Christiaan Jacobs

Bernard Lonergan argued that a Thomist theory of intellect must begin with advertence to the act of understanding. He distinguished his cognitional theory from a conceptualism that neglects the experience of insight and reflection on it. Early in his career, he explained how the conceptualist approach misinterprets Aquinas and creates problems for the metaphysics of rational psychology. This article explains Lonergan’s position and illustrates the conceptualist alternative by analysing Joseph Owens’s view of cognition. By explaining the metaphysical differences between Lonergan’s and Owens’s opposing views of human knowing in relation to their distinctive readings of Aquinas, this article contributes to a more accurate reading of Aquinas on the act of understanding

In the first half of this article, the author argues that the notion of criticizability plays a central role in the communicative rationality that Jiirgen Habermas proposes. He also identifies the incurable errors that Habermas recognizes in the philosophy of consciousness, and explains how Habermas thinks the concept of communicative rationality overcomes these errors. At the end of this discussion, he shows how the theory of communicative action suffers from vague and unsatisfying treatments of the key philosophical issues of cognition and objectivity, and suggests that these deficiencies in the theory result from Habermas's desire to avoid all things subject-centered and metaphysical. In the latter half of the article, the author discusses the cognitional theory of Bernard Lonergan and shows how it (1) avoids the legitimate criticisms Habermas raises against the philosophy of consciousness and (2) supplements and complements the theory of communicative action. /// Na primeira parte do presente artigo, o autor defende que a noção de critica-bilidade desempenha um papel central na racionalidade comunicativa proposta por Jürgen Habermas. Aí são também identificados os erros insanáveis que Habermas reconhece na filosofia da consciência, e se explica de que modo Habermas pensa que o conceito de racionalidade comunicativa supera esses erros. No final da discussão, porém, o autor do artigo mostra até que ponto a teoria da acção comunicativa padece de tratamentos vagos e insatisfatórios de questões filosóficas chave relativas à cognição e à objectividade, sugerindo que estas deficiências na teoria resultam do desejo de Habermas de evitar tudo o que seja centrado no sujeito e de natureza metafísica. Na segunda grande porção do artigo, o autor discute a teoria cognitiva de Bernard Lonergan procurando demonstrar de que modo ela (1) evita as críticas legítimas de Habermas relativamente à filosofia da consciência e (2) suplementa e complementa a teoria da acção comunicativa.