•  84
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promis…Read more
  •  46
    Deflationism About Logic
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3): 551-571. 2020.
    Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this orthodoxy. In Williamson’s recent presentation of deflationism, logic’s primary concern is with universal generalizations over absolutely everything. As well as an interesting account of logic in its own right, deflationism has also been recruited to decide between competing logics in resolving semantic paradoxes. This paper defends deflationism from…Read more
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  •  27
    The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1-16. forthcoming.
    An influential way of distinguishing inferential from non-inferential processes appeals to representational states: an agent infers a conclusion from some premises only if she represents those premises as supporting that conclusion. By contrast, when some premises merely cause an agent to believe the conclusion, there is no relevant representational state. While promising, the appeal to representational states invites a regress problem, first famously articulated by Lewis Carroll. This paper dev…Read more
  •  20
    Correction to: Deflationism About Logic
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3): 573-573. 2020.
    The original version of this article unfortunately contains mistakes introduced by the publisher during the production process. The mistakes and corrections are described in the following list.
  • Fake News, Relevant Alternatives, and the Degradation of Our Epistemic Environment
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1. 2020.
    This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environ…Read more