•  47
    La procrastination est-elle possible? Procrastination, souci de soi et identité personnelle
    RÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 7 13-43. 2013.
  •  37
    The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of Emotions
    Philosophies 8 (6): 117. 2023.
    Cognitive Theories of emotions have enjoyed great popularity in recent times. Allegedly, the so-called Perceptual Theory constitutes the most attractive version of this approach. However, the Perceptual Theory has come under increasing pressure. There are at least two ways to deal with the barrage of objections, which have been mounted against the Perceptual Theory. One is to argue that the objections work only if one assumes an overly narrow conception of what perception consists in. On a bette…Read more
  •  50
    Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quels sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme quand on ress…Read more
  •  1
    Perspectives on Ill-Being (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  267
    Plus on monte plus on s’amuse : Introduction
    Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2): 149-151. 2014.
    Fabrice Correia ,Christine Tappolet
  •  71
    Précis of Emotions, Values, and Agency
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 494-499. 2018.
  •  12
    Introduction
    Philosophiques 28 (1): 3-8. 2001.
  •  29
    La nature des normes
    Philosophiques 28 (1): 3. 2001.
  •  7
    Une Théorie du Bien-Être Comme Bonheur Approprié
    Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 17 112-125. 2022.
    Il existe un lien intuitif entre le bien-être et le bonheur. Nous souhaitons proposer une nouvelle théorie selon laquelle le bien-être consiste en un bonheur approprié. Notre théorie peut être considérée comme la combinaison de quatre thèses. La première thèse est que le bonheur psychologique consiste en une balance largement positive d’états affectifs tels que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels. La seconde est que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels sont diffé…Read more
  •  9
    What would a person look like if she were to possess a virtue like compassion or courage? This is the question that will come to mind when contemplating the hau.
  •  225
    Well-Being as Fitting Happiness
    In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness, Oxford University Press. pp. 267-289. 2022.
    There is an intuitive connection between well-being and happiness. Accordingly, many theories of well-being hold that well-being consists in (either unqualified or properly qualified) happiness. Traditional happiness-based theories are subject, however, to several important objections. The goal in this chapter is to offer a new happiness-based theory that is immune to the main objections raised against traditional happiness-based theories. The authors’ own fitting happiness theory of well-being …Read more
  •  2
    Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions1
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 32. 2006.
  •  1
  •  460
    Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions
    In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays, Routledge. 2020.
    Most of those who hold that emotions involve appraisals also accept that the content of emotions is nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for the difference between emotions and evaluative judgements. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose …Read more
  •  290
    In this paper, we propose a defence of Value Realism that relies on the unusual combination of Values Realism with Sentimentalism. What this account, which we call “Sentimental Realism”, holds, in a nutshell, is that what makes evaluative facts special is their relationship to emotions. More precisely, Sentimental Realism claims that evaluative facts are fully objective facts, but that such facts are picked out by concepts that are response-dependent, in the sense that they are essentially tied …Read more
  •  1607
    Les Concepts de l'éthique
    with Ruwen Ogien
    Hermann Editeur. 2009.
    Qu’est-ce qui justifie des normes comme « Tu ne tueras point » ou «Nul ne peut être soumis à la torture »? C’est autour de cette question fondamentale que se sont constituées les trois grandes théories morales : l’éthique des vertus (inspirée d’Aristote), l’éthique des devoirs (mise en forme par Kant) et l’éthique des conséquences (matrice de l’utilitarisme). Qu’est-ce qui distingue ces trois approches ? Y a-t-il des raisons décisives d’en préférer une ? Dans ce livre, Ruwen Ogien et Christine …Read more
  •  29
    Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emot…Read more
  •  57
    A critical review of John Cottingham's "Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, cartesian, and psychoanalytic ethics" Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  •  23
    Introduction
    In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions, Routledge. pp. 1-9. 2018.
  •  15
    Many people place great stock in the importance of civic virtue to the success of democratic communities. Is this hope well-grounded? The fundamental question is whether it is even possible to cultivate ethical and civic virtues in the first place. Taking for granted that it is possible, at least three further questions arise: What are the key elements of civic virtue? How should we cultivate these virtuous dispositions? And finally, how should schools be organized in order to make the education…Read more
  •  95
    Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emot…Read more
  •  17
    Précis de Emotions, Values, and Agency
    Philosophiques 45 (2): 461-465. 2018.
    This is a summary of my 2016 book.
  •  11
    Réponses à mes critiques
    Philosophiques 45 (2): 513-526. 2018.
    Christine Tappolet
  •  281
    Weakness of will and practical irrationality (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the conn…Read more
  •  38
    Replies
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 525-537. 2018.
  •  252
    This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual t…Read more
  •  510
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  •  25
    Reply to Kurth, Crosby, and Basse’s review of Emotions, Values, and Agency
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (4): 500-504. 2018.
    In this reply, I argue that the worries raised by Kurth and this coauthors are not fatal for the perceptual theory of emotions. A first point to keep in mind in discussing the analogy argument in favor of that account is that what counts is the overall balance of similarities and differences, given their respective weight. In any case, I argue that none of the alleged differences between sensory perceptual experiences and emotions are such as to rule out that emotions are a kind of perceptual ex…Read more