-15. 2006.
    Propositional identity is not expressed by a predicate. So its logic is not given by the ordinary first order axioms for identity. What are the logical axioms governing this concept, then? Some axioms in addition to those proposed by Arthur Prior are proposed.
  •  65
    Frege on identities
    History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3): 195-205. 2000.
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an identity the terms flanking the symbol for identity do not hav…Read more
  •  8
    Analysis “Problem” No. 15
    Analysis 36 (2): 49. 1976.