Academia Sinica, Taiwan
  •  1153
    Xunzi and Virtue Epistemology
    Universitas 41 (3): 121-142. 2014.
    Regulative virtue epistemology argues that intellectual virtues can adjust and guide one’s epistemic actions as well as improve on the quality of the epistemic actions. For regulative virtue epistemologists, intellectual virtues can be cultivated to a higher degree; when the quality of intellectual virtue is better, the resulting quality of epistemic action is better. The intellectual virtues that regulative epistemologists talk about are character virtues (such as intellectual courage and open-…Read more
  •  745
    Technê and Understanding
    National Taiwan University Philosophical Review 47 39-60. 2014.
    How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practical technê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, in conclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
  •  340
    Generalizing and Normalizing Quine's Epistemology
    Philosophical Writings 19 3-21. 2002.
    The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to generalize Quine's epistemology, to show that what Quine refutes for traditional epistemology is not only Cartesian foundationalism and Carnapian reductionism, but also any epistemological program if it takes atomic verificationist semantics or supernaturalism, which are rooted in the linguistic/factual distinction of individual sentences, as its underlying system. Thus, we will see that the range of naturalization in the Quinean sense is not as narrow…Read more
  •  215
    The metaepistemology of knowing-how
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4): 541-556. 2011.
    Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by…Read more
  •  196
    A Virtue Semantics
    South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 27-39. 2008.
    In this paper, I propose a virtue-theoretic approach to semantics, according to which the study of linguistic competence in particular, and the study of meaning and language in general, should focus on a speaker's interpretative virtues, such as charity and interpretability, rather than the speaker's knowledge of rules. The first part of the paper proffers an argument for shifting to virtue semantics, and the second part outlines the nature of such virtue semantics.
  •  174
    Linguistic Know-How: The Limits of Intellectualism
    Theoria 77 (1): 71-86. 2011.
    In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its expla…Read more
  •  160
    Practical knowledge of language
    Philosophia 38 (2): 331-341. 2010.
    One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how view in which knowledge of the rules…Read more
  •  131
    On the Epistemology of Language
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4): 677-696. 2006.
    Epistemology of language, a branch of both epistemology and the philosophy of language, asks what knowledge of language consists in. In this paper, I argue that such an inquiry is a pointless enterprise due to its being based upon the incorrect assumption that linguistic competence requires knowledge of language. However, I do not think the phenomenon of knowledge of language is trivial. I propose a virtue-theoretic account of linguistic competence, and then explain the phenomenon from a virtue-…Read more
  •  108
    Ethical expertise and the articulacy requirement
    Synthese 193 (7): 2035-2052. 2016.
    Recently virtue ethicists, such as Julia Annas and Matt Stichter, in order to explain what a moral virtue is and how it is acquired, suggest modeling virtue on practical expertise. However, a challenging issue arises when considering the nature of practical expertise especially about whether expertise requires articulacy, that is, whether an expert in a skill is required to possess an ability to articulate the principles underlying the skill. With regard to this issue, Annas advocates the articu…Read more
  •  102
    Knowledge of language in action
    Philosophical Explorations 18 (1): 68-89. 2015.
    Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael Dummett's Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby's Practical Knowledge Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different reasons. I present an…Read more
  •  94
    Phronesis and Techne: The Skill Model of Wisdom Defended
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2): 234-247. 2020.
    Contemporary philosophers have contributed to the development of the skill model of wisdom, according to which practical wisdom is practical skill. However, the model appears to be limited in its explanatory power, since there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill: A person with practical wisdom can and should deliberate about the end being pursued; by contrast, a person with a particular practical skill cannot deliberate about the end of the skill, and even if she can, she is not required to…Read more
  •  83
    The Structure of Practical Expertise
    Philosophia 42 (2): 539-554. 2014.
    Anti-intellectualists in epistemology argue for the thesis that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, and most of them tend to avoid any use of the notion “knowing-that” in their explanation of intelligent action on pain of inconsistency. Intellectualists tend to disprove anti-intellectualism by showing that the residues of knowing-that remain in the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. Outside the field of epistemology, some philosophers who try to highlight the natur…Read more
  •  77
    Can, or Should, Dummett Solve the Delivery Problem?
    Auslegung 28 (1): 21-43. 2006.
    Michael Dummett has long argued that we should ascribe implicit knowledge of a meaning-theory to speakers, and that the task of a theory of meaning is to tell us what such knowledge consists in. But he also sees it as a problem that how implicit knowledge is actually used, that is, how a speaker's metalinguistic knowledge of a meaning-theory issues or delivers the speaker's knowledge of meanings of utterances (the delivery problem). In this paper 1argue that Dummett's instrumental construal of i…Read more
  •  66
    Artificial Wisdom: A Philosophical Framework
    AI and Society. forthcoming.
    Human excellences such as intelligence, morality, and consciousness are investigated by philosophers as well as artificial intelligence researchers. One excellence that has not been widely discussed by AI researchers is practical wisdom, the highest human excellence, or the highest, seventh, stage in Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition. In this paper, I explain why artificial wisdom matters and how artificial wisdom is possible (in principle and in practice) by responding to two philosophical c…Read more
  •  65
    Dummett's Notion of Implicit Knowledge
    Philosophical Writings 24 17-35. 2003.
    In this paper I evaluate Michael Dummett's notion of implicit knowledge by examining his answers to these two questions: (1) Why should we ascribe knowledge of a meaning-theory of a language to a language-user, and why the mode of this knowledge is implicit, but not pure theoretical, pure practical, or unconscious in a Chomskian sense? (2) How could a meaning-theory, which is known implicitly, function as a rule to be followed by the language-user? To answer (1) I shall construct Dummett's argum…Read more
  •  43
    On How to Defend or Disprove the Universality Thesis
    with Chinfa Lien
    In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world, Oxford University Press. pp. 267-278. 2018.
    According to the universality thesis, the epistemic properties referred to by the English epistemic verb “know” contained in the expressions of the form “S knows that p” or “S knows how to φ‎” are shared by the translations of the epistemic verb in all other languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and so on. Some doubt that there is reason to think the universality thesis is true because little or nothing is shown about the meanings and uses of the epistemic terms in languages othe…Read more
  •  19
    Liao’s Moral Intuitionism
    In Tzu-wei Hung & Duen-Min Deng (eds.), Enlightenment and Rebellion: 100 Years of Taiwanese Philosophy, National Taiwan University Press. pp. 155-184. 2018.