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Chelsea Haramia

Spring Hill College
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  • Spring Hill College
    Assistant Professor
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  • All publications (5)
  •  17
    PGD and Parental Obligations: What Parents Owe to Communities That Do Not Yet Exist
    American Journal of Bioethics 13 (10). 2013.
    No abstract
    Biomedical EthicsReproductive Ethics
  •  6
    Evolved, NotCausa Sui: An Embodiment Critique of Freedom and Responsibility
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (2): 14-15. 2015.
    Biomedical Ethics
  •  12
    Disabusing Physicians of the Assumption of Competing Interests
    American Journal of Bioethics 19 (1): 46-47. 2019.
    Biomedical Ethics
  •  14
    How To Think About the Individual as a Nonautonomous Community
    American Journal of Bioethics 16 (2): 61-62. 2016.
    Biomedical Ethics
  •  143
    Our Responsibility to the Non-existent
    Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1): 249-256. 2013.
    Those who do not exist cannot be harmed. If someone is not worse off than she otherwise would have been, she is not harmed. Together, these claims entail that the individuals in non-identity cases are not harmed, because no one who exists is made worse off. While these claims might be true at the individual level, their truth does not preclude our having harm-based concerns about future persons in general. These concerns are justified when we recognize the responsibility we have over certain off…Read more
    Those who do not exist cannot be harmed. If someone is not worse off than she otherwise would have been, she is not harmed. Together, these claims entail that the individuals in non-identity cases are not harmed, because no one who exists is made worse off. While these claims might be true at the individual level, their truth does not preclude our having harm-based concerns about future persons in general. These concerns are justified when we recognize the responsibility we have over certain offices that persons come to fill. By positing an account of de dicto harm and arguing for its moral relevance, I provide a solution to the non- identity problem that coheres nicely with our intuitions regarding harm, responsibility, and obligations to future persons
    EthicsFreedom and Liberty
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