•  15
    Varieties of the Cruelty-Based Objection to Factory Farming
    Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (3): 377-390. 2019.
    Timothy Hsiao defends industrial animal agriculture from the “strongest version of the cruelty objection” :37–54, 2017). The cruelty objection, following Rachels Food for thought: the debate over eating meat, Prometheus, Amherst, 2004), is that, because it is wrong to cause pain without a morally good reason, and there is no morally good reason for the pain caused in factory farming, factory farming is morally indefensible.In this paper, I do not directly engage Hsiao’s argument for the moral pe…Read more
  •  7
    Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3): 379-404. 2020.
    Hope is important in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the emotions: it is one of the four primary emotions and the first of the irascible emotions. Yet his account of hope as a movement of the sensory appetite toward a future possible good that is arduous to attain appears to be overly restrictive, for people often hope for things that are not cognized as arduous. This paper examines Aquinas’s reasons for limiting hope to arduous goods.
  •  10
    Revisiting Anselm on Time and Divine Eternity
    Heythrop Journal. forthcoming.
    How to understand Saint Anselm of Canterbury on time and divine eternity is subject to debate. Katherin Rogers argues that Anselm is a four‐dimensionalist, whereas Brian Leftow argues that he is a presentist. Despite the disagreement, both scholars assume that Anselm has a positive account of time and divine eternity to offer. I challenge this assumption, arguing that Anselm is not interested in offering an account of the metaphysics of time and divine eternity. The reading defended here is defl…Read more
  • David DeGrazia and Stuart Rachels, among others, offer moral arguments in favor of adopting a vegetarian diet that have, they claim, broad appeal. Rather than relying on an account of animal rights or a particular ethical theory, these arguments rely on the moral principle that an extensive amount of pain requires moral justification. Since people do not need to eat meat in order to survive, the arguments conclude that the pain that animals experience in factory farming is unjustified. I argue t…Read more
  •  4
    Thomas Aquinas divides the sensory appetite into two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible. The irascible power moves creatures toward arduous goods and away from arduous evils, while the concupiscible power moves creatures toward pleasant goods and away from non-arduous evils. Despite the importance of this distinction, it remains unclear what counts as an arduous good or evil, and why arduousness is the defining feature of the division. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue th…Read more
  •  2
    Revisiting Aquinas on the Passion of Despair
    New Blackfriars. forthcoming.
    New Blackfriars, EarlyView.
  •  5
    Deflating Moods
    Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1): 25-32. 2017.
  •  44
    Hope and practical deliberation
    Analysis 77 (3): 495-497. 2017.
    Accounts of practical deliberation tend to overlook any possible role for hope. I offer an argument showing that hope sets the ends of our practical deliberations and is thereby necessary for practical deliberation. It is because I hope to summit the mountain by midday that I deliberate about how to do so. Absent this particular hope, I could not deliberate about how to summit the mountain by midday.
  •  6
    In Defense of Virtue-Responsibilism
    Logos and Episteme 4 (2): 201-216. 2013.
    Modest realism affirms that some of the objects of our beliefs exist independently of our beliefs. That is, there is a mind-independent world that we canepistemically access. The Cartesian skeptic claims that we can’t offer any non-question-begging arguments in favor of modest realism and therefore we are not justified in believing that modest realism is true. Reliabilists argue that the skeptic assumes an evidentialist-internalist account of justification and that a proper account of justificat…Read more
  •  23
    The Conciliatory View and the Charge of Wholesale Skepticism
    Logos and Episteme 3 (4): 619-627. 2012.
    If I reasonably think that you and I enjoy the same evidence as well as virtues and vices, then we are epistemic peers. What does rationality require of usshould we disagree? According to the conciliatory view, I should become less confident in my belief upon finding out that you, whom I take to be my peer, disagree with me. Question: Does the conciliatory view lead to wholesale skepticism regarding areas of life where disagreement is rampant? After all, people focusing on the same arguments and…Read more
  •  64
    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation
    Philosophia 42 (2): 309-320. 2014.
    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. In this paper, I offer a novel counterexampl…Read more
  •  153
    God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument
    Sophia 52 (4): 593-600. 2013.
    The Kalām cosmological argument deploys the following causal principle: whatever begins to exist has a cause. Yet, under what conditions does something ‘begin to exist’? What does it mean to say that ‘X begins to exist at t’? William Lane Craig has offered and defended various accounts that seek to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for when something ‘begins to exist.’ I argue that all of the accounts that William Lane Craig has offered fail on the following grounds: either they …Read more
  •  14
    Leibniz on unbaptized infant damnation
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2): 185-194. 2016.
    Leibniz consistently denies that unbaptized infants are condemned to hell in virtue of original sin. He is less than forthcoming, however, about where they go when they die. Scholars are divided on this issue. Some think that, according to Leibniz, they go to limbo, while others think that he is committed to the view that they go to heaven. The aim of this paper is to show that this scholarly attention is misguided and that Leibniz does not defend a position regarding the fate of unbaptized infa…Read more
  •  41
    Why Hope is not a Moral Virtue: Aquinas's Insight
    Ratio 31 (2): 214-232. 2018.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers that hope is a moral virtue: the virtuously hopeful person experiences the right amount of hope for the right things. This moralization of hope presents us with a puzzle. The historical consensus is that hope is a passion and hope is a theological virtue, not a moral virtue. Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher who wrote most extensively on hope, offers an explanation for why hope is not a moral virtue. The aim of this paper is argue that Aquinas is rig…Read more