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72Medicating Children: The Case of RitalinBioethics 11 (3-4): 228-240. 1997.In response to recent concerns about the overmedication of children, this paper considers ethical and conceptual issues that arise in the issue of when children who are diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder should be given stimulants such as the psychotropic drug Ritalin as part of their treatment. There is considerable resistance and worry about the possibility of overmedication. This is linked to the worry that the diagnosis of ADHD is overused, and the paper considers some r…Read more
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67The Place of Moral Responsibility and Mental IllnessAmerican Journal of Bioethics 9 (9): 32-33. 2009.
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66Resisting the Temptations of Addiction RhetoricAmerican Journal of Bioethics 2 (2): 51-52. 2002.
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66Degrees of PersonhoodJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (2): 173-197. 1997.In this paper I argue that a Naturalist conception of personhood, such as the one defended by Derek Parfit, implies that there are degrees of personhood, i.e., that it makes sense to say one individual has a greater degree of personhood than another. I describe both criteria of general personhood, which distinguish between persons and non-persons, and criteria of particular personhood, which distinguish between one person and another. I examine some of the consequences for ethics, including the …Read more
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43Bridging the gap between philosophers of mind and brain researchers: The example of addictionMens Sana Monographs 9 (1): 193. 2011.Philosophers and psychologists have long tried to understand people's irrational behaviour through concepts such as weakness of will, compulsion and addiction. The scientific basis of the project has been greatly enhanced by advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, some philosophers have also been critical of the more general conclusions drawn by the scientists. This is especially true when scientific researchers start making claims that go to philosophical issues, such as fre…Read more
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39Problems With Non-Naturalistic Accounts of Non-VoluntarinessPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (1): 17-19. 2015.The debate in philosophy of science in the twentieth century over the theory-laden-ness of observation showed both that there are many ways in which scientific observation depends on theory, and also highlighted some ways in which it is blind to theoretical assumptions. Debates in the philosophy of medicine have shown how concepts and theories of illness are value-laden, especially in psychiatry. Kious in his helpful and stimulating target article argues that the mainstream approach to autonomy …Read more
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38When self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughtsPhilosophical Review 110 (4): 623-626. 2001.Stephens and Grahamset themselves an apparently modest task, to understand why people who experience alien voices and inserted thoughts do not believe that they themselves are the source of these experiences. However, it soon becomes clear that there are many connected issues here. In eight short chapters, they address the phenomenology and ontology of consciousness, the phenomenology of alien voices, inserted thoughts, obsessive-compulsive thoughts and feelings, and other cases of unusual exper…Read more
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37The neuron doctrine in psychiatryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 846-847. 1999.Gold & Stoljar's target article is important because it shows the limitations of neurobiological theories of the mind more powerfully than previous philosophical criticisms, especially those that focus on the subjective nature of experience and those that use considerations from philosophy of language to argue for the holism of the mental. They use less controversial assumptions and clearer arguments, the conclusions of which are applicable to the whole of neuroscience. Their conclusions can be …Read more
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30Direct, fully intentional self-deception is also realBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 123-124. 1997.An important way to become self-deceived, omitted by Mele, is by intentionally ignoring and avoiding the contemplation of evidence one has for an upsetting conclusion, knowing full well that one is giving priority to one's present peace of mind over the search for truth. Such intentional self-deception may be especially hard to observe scientifically.
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29John Martin Fischer , Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (6): 458-460. 2013.
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27Derek Bolton, What is Mental Disorder? An Essay in Philosophy, Science, and Values Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 29 (5): 318-320. 2009.
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26Methodology in Ascribing Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1): 17-20. 2014.There is much to admire in Michelle Ciurria’s provocative approach to ascribing moral responsibility. Her work is detailed and spells out explicitly her methodological assumptions. In this commentary, my main focus is on the methodological assumptions she makes. Ciurria’s arguments often depend on our reactions to actual cases and thought experiments. She takes it for granted that we need a theory that matches certain of our intuitions. This is not an unreasonable way to proceed. We definitely n…Read more
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24Review of Allan V. Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness (review)American Journal of Bioethics 4 (2): 70-72. 2004.
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20Addiction requires philosophical explanation, not mere redescriptionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4): 592-593. 1996.Heyman's model explains the irrationality of addictive behavior, but it does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether this behavior is voluntary because it does not address the issue of the choice of preference functions. Furthermore, although Heyman disconfirms the disease model of addiction, this does not resolve the issue of whether addiction should be classified as a mental illness.
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20Conceptualiser les troubles mentaux chez les enfants et les adolescentsPhilosophiques 33 (1): 65-79. 2006.J’explore de façon critique la supposition du DSM[1] et de théoriciens tels que Wakefield et Gert selon laquelle les troubles mentaux doivent être attribués à un individu plutôt qu’à un groupe de personnes. Cette supposition est particulièrement problématique en pédopsychiatrie où le système familial est très souvent au centre de l’attention clinique. Il y a bien sûr des éléments de preuve substantiels indiquant que certains troubles mentaux des individus sont causés par leurs relations avec les…Read more
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19Rae Langton , Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (review)Philosophy in Review 31 (4): 287-289. 2011.
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