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103Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive EgalitarianismIn Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V., Duepublico. pp. 525-535. 2013.Distributive egalitarians believe that distributive justice is to be explained by the idea of distributive equality (DE) and that DE is of intrinsic value. The socio-relational critique argues that distributive egalitarianism does not account for the “true” value of equality, which rather lies in the idea of “equality as a substantive social value” (ESV). This paper examines the socio-relational critique and argues that it fails because – contrary to what the critique presupposes –, first, ESV i…Read more
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54The Philosophical Biography of the Utilitarian Tradition: Is Sidgwick a Point of Culmination?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (1): 124-140. 2020.
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54Norbert Anwander, Versprechen und Verpflichten (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1): 117-119. 2010.
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48Zwei (mal zwei) Perspektiven in der Zukunftsethik. Kommentar zu Was schulden wir künftigen Generationen?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1): 138-143. 2019.
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39On 'imperfect' imperfect duties and the epistemic demands of integrationist approaches to justiceEthics, Policy and Environment 17 (1): 39-42. 2014.Christian Baatz claims that individuals have an imperfect duty to reduce emissions as far as can reasonably be demanded of them. His ‘epistemic’ argument roughly runs like this:(P1...
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39The Deontic Transfer PrincipleErkenntnis 86 (5): 1185-1195. 2021.The Deontic Transfer Principle states that if it is permissible for a person A to cause another person B harm H then, other things being equal, it is permissible for A to impose a risk of harm H on B. In this article we show that the Deontic Transfer Principle is vulnerable to counterexamples, and that the same is true of a range of closely related principles. We conclude that the deontic status of a risk imposition is not directly inherited from the deontic properties of deterministic acts.
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29Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.Consequentialism is a focal point of discussion and a driving force behind important developments in moral philosophy. Recently, the debate has shifted in focus and in style. By seeking to consequentialize rival moral theories, in particular those with agent-relative characteristics, and by framing accounts in terms of reasons rather than in terms of value, an emerging new wave consequentialism has presented - at much higher levels of abstraction - theories which proved extremely flexible and po…Read more
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24Climate Justice: An IntroductionRoutledge. 2016.The link between justice and climate change is becoming increasingly prominent in public debates on climate policy. This clear and concise philosophical introduction to climate justice addresses the hot topic of climate change as a moral challenge. Using engaging everyday examples the authors address the core arguments by providing a comprehensive and balanced overview of this heated debate, enabling students and practitioners to think critically about the subject area and to promote discussion …Read more
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207. Normative Bedingungen personaler AutonomieIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 259-323. 2016.
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18Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (4): 609-614. 2008.
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18Autonomie und prozedurale Unabhängigkeit: eine Verhältnisbestimmung anhand der Debatte um MenschenwürdeIn Alfred Dunshirn, Elisabeth Nemeth & Gerhard Unterthurner (eds.), Crossing Borders - Grenzen (Über)Denken - Thinking (Across) Boundaries. Beiträge zum 9. Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Österreichische Gesellschaft Für Philosophie. pp. 619-629. 2012.
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16Equality, Justice and Feasibility: An Ethical Analysis of the WBGU’s Budget ApproachClimatic Change 133 (3): 397-406. 2015.According to the Budget Approach proposed by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), allocating CO2 emission rights to countries on an equal per-capita basis would provide an ethically justified response to global climate change. In this paper, we will highlight four normative issues which beset the WBGU’s Budget Approach: (1) the approach’s core principle of distributive justice, the principle of equality, and its associated policy of emissions egalitarianism are much more complex …Read more
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15Personale Autonomie als praktische AutoritätDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (6): 897-915. 2011.Autonomy and authority are often regarded as opposites. In this paper, I argue that autonomy should be conceived of as a specific form of (practical) authority and that this perspective is useful for identifying the conditions of personal autonomy. I will first highlight some structural analogies in the functioning of the concepts "autonomy" and "authority" and explain the resulting constraints on accounts of personal autonomy. I will then show that the problems of certain internalist and extern…Read more
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144. Ein reines Weltverhältnis? Externalistische TheorienIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 99-139. 2016.
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136. Eine Diagnose: Autonomie als dicker normativer BegriffIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 189-258. 2016.
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12Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie.De Gruyter. 2016.What is it for a person to be autonomous? Starting with a philosophical puzzle about personal autonomy and by way of critically discussing contemporary accounts, this monograph argues that AUTONOMY is a thick normative concept – the concept of a certain kind of practical authority. It then develops a conception of autonomy which solves the puzzle and offers an adequate understanding of what it means to determine oneself.
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122. Das Rätsel personaler AutonomieIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 38-64. 2016.
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10Die normative Grundlage intergenerationeller Unternehmensethik. Zwei Ansätze, zwei SchwierigkeitenZeitschrift Für Wirtschafts- Und Unternehmensethik 2 (21): 128-164. 2020.There are two accounts of the normative foundation of intergenerationel business ethics, agent-variant theories and agent-invariant theories. Each of them faces a specific challenge: agent-variant theories have to deal with the inverse non-identity problem, while agent-invariant theories are vulnerable to the moral crowding-out effect. Both are particularly difficult to deal with within a reductivist approach that conceives of corporations as distinct moral agents whose responsibility cannot be …Read more
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91. Die philosophische AufgabeIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 11-37. 2016.
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8Feasibility, normative heuristics and the proper place of historical responsibility – a reply to Ohndorf et al.Climate Change 2 (140): 101-107. 2017.In this comment, we pick up three points raised by Ohndorf et al. (Clim Chang 133:385–395, 2015) in their reply to our ethical assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). First, we discuss and clarify the relationship between ethics and political feasibility, highlighting that the way Ohndorf et al. use feasibility creates an unwarranted status quo bias. Second, we explain the proper place historical responsibility should have within the WBGUBA, stressing the fact that …Read more
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8LiteraturverzeichnisIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 329-340. 2016.
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7EinleitungIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 1-8. 2016.
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7Précis zu "Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie"Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (2): 289-293. 2017.
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6ZusammenfassungIn Selbst bestimmen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung personaler Autonomie., De Gruyter. pp. 324-328. 2016.
Christian Seidel
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
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Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)Professor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
19th Century Philosophy |