University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2010
Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics
Epistemology
Philosophy of Action
Aristotle: First Philosophy
Aristotle: Substance
Aristotle: Form and Matter
Aristotle: Substantial Forms
Aristotle: Actuality and Potentiality
Aristotle: Essence
Aristotle: Metaphysics Theta
Aristotle: Matter and Elements
Aristotle: Cosmology
Aristotle: Biology
Aristotle: Matter and Material Change
Aristotle: Physics
Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption
Aristotle: On the Heavens
Aristotle: On the Soul
Aristotle: Parts of Animals
Aristotle: Generation of Animals
Aristotle: Perception
Aristotle: Theoretical Science
Aristotle: Soul
Aristotle: Philosophy of Science
Aristotle: Parva Naturalia
Pre-Socratic Philosophy
Plato
Ancient Greek and Roman Metaphysics
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy of Mind
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Miscellaneous
G. E. M. Anscombe
Gottlob Frege
20th Century Analytic Philosophy, Misc
Medieval Metaphysics
Medieval Philosophy of Nature
Thomas Aquinas
The Nature of Action
Abilities
Explanation of Action
Intentional Action
Knowledge of Action
Perception and Action
Agency
Practical and Theoretical Reasoning
Practical Reason, Misc
Intentionality
Representation
Perception
The Nature of Perceptual Experience
Intentionalist Theories of Perception
Naive and Direct Realism
The Perceptual Relation
Physical and Animalist Theories Of Personal Identity
Human Nature
Human Beings, Misc
Natural Kinds
Substance
Emergence
Philosophy of Biology
Teleology and Function
Teleology and Function, Misc
Vitalism
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  •  2
    Seeing, Knowing, Understanding: Philosophical Essays by Barry Stroud
    Review of Metaphysics 73 (4): 860-861. 2020.
  • Practical Truth (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  26
    Aristotle on Activity as a Variety of Rest
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. forthcoming.
  •  82
    Phenomenal Presence
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oup Usa. pp. 71-92. 2013.
    I argue that the most common interpretation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately extraneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call core transparency. Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. The objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgm…Read more
  •  3
    To which science, if any, does the intellect’s study belong? Though the student of nature studies every other vital capacity, most interpreters maintain that Aristotle excludes the intellect from natural science’s domain. I survey the three main reasons that lead to this interpretation: the intellect (i) is not realized physiologically in a proprietary organ, (ii) its naturalistic study would corrupt natural science’s boundaries and leave no room for other forms of inquiry, and (iii) it is not…Read more
  •  14
    Greek Models of Mind and Self by A. A. Long (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 69 (1): 145-146. 2015.
  •  189
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;…Read more
  •  9
    Two Conceptions of Soul in Aristotle
    In David Ebrey (ed.), Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 137-160. 2015.
    Aristotle outlines two methods in De Anima that one can employ when one investigates the soul. The first focuses on the exercises of a living organism’s vital capacities and the proper objects upon which these activities are directed. The second focuses on a living organism’s nature, its internal principle of movement and rest, and the single end for the sake of which this principle is exercised. I argue that these two methods yield importantly different, and prima facie incompatible, views abou…Read more
  •  98
    From Blood to Flesh: Homonymy, Unity, and Ways of Being in Aristotle
    Ancient Philosophy 35 (2): 375-394. 2015.
    My topic is the fundamental Aristotelian division between the animate and the inanimate. In particular, I discuss the transformation that occurs when an inanimate body comes to be ensouled. When nutriment is transformed into flesh it is first changed into blood. I argue that blood is unique in being, at one and the same time, both animate and inanimate; it is inanimate nutriment in actuality (or in activity) and animate flesh in potentiality (or in capacity). I provide a detailed exposition of t…Read more
  •  134
  •  74
    _ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 88 - 126 The dominant interpretation of Metaphysics Θ.8 commits Aristotle to the claim that the heavenly bodies’ eternal movements are not the exercises of capacities. Against this, I argue that these movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities. I clarify what it is for a heavenly body to possess a nature and argue that a body’s nature cannot be a final cause unless the natural body possesses capacities that are exercised for the sake of its nat…Read more
  •  83
    Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2): 237-254. 2015.
    I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual …Read more