•  8
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  34
    On needing time to think: consciousness, temporality, and self-expression
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3): 413-429. 2020.
    I examine an argument proposed by Tye and Wright, inspired by Geach, which holds that a correct understanding of how conceptual thought occurs in time demands we expel it from experience. This would imply—pace William James— that the “stream of consciousness” is not, even in part, a “stream of thought.” I argue that if we closely examine what seems to support crucial premises of their argument, we will find this undermines its other assumptions, and points us to a way of placing thought in time …Read more
  •  29
    Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 1-21. 2007.
    There are general aspects of mental life it is reasonable to believe do not vary even when subjects vary in their first-person judgments about them. Such lack of introspective agreement gives rise to “phenomenological disputes.” These include disputes over how to describe the perspectival character of perception, the phenomenal character of perceptual recognition and conceptual thought, and the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. Some supposethat when we encounter such dispute…Read more
  •  1
    Phenomenality and intentionality---which explains which?: reply to Gertler
    Journal of Experimental Psychology 10 (2). 2004.
    In Chapter 7 I argue that we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having phenomenal features. According to Gertler, my claim needs, but does not receive from me, a defence against the allegedly rival thesis that phenomenal features are explained by intentional ones. I maintain that this criticism involves a misunderstanding of my view’s implications. In my book I oppose the “rival” thesis only to this extent: where my conception of consciousness conflicts with broad ways of trying to explain…Read more
  •  166
    Plato's Division of Reason and Appetite
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4). 2001.
  •  285
    In favor of (plain) phenomenology
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 201-220. 2007.
    Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. De…Read more
  •  18
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness. 2004.
  •  138
    The Significance of Consciousness
    Princeton University Press. 1998.
    "This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument
  •  87
    Precis of The Significance of Consciousness
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6. 2000.
    The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-perso…Read more
  •  283
    Is experience transparent?
    Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2): 15-41. 2004.
  •  94
    Attention and sensorimotor intentionality
    In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 270. 2005.
  •  47
    Subjectivity and Selfhood
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 840-843. 2008.
  •  296
    On the Phenomenology of Introspection
    In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 129. 2012.
  •  6
    Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: A Reply to Lycan
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.
    Lycan is concerned that I fail to explain my sense of 'phenomenal consciousness' sufficiently, and that I would unjustifiably criticize his "inner sense" theory for consciousness neglect. In response, I argue that my explanation of what I mean provides an adequate basis for disambiguating and answering Lycan's questions about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to "visual awareness" and the like. While I do not charge Lycan's theory with consciousness neglect, I do argue it employs a notion…Read more
  •  52
    What Dennett can't imagine and why
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2): 93-112. 1993.
    Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers? ?zombies? might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ?Hindsight?, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are actually incoheren…Read more
  •  30
    First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: A Reply to Witmer
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.
    My response to Witmer comes in three sections: In the first I address concerns about my book's blindsight thought-experiment, remarking specifically on the role imagination plays in it, and my grounds for thinking that a first-person approach is valuable here. In Section Two I consider the relation of the thought-experiment to theses regarding possibility and necessity, and Witmer's discussion of ways of arguing for the impossibility of "Belinda-style" blindsight, despite its apparent conceivabi…Read more
  •  75
  •  187
    Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 840-843. 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  661
    Is the appearance of shape protean?
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 1-16. 2006.
    </b>This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” a…Read more
  •  118
    Consciousness and Intentionality
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006.
  •  5
    Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: A Reply to Carruthers
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.
    Carruthers' "immediate availability" theory of consciousness is criticized on the grounds that it offers no reasonable alternative to asserting the metaphysical impossibility of spontaneous blindsight. In defense, Carruthers says he can admit a spontaneous blindsight that relies on unconscious behavioral cues, and deny only its possibility without such mechanisms. I argue: This involves him in an unwarranted denial of the possibility that conscious visual discrimination could depend on behaviora…Read more
  •  51
    Phenomenal thought
    In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 236-267. 2011.
  •  9
    Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to Levine
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.
    Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intent…Read more