Christian Perring

This dissertation is a philosophical investigation of irrationality. The aim is to provide a conceptual basis for understanding various forms of irrationality, such as psychosis, neurosis, self-deception, repression, and weak-willed behavior. There are six main chapters, focusing on different phenomena, and touching on several fields of inquiry, including moral psychology, value theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science and psychoanalytic theory. The first two chapters are broad in scope, discussing the relation of philosophy to clinical psychology, and the very possibility of the existence of irrationality. The subsequent four chapters explore the particular topics of the disunity of self, unconscious mental states, self-deception, and weakness of will. There is no single overriding thesis being argued for here, but the general theme is that it is possible to understand irrationality in detail, and that the forms of irrationality that we are capable of understanding include extreme ones that many thinkers have deemed conceptually or logically impossible. Chapter One argues for the importance of the interrelation of philosophy and clinical psychology. Chapter Two argues against the necessity of charitable assumptions of rationality in interpreting the language or behavior of others. Chapter Three discusses the various ways in which the disunity of persons have been conceptualized, and argues that homuncularism often confuses different levels of talking about people. Chapter Four argues for a strong ontology of unconscious mental states and processes, giving them equal status to conscious mentality. Chapter Five argues against several so-called 'paradoxes of self-deception' and clears the way for the possibility of intentional self-deception. Finally, in Chapter Six a standard conception of the distinction between valuing and desiring is examined and found wanting. A new model of the nature of valuing is proposed, drawing on Gestalt psychology. On this view, most weak-willed behavior involves not a divergence between what is desired and what is valued at the time, but rather a change in the person's values. If there are occasions where what is valued differs from what is desired, they are rare and demand a special explanation

The debate in philosophy of science in the twentieth century over the theory-laden-ness of observation showed both that there are many ways in which scientific observation depends on theory, and also highlighted some ways in which it is blind to theoretical assumptions. Debates in the philosophy of medicine have shown how concepts and theories of illness are value-laden, especially in psychiatry. Kious in his helpful and stimulating target article argues that the mainstream approach to autonomy depends on assumptions about value, and this conclusion is surely correct. However, his focus on the concept of non-voluntariness is problematic, as I argue, and we are better off not seeing it as laden with.

J’explore de façon critique la supposition du DSM[1] et de théoriciens tels que Wakefield et Gert selon laquelle les troubles mentaux doivent être attribués à un individu plutôt qu’à un groupe de personnes. Cette supposition est particulièrement problématique en pédopsychiatrie où le système familial est très souvent au centre de l’attention clinique. Il y a bien sûr des éléments de preuve substantiels indiquant que certains troubles mentaux des individus sont causés par leurs relations avec les autres et que leur guérison est grandement facilitée en traitant le groupe, tel que la famille, comme un tout. Malgré cela, il y a eu beaucoup moins de travail conceptuel visant à définir ce que cela pourrait être pour un couple, une famille ou un autre groupe que de se voir attribuer un trouble mental. Pour traiter de cette question, j’utilise un débat entre Wakefield et Murphy et Woolfolk sur la question de savoir s’il fait partie du concept de trouble mental que celui-ci soit causé par une dysfonction interne de la personne. Je discute aussi de la proposition faite par Bolton d’abandonner complètement le concept de trouble mental et d’utiliser plutôt le concept, plus large, de problème de santé mentale. Je soutiens qu’en fin de compte le caractère individuel des troubles mentaux ne constitue pas une vérité conceptuelle a priori, et qu’il faut faire intervenir des considérations pragmatiques pour décider s’il est utile de nous limiter à une telle définition ou si nous pourrions être mieux servis par une définition plus extensive. Je fais le lien avec le pragmatisme et je soutiens qu’une approche pluraliste non réductive est particulièrement appropriée en pédopsychiatrie.I critically explore the assumption of the DSM and theorists such as Wakefield and Gert that mental disorder must be attributed to an individual rather than a group of people. This assumption is especially problematic in child and adolescent psychiatry where very often the focus of clinical attention is the family system. There is of course substantial evidence that some mental disorders of individuals are caused by their relationships with other people and that their recovery is greatly facilitated by treating the group, such as a family, as a whole. However, there has been much less conceptual work on defining what it might be for a couple, family or other group to itself be attributed a mental disorder. To address this issue, I employ a debate between Wakefield , Murphy and Woolfolk on whether it is part of the concept of a mental disorder that it is caused by an internal malfunction of a person. I also discuss the proposal of Bolton that we do away with the concept of mental disorder altogether and instead use a broader concept of mental health problem. I argue that ultimately it is not an a priori conceptual truth that mental disorders are individual, and we need to bring in pragmatic considerations to decide whether it is helpful to restrict ourselves to such a definition or whether we could be better served by a more expansive definition. I link this to the philosophical view of pragmatism and argue that a pluralistic nonreductive approach is especially appropriate in child and adolescent psychiatry

In this paper I argue that a Naturalist conception of personhood, such as the one defended by Derek Parfit, implies that there are degrees of personhood, i.e., that it makes sense to say one individual has a greater degree of personhood than another. I describe both criteria of general personhood, which distinguish between persons and non-persons, and criteria of particular personhood, which distinguish between one person and another. I examine some of the consequences for ethics, including the rights to life, self-determination, and treatment. There may be circumstances in medicine where we have to judge the value of a patient's life in order to decide what medical treatment, if any, to provide, and although it may be emotionally difficult and politically dangerous, one relevant factor is what degree of personhood that individual has

Philosophers and psychologists have long tried to understand people's irrational behaviour through concepts such as weakness of will, compulsion and addiction. The scientific basis of the project has been greatly enhanced by advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, some philosophers have also been critical of the more general conclusions drawn by the scientists. This is especially true when scientific researchers start making claims that go to philosophical issues, such as free will and responsibility. Conversely, some scientists have been critical of philosophical approaches for not understanding the results of recent research. I examined some of the recent history of scientific claims about addiction, and the rise of the claims from scientists to have shown that addiction is a brain disease and that addictive behaviour is compulsive. Given the well-confirmed evidence that addicts can modulate their behaviour in response to rewards, punishments and context, it is clear that according to normal definitions of compulsivity the behaviour of addicts is not typically compulsive, suggesting that neuroscientists are making an error in their interpretation of data. Since philosophers have expertise in making distinctions between different kinds of action and categorising them as free, weak-willed and compulsive, we will achieve a better interpretation of the neuroscience of addiction when taking this philosophical work into account. Conversely, given the status of science in the modern world, philosophers have to grapple with the latest neuroscientific discoveries and show the compatibility of their philosophical theories with the data for their approaches to maintain credibility

In response to recent concerns about the overmedication of children, this paper considers ethical and conceptual issues that arise in the issue of when children who are diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder should be given stimulants such as the psychotropic drug Ritalin as part of their treatment. There is considerable resistance and worry about the possibility of overmedication. This is linked to the worry that the diagnosis of ADHD is overused, and the paper considers some reasons to worry about the overuse of the diagnosis itself. The paper then focuses on the resistance to the use of drugs, which is particularly strong for children in the gray area of diagnosis, where it is dubious whether the children really meet the strict diagnostic criteria. The reasons behind such resistance are often not well articulated, so part of the task of the paper is spell out what they might be. The reasons are given the following labels: side effects, unnaturalness, profit motives, thought control, competitiveness, and doctors' power. The paper ends in taking the polemical position that while there is some legitimate concern about possible short and long term side effects of children taking psychotropic drugs, the other reasons for resistance are not well‐founded.