•  334
    Suicide is neither rational nor irrational
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5). 2006.
    Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I…Read more
  •  288
    Understanding another's wrongdoing
    Philosophy and Literature 35 (1): 79-90. 2011.
    In Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov is an impoverished university student who commits a brutal double-murder of an old money-lender and her sister, and then for much of the novel manages to evade detection.1 He is racked by guilt and anxiety from the act. Sonia is a young woman who lives with her parents and several siblings. Her father is an alcoholic, unable to hold down a job, and Sonia has therefore become a prostitute to support the family. What is remarkabl…Read more
  •  174
    A new defence of Williams's reasons-internalism
    Philosophical Investigations 28 (4). 2005.
    Williams's classic 1980 article ‘Internal and External Reasons’ has attracted much criticism, but, in my view, has never been properly refuted. I wish to describe and defend Williams's account against three powerful criticisms by Michael Smith, John McDowell and Tim Scanlon. In addition, I draw certain implications from Williams's account – implications with which Williams would not necessarily agree – about the nature and the role of the personal in ethics. Williams's insight, that a reason (in…Read more
  •  156
    In a recent Bioethics editorial, Udo Schuklenk argues against allowing Canadian doctors to conscientiously object to any new euthanasia procedures approved by Parliament. In this he follows Julian Savulescu's 2006 BMJ paper which argued for the removal of the conscientious objection clause in the 1967 UK Abortion Act. Both authors advance powerful arguments based on the need for uniformity of service and on analogies with reprehensible kinds of personal exemption. In this article I want to defen…Read more
  •  143
    Euthanasia in psychiatry can never be justified. A reply to Wijsbek
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (3): 227-238. 2013.
    In a recent article, Henri Wijsbek discusses the 1991 Chabot “psychiatric euthanasia” case in the Netherlands, and argues that Chabot was justified in helping his patient to die. Dutch legislation at the time permitted physician assisted suicide when the patient’s condition is severe, hopeless, and unbearable. The Dutch Supreme Court agreed with Chabot that the patient met these criteria because of her justified depression, even though she was somatically healthy. Wijsbek argues that in this cas…Read more
  •  136
    In a recent issue of Bioethics, Bernard Gesang asks whether a moral philosopher possesses greater moral expertise than a non-philosopher, and his answer is a qualified yes, based not so much on his infallible access to the truth, but on the quality of his theoretically-informed moral justifications. I reject Gesang's claim that there is such a thing as moral expertise, although the moral philosopher may well make a valid contribution to the ethics committee as a concerned and educated citizen. I…Read more
  •  133
    Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3). 2005.
    Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, app…Read more
  •  93
    Regret, Remorse and the Twilight Perspective
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5): 624-634. 2017.
    I examine the ‘momentous’ choices that one makes early in life – about career or spouse, for example – and I ask what it means to regret such choices at the end of one’s life. I argue that such regrets are almost meaningless because of the difficulty of imaginatively accessing a much earlier self. I then contrast long-term regret to remorse, and argue that the two are qualitatively different experiences because remorse involves another person as victim.
  •  78
    Why Genuine Forgiveness must be Elective and Unconditional
    Ethical Perspectives 17 (4): 556. 2010.
    Charles Griswold’s 2007 book Forgiveness argues that genuine forgiveness of an unexcused, unjustified and unignored offence must be normgoverned and conditional. In the same way that gift-giving is governed by norms of appropriateness, so too is forgiveness; and the appropriateness of forgiving is centrally dependent on the offender’s repentance. In response, I claim that genuine forgiveness must always be elective and unconditional, and therefore genuinely unpredictable, no matter how much – or…Read more
  •  73
    In this article I consider the case of the surgical separation of conjoined twins resulting in the immediate and predictable death of the weaker one. The case was submitted to English law by the hospital, and the operation permitted against the parents’ wishes. I consider the relationship between the legal decision and the moral reasons adduced in its support, reasons gaining their force against the framework of much mainstream normative ethical theory. I argue that in a few morally dilemmatic s…Read more
  •  70
    Learning to Love
    Philosophical Topics 38 (1): 1-15. 2010.
    Imagine that you find yourself in a situation of considerable adversity and apparent permanence. Does it make sense for me to advise you to learn to love your situation? I argue that such advice is capable of a robust meaning beyond the mere expression of compassion, and far beyond the pragmatic advice to ‘accept it’ or ‘make the best of it’. I respond to the objections that love cannot be commanded, and that I am counselling pernicious forms of self-deception or self-deprecation. The key, I sug…Read more
  •  70
    The dangers of medical ethics
    Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (12): 739-742. 2005.
    Next SectionThe dominant conception of medical ethics being taught in British and American medical schools is at best pointless and at worst dangerous, or so it will be argued. Although it is laudable that medical schools have now given medical ethics a secure place in the curriculum, they go wrong in treating it like a scientific body of knowledge. Ethics is a unique subject matter precisely because of its widespread familiarity in all areas of life, and any teaching has to start from this shar…Read more
  •  70
    A New Rejection of Moral Expertise
    Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 8 (3): 273-279. 2005.
    There seem to be two clearly-defined camps in the debate over the problem of moral expertise. On the one hand are the “Professionals”, who reject the possibility entirely, usually because of the intractable diversity of ethical beliefs. On the other hand are the “Ethicists”, who criticise the Professionals for merely stipulating science as the most appropriate paradigm for discussions of expertise. While the subject matter and methodology of good ethical thinking is certainly different from that…Read more
  •  67
    Medical Ethics and Law: the Core Curriculum
    Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (4): 409-409. 2004.
    This is a slim, user friendly volume designed to introduce medical students and practicing clinicians to some basic issues of medical law and ethics, as well as to the ways in which lawyers and philosophers characteristically think. The book is divided into two parts: the first adumbrates the main ethical theories, some central ethical concepts, the role of law in society, and the English legal system ; the second part comprises chapters about key issues such as “consent”, “reproductive medicine…Read more
  •  67
    Book reviews (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3): 347-351. 2008.
  •  63
    Most discussions in ethics argue that a certain practice or act is morally justified, with any underlying theory taken as supporting a guide to general action by aiding discovery of the objectively and singularly right thing to do. I suggest that this oversimplifies the agent’s own experience of the moral dilemma, and I take the recent English case of Diane Pretty’s request for assisted suicide as an example. Here the law reacted one way, despite the obvious sympathy many felt for her. This only…Read more
  •  59
    Introduction: The agents, acts and attitudes of supererogation
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 1-23. 2015.
    I confess to finding the term ‘supererogation’ ugly and unpronounceable. I am also generally suspicious of technical terms in moral philosophy, since they are vulnerable to self-serving definition and counter-definition, to the point of obscuring whether there is a single phenomenon about which to disagree. It was surely not accidental that J.O. Urmson, in his classic 1958 article that launched the contemporary Anglophone debate, eschewed the technical term in favour of the more familiar concept…Read more
  •  55
    Justifying terminal care by 'retrospective quality-adjusted life-years'
    Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (5): 290-292. 2010.
    A lot of medical procedures can be justified in terms of the number of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) they can be expected to generate; that is, the number of extra years that the procedure will provide, with the quality of life during those extra years factored in. QALYs are a crude tool, but good enough for many decisions. Notoriously, however, they cannot justify spending any money on terminal care (and indeed on older people in general). In this paper I suggest a different way of constr…Read more
  •  54
    Conscientious objection in healthcare and the duty to refer
    Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (4): 207-212. 2017.
    Although some healthcare professionals have the legal right to conscientiously object to authorise or perform certain lawful medical services, they have an associated duty to provide the patient with enough information to seek out another professional willing to authorise or provide the service (the ‘duty to refer’). Does the duty to refer morally undermine the professional's conscientious objection (CO)? I narrow my discussion to the National Health Service in Britain, and the case of a general…Read more
  •  54
    Polemic: five proposals for a medical school admission policy
    Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (8): 491-494. 2006.
    Five proposals for admitting better applicants into medical school are discussed in this article: An A level in a humanity or social science would be required, to supplement—not replace—the stringent science requirement. This would ensure that successful candidates would be better “primed” for the medical curriculum. Extra points in the applicant’s initial screening would be awarded for an A level in English literature. There would be a minimum age of 23 for applicants, although a prior degree w…Read more
  •  46
    Dementia, identity and the role of friends
    Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (2): 255-264. 2018.
    Ronald Dworkin introduced the example of Margo, who was so severely demented that she could not recognise any family or friends, and could not remember anything of her life. At the same time, however, she seemed full of childish delight. Dworkin also imagines that, before her dementia, Margo signed an advance refusal of life-saving treatment. Now severely demented, she develops pneumonia, easy to treat, but lethal if untreated. Dworkin argues that the advance refusal ought to be heeded and Margo…Read more
  •  46
    Education, Despair and Morality: A Reply to Roberts
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (4). 2016.
    In a recent thought-provoking piece, Peter Roberts argues against the central role of happiness as a guiding concept in education, and argues for more attention to be paid to despair. This does not mean cultivating despair in young people, but allowing them to make sense of their own natural occasional despair, as well as the despair of others. I agree with Roberts about happiness, and about the need for more attention to despair, but I argue that focusing too much on despair is dangerous withou…Read more
  •  41
    Education, Despair and Morality: A Reply to Roberts
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (1): 298-309. 2017.
    In a recent thought-provoking piece, Peter Roberts argues against the central role of happiness as a guiding concept in education, and argues for more attention to be paid to despair. This does not mean cultivating despair in young people, but allowing them to make sense of their own natural occasional despair, as well as the despair of others. I agree with Roberts about happiness, and about the need for more attention to despair, but I argue that focusing too much on despair is dangerous withou…Read more
  •  40
    Moral Necessity and the Personal
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1): 123-138. 2004.
    I claim that the dominant moral-realist understanding of action and moral responsibility cannot provide a comprehensive account of morality since it neglects the irreducibly personal component of the individual’s moral experience. This is not to embrace non-cognitivism, however; indeed, I challenge the whole realist framework of most contemporary moral philosophy. To this end I explore the phenomenon of moral necessity, exemplified by Luther’s declaration that he “has to” continue his protests a…Read more
  •  39
    Conscientious objection and the limits of dialogue
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (10): 1004-1014. 2016.
    In Kimberly Brownlee’s book, Conscience and Conviction, she argues that Thomas More’s paradigmatic ‘personal objection’ successfully meets the 4 conditions of her ‘Communicative Principle’. In this article I want to challenge Brownlee’s ‘universality’ condition and the ‘dialogical’ condition by focusing on a counter-example of a British GP conscientiously objecting to authorizing an abortion. I argue that such an objection can be morally admirable, even though the GP is not politically active, e…Read more
  •  37
    Justice, Identity and the Family
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5): 754-765. 2015.
  •  37
    The Ethics of Forgiveness: A Collection of Essays (review)
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2): 289-294. 2012.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 289-294, May 2012