Christian Wenzel

In 1930, the British economist John Maynard Keynes predicted that by 2030 people would work only fifteen hours per week and enjoy more free time and leisure, that we would return to “principles of religion and traditional virtue,” declaring “love of money morbid, semi-criminal, and semi-pathological,” and that “we shall once more value ends above means.” But today, we do not see that this prophesy has proven true. Something must have gone wrong. We do not sufficiently know the distinction between needs and wants, absolute values and relative values, what a good life is, and how to live it. In this essay, I will present and discuss ideas from Confucius, Aristotle, Zhuangzi, and the Stoics that I think are deep and meaningful and can help us free ourselves from evolutionary programming and blind belief in economic and technological growth.

Wittgenstein wrote: “No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain processes.” In general, he rejects what he calls “psycho-physical parallelism.” In Sect. 1, I explain Wittgenstein’s position on this topic and how his followers defend it. In Sect. 2, I argue against Wittgenstein, contending that there is “thought” in a wider sense and that it can be “manifested” without expression. Thought does not need to be ordinarily expressed or even expressible, and it can be read off from the brain, provided one has sufficient technology, data, and understanding of the subject’s interaction with the environment. In Sect. 3, I offer results from brain-science in support of my claims.

In this piece, Wenzel explores how the ancient Chinese philosopher, Zhuangzi, approaches issues of freedom and moral responsibility. Zhuangzi’s writings are very different in form from traditional Western philosophy, but there is significant overlap in the treatment of freedom and moral responsibility. Distinctive of Zhuangzi’s approach is the method of “fasting of the mind,” where one is less focused on extensive practical deliberations and is more attuned to the environment and task at hand. In this way, acting and deciding are more like skills such as woodworking or swimming, as opposed to more theoretical activities. And while Wenzel thinks that approaching freedom and moral responsibility as Zhuangzi suggests does have some appealing features, he also argues that it faces some important difficulties, particularly when it comes to understanding moral responsibility.

This essay introduces ideas from Confucius, Xunzi, the Six Dynasties, and Kant about beauty, music, morality, and what we might today call “aesthetic education.” It asks how beauty and morality are related and how they ideally should be related to each other. We know that beauty and morality can drift apart, and we may wonder how aesthetic education might work best. Should the arts be a means for developing morality? Or should it be the other way around? These questions are still relevant today. But our world has changed, not only since Confucius, but also since Kant. We may ask what to make of their ideas in our present time. I argue that there are good reasons for keeping morality and aesthetics apart, somewhat in the spirit of Kant, and in opposition to the idea of “fusing” the two.

This is a short, but complex and ambitious book. It is argumentative in style and in many places written in the first person. It appeared first in German in 2003, and in 2016 in English translation, to which the two translators added a detailed and informative introduction. The overall aim of the book is to describe and explain how human beings, as users of propositional language and with the ability to refer to themselves, develop into egocentric beings, who find themselves confronted with the world as a whole, and who turn to mysticism or religion in order to find some peace of mind. A wide range of themes and arguments are interwoven along on the way from being an "I"-sayer to...

In this essay I closely look at dialogues from the Daoist text Zhuangzi and examine their modes of reasoning. The observations, comments, and dialogues are often witty, surprising, and puzzling. Sometimes they are mystic and difficult to understand. But how “reasonable” are the answers given in these dialogues? I will focus on a dialogue from chapter 17, called “Autumn Floods.” I will closely follow and analyze the arguments and their twists. In particular, I will question the use of the word “Dao.” I will also place this analysis in broader comparative frameworks regarding rationality, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and Western traditions.

Kann Mathematik schön sein? Gibt es Leben in der Mathematik? In der Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) untersucht Kant Prinzipien der Zweckmäßigkeit, eine subjektive Zweckmäßigkeit für die Ästhetik und eine objektive Zweckmäßigkeit für die Teleologie. Die Mathematik aber fällt bezüglich beider durch. Mathematische Gegenstände und Eigenschaften können nach Kant nicht schön sein und bei Erklärungen müssen wir keine Vorstellung von einem Zweck voraussetzen, denn wir können die Gegenstände konstruieren, meint Kant. Jedoch räumt er ein, mathematische „Demonstrationen“ könnten schön sein. Dies hängt mit seiner Unterscheidung von Anschauung und Begriff zusammen. Ich werde diesbezüglich einige seiner Ausführungen darstellen und problematisieren.

Mathematicians often say that their theorems, proofs, and theories can be beautiful. They say mathematics can be like art. They know how to move creatively and freely in their domains. But ordinary people usually cannot do this and do not share this view. They often have unpleasant memories from school and do not have this experience of freedom and creativity in doing mathematics. I myself have been a mathematician, and I wish to highlight some of the creative aspects in doing mathematics. I always had the feeling that there is much freedom in mathematics and that one can do as one pleases as long as one avoids contradictions (and one can even live with contradictions for a while). In mathematics one only needs to define something and there it is! Just imagine it, and it immediately exists. Where else, besides fiction, does one have such power? --- This essay has three parts. In the first, I lay out some historical facts and views that I will need later. Second, I insert an interlude with Kant, pointing out some of his claims and insights in aesthetics, and some aspects in mathematics that I think he overlooked or underestimated. Third, I will bring out some aspects of higher mathematics that I will show are similar to art. These aspects are in the doing and creating of mathematics, not in the finished theories. They are usually not found in textbooks. I want to show that a researcher in mathematics is like a painter or composer, exploring and creating. To see this, one has to adopt a first-person perspective. In this way I will show that aesthetics plays a role and leaves its traces also in mathematics.

Kant sometimes compares human beings with animals and angels and grants human beings a middle position. But contrary to what one might expect, his transcendental philosophy does not apply well to animals or angels. The question of whether we share perception with animals has no good answer in his system that has to be taken as a single piece and does not allow for introducing steps of empirical, real developments. Differently from Kant, McDowell does compare human beings with animals, but he is not a transcendental philosopher and his attempts to find support in Kant are problematic. Although McDowell says that concepts go "all the way out" and Kant says the categories go "all the way down," which sounds similar, Kant talks of a priori categories, not empirical concepts. Burge is definitely not a transcendental philosopher like Kant. Up front he strongly relies on empirical studies, especially animal perception. Nevertheless, his quest into mental content introduces first-person perspectives that have a metaphysical flavor, and this makes - at least to me - comparisons with Kant tempting again.

In _An Introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics_, Christian Wenzel discusses and demystifies Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, guiding the reader each step of the way and placing key points of discussion in the context of Kant’s other work. Explains difficult concepts in plain language, using numerous examples and a helpful glossary. Proceeds in the same order as Kant’s text for ease of reference and comprehension. Includes an illuminating foreword by Henry E. Allison. Offers twenty-six further-reading sections, commenting briefly on books and articles from the English, German, and French, that are relevant for each topic Provides an extensive bibliography and a chapter summarizing Kant's main points.

When contrasting something with its opposite, such as positive numbers with negative numbers, repulsion with attraction, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, Kant some-times says the latter are not merely cases of negation or privation of the former, but that they have their own, independent grounds. But do negative judgments of taste really have a priori grounds? There are two kinds of negative judgments of taste: “This is not beautiful” and “This is ugly.” Can they be a priori judgments? Or are they always impure and without a priori basis? In this essay, I argue that they can be pure a priori judgments. I will give detailed analyses of examples involving part-whole relationships, objects of art, and aesthetic ideas. In addition, detailed discussions of opposing interpretations will be offered.

What is the nature of thought? Is thought linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Does it happen in the brain? I will focus on the last question, but also say something about the other two. I will present a simple thought experiment to show that thought must somehow happen in the brain. But then I will soften the impression this might give by pointing out what is needed to read those thoughts. Simply put, ontologically thought is in the brain, epistemologically it is not.

The main ideas in this paper can be summarized in the following three points. (1) Openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity are elements of both Kant's aesthetics and Wittgenstein's notion of language games. (2) These elements are essential to what makes a person. They are necessary in processes of decision-making and in the development of a person. (3) Such aspects were in the center of discussion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, especially in the tradition of the so-called Bildungsroman. Unfortunately, they tend to be forgotten nowadays.