•  15
    Why Reduction is Underrated
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1): 121-136. 2019.
    The key idea behind reduction is a simple and familiar one: it’s that there’s more to things than meets the eye. Surprisingly, this simple idea provides the resources to block a number of notable anti-reductionist arguments: Mackie’s argument from queerness against objective moral values, Kripke’s Humphrey objection and its recent variants, and Jubien’s objection from irrelevance against Lewisian modal realism. What is wrong with each of these arguments is that they suppose that what is to be re…Read more
  • Tropes
    In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
  •  19
    Agnosticism and the Balance of Evidence
    In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Theistic Beliefs, De Gruyter. pp. 1-18. 2018.
  •  21
    Why Only Us? Language and Evolution
    Analysis 78 (2): 381-383. 2018.
    Why Only Us? Language and Evolution By BerwickRobert C. and ChomskyNoamMassachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. 224 pp. £17.95 paper.
  •  27
    © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comThis article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...This is a clear and extremely stimulating book in which the authors present a series of innovative, even unorthodox, views on the relation between language and biology. It treats the study of language, a…Read more
  •  20
    Tropes
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1): 253-262. 1994.
  •  164
    Acquaintance and de re Thought
    Synthese 156 (1): 79-96. 2007.
  •  14
    D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4): 640. 1998.
  •  57
    Modality and acquaintance with properties
    The Monist 81 (1): 44--68. 1998.
    What is required for you to know what a certain property is? And what is required for you to have the concept of that property? Hume held that a person who has never tasted a pineapple cannot know what the property tasting like a pineapple is. He also thought that this person cannot have the corresponding concept. A subsequent tradition in empiricism generalises these claims at least to all the so-called "secondary qualities." I will argue that this tradition is mistaken. I will argue that there…Read more
  •  210
    Fictionalism and the attitudes
    Philosophical Studies 139 (3). 2008.
    This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The ar…Read more
  •  127
    Does physicalism need fixing?
    Analysis 55 (3): 135-41. 1995.
  •  186
    The methodology of genuine modal realism
    Synthese 162 (1): 37-52. 2008.
    David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to a…Read more
  •  62
  •  644
    In defence of existence questions
    Monist 97 (7). 2014.
    Do numbers exist? Do properties? Do possible worlds? Do fictional characters? Many metaphysicians spend time and effort trying to answer these and other questions about the existence of various entities. These inquiries have recently encountered opposition: a group of philosophers, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, have argued that many or all of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians can be answered trivially, and so are not worth debating. Our task is to defend existence questions…Read more
  • Bacon, J.-Universals and Property Instances
    Philosophical Books 37 266-267. 1996.
  •  147
    What are physical properties?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3): 196-217. 1998.
  •  54
    Tropes
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94. 19934.
  •  20
    Properties as Truthmakers
    Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170): 95-107. 2000.
  •  242
    Mathematical explanation and indispensability arguments
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 641-658. 2009.
    We defend Joseph Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to 'index' quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena. This thesis is defended against objections by Mark Colyvan and Alan Baker.
  •  51
    Defending promiscuous realism about natural kinds
    Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185): 496-500. 1996.
  •  448
    Animalism and Deferentialism
    Dialectica 67 (4): 605-609. 2013.
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to Blatti's argument, and…Read more
  •  130
    The metaphysics within physics • by Tim Maudlin
    Analysis 69 (2): 374-375. 2009.
    The basic idea of Maudlin's superb book is methodological: ‘metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics. Physical theories provide us with the best handle we have on what there is, and the philosopher's proper task is the interpretation and elucidation of those theories. In particular, when choosing the fundamental posits of one's ontology, one must look to scientific practice rather than to philosophical prejudice’ .The apparently …Read more
  •  1
    Review of Armstrong (1997) (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4): 640-642. 1998.
  • Natural kinds
    In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 682-5. 1998.
  •  68
    II—Persistent Philosophical Disagreement
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1): 23-40. 2017.
  •  661
    Deferentialism
    Philosophical Studies 156 (3): 321-337. 2011.
    There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend— deferentialism , as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made by those d…Read more