•  440
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promis…Read more
  •  355
    Fake News, Relevant Alternatives, and the Degradation of Our Epistemic Environment
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1. forthcoming.
    This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environ…Read more
  •  333
    Acting and believing on the basis of reasons
    Philosophy Compass 17 (1). 2021.
    This paper provides an opinionated guide to discussions of acting and believing on the basis of reasons. I aim to bring closer together largely separate literatures in practical rea- son and in epistemology. I focus on three questions. First, is basing causing? Causal theories of basing remain popular despite the notorious Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. Causal theorists in both the epistemic and practical domains have begun to appeal to dispositions to try and solve the problem. Second, how u…Read more
  •  296
    The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1): 86-101. 2022.
    An influential way of distinguishing inferential from non-inferential processes appeals to representational states: an agent infers a conclusion from some premises only if she represents those premises as supporting that conclusion. By contrast, when some premises merely cause an agent to believe the conclusion, there is no relevant representational state. While promising, the appeal to representational states invites a regress problem, first famously articulated by Lewis Carroll. This paper dev…Read more
  •  274
    Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism
    Philosophical Studies 178 (12): 4099-4118. 2021.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. A key objection to logical pluralism is that it collapses into monism. The core of the Collapse Objection is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does any genuine normative work; since a logic must do genuine normative work, this means that the pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her strongest logic being the one true logic. This paper considers a neglected question in the collapse debate: what is it for …Read more
  •  227
    Deflationism About Logic
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3): 551-571. 2020.
    Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this orthodoxy. In Williamson’s recent presentation of deflationism, logic’s primary concern is with universal generalizations over absolutely everything. As well as an interesting account of logic in its own right, deflationism has also been recruited to decide between competing logics in resolving semantic paradoxes. This paper defends deflationism from…Read more
  •  27
    Correction to: Deflationism About Logic
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3): 573-573. 2020.
    The original version of this article unfortunately contains mistakes introduced by the publisher during the production process. The mistakes and corrections are described in the following list.