Bellingham, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Value Theory
  •  185
    On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 30 251-259. 2005.
    Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.
  •  50
    Excluded Knowledge
    Synthese 193 (8): 1-26. 2016.
    Does vagueness exclude knowledge? After arguing for an affirmative answer to this question, I consider a fascinating objection. Barnett offers purported counterexamples to the following: Vagueness as to whether p entails that nobody knows whether p. These putative counterexamples, were they successful, would establish that standard accounts of vagueness are mistaken. I defend three central theses: First, whenever it is vague whether p competent speakers would be ambivalent about whether p when c…Read more
  •  10
    On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 30 251-259. 2005.
    Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.