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327The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the BhagavadgītāPhilosophy East and West 56 (4): 604-617. 2006.Niskamakarma is generally understood nonliterally as action done without desire of a certain sort. It is argued here that all desires are prohibited by niskamakarma. Two objections are considered: 1 desire is a necessary condition of action, and 2 the Indian tradition as a whole accepts desire as a necessary condition of action. A distinction is drawn here between a goal and a desire, and it is argued that goals-not desires-are entailed by action, and that the Indian tradition accepts goals-not …Read more
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84Environmental Ethics and the Mahābhārata : The Case of the Burning of the Forest Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s11841-011-0264-2 Authors Christopher G. Framarin, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. NW, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada Journal Sophia Online ISSN 1873-930X Print ISSN 0038-1527.
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66Atman, identity, and emanation: Arguments for a hindu environmental ethicComparative Philosophy 2 (1): 3-24. 2011.Many contemporary authors argue that since certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman (God), these texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. I outline three common versions of this argument, and argue that each fails to meet at least one criterion for an environmental ethic. This doesn’t mean, however, that certain Hindu texts and traditions do not provide the basis for an environmental ethic. In the last section…Read more
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65Motivation-encompassing attitudesPhilosophical Explorations 11 (2). 2008.Alfred R. Mele defends a broadly 'Humean' theory of motivation. One common dispute between Humeans and anti-Humeans has to do with whether or not a desire is required to motivate action. For the most part Mele avoids this dispute. He claims that there are reasons to think that beliefs cannot motivate action, but finally allows that it might be that it is a contingent fact that beliefs can motivate action in human beings. Instead Mele argues for the claim that certain kinds of desires - namely ac…Read more
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61Desire and motivation in Indian philosophyRoutledge. 2009.They conclude that desireless action is action performed without certain desires; other desires are permissible.In this book, the author surveys the ...
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46Good and bad desires: Implications of the dialogue between kṛṣṇa and arjuna (review)International Journal of Hindu Studies 11 (2): 147-170. 2007.
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43Taking desirelessness () seriouslyAsian Philosophy 15 (2). 2005.There is a principle of charity within the Indian philosophical tradition that states that one is justified in reverting to a non-literal interpretation of a text only when a literal reading entails a clear contradiction. Most scholars have argued that a literal interpretation of the Bhagavadgtā's advice to act without desire ought to be abandoned for this reason, because it contradicts the obvious fact that desire is a necessary condition of action. In this paper two often cited arguments for t…Read more
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42The Problem with Pretending: Rāmānuja’s Arguments Against Jīvanmukti (review)Journal of Indian Philosophy 37 (4): 399-414. 2009.In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appe…Read more
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42Renunciation, Pleasure, and the Good Life in the Saṃnyāsa UpaniṣadsPhilosophy East and West 67 (1): 140-159. 2017.The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads characterize the life of the saṃnyāsin as devoid of earthly pleasures. At the same time, these and other texts record confusion and suspicion toward those who would pursue such a life, and disbelief that such severe austerity could be required. To many, the saṃnyāsin seems to forsake the good life in forsaking earthly pleasures. I call this the ‘Precluded Pleasures Objection’ to the saṃnyāsin ideal. A number of replies to the Precluded Pleasures Objection might be drawn fr…Read more
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42Hinduism and Environmental Ethics: An Analysis and Defense of a Basic AssumptionAsian Philosophy 22 (1): 75-91. 2012.The literature on Hinduism and the environment is vast, and growing quickly. It has benefitted greatly from the work of scholars in a wide range of disciplines, such as religious studies, Asian studies, history, anthropology, political science, and so on. At the same time, much of this work fails to define key terms and make fundamental assumptions explicit. Consequently, it is at least initially difficult to engage with it philosophically. In the first section of this paper, I clarify a central…Read more
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41Motivation in the nyāyasūtra and brahmasiddhiReligious Studies 44 (1): 43-61. 2008.One common interpretation of the orthodox Indian prohibition on desire is that it is a prohibition on phenomenologically salient desires. The Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi seem to support this view. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. The Vedāntins draw a distinction between counting some fact as a reason for acting (icchā) and counting one's desire (rāga) as a reason for acting, and prohibit the latter. The Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between desiring to avoid some state of affairs (d…Read more
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35Karma, Rebirth, and the Value of NatureEnvironmental Ethics 36 (2): 215-233. 2014.Many contemporary authors argue that the Hindu doctrines of karma and/or rebirth entail that both human and nonhuman entities in nature are interconnected, and hence have intrinsic value. These doctrines do not entail that entities in nature are interconnected, however. Even if they did, the interconnectedness of entities cannot establish their intrinsic value. If the interconnectedness of entities did establish their intrinsic value, the account would attribute equal intrinsic value to all thin…Read more
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35Roy W. Perrett argues that the Hindu sage, like the western moral saint, seems precluded from pursuing non-moral ends for their own sakes. If he is precluded from pursuing non-moral ends for their own sakes, then he is precluded from pursuing non-moral virtues, interests, activities, relationships, and so on for their own sakes. A life devoid of every such pursuit seems deficient. Hence, the Hindu sage seems to forsake the good life. In response, I adapt a reply that Vanessa Carbonell offers in …Read more
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31UnselfishnessInternational Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1): 69-83. 2008.In this paper I argue that the prohibition on desire in the orthodox Indian systems is not simply a prohibition on selfish desires. The word “selfish” is ambiguous. It can mean either “self-interested” or “excessively self-interested.” Since only excessively self-interested actions are prohibited, the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on all self-interested desires. But the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on excessively self-interested desires either, because this class…Read more
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29Nikāmakarma: how desireless need one be?1Asian Philosophy 14 (3): 239-254. 2004.In the Bhagavadgītā K a advises Arjuna to act without desire. He also describes the nikāmakarmin as possessed of perfect equanimity. Some scholars have argued that K a's advice is a contradiction. Because action requires desire, desireless action is impossible. Others have claimed that this fact only suggests that K a's prohibition is against a subset of desires and not desire as a whole. These ‘subset’ positions, however, are not consistent with the equanimity requirement. The conclusion that K…Read more
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25Ni K makarma: How desireless need one be?Asian Philosophy 14 (3). 2004.In the Bhagavadgīt K a advises Arjuna to act without desire. He also describes the ni k makarmin as possessed of perfect equanimity. Some scholars have argued that K a's advice is a contradiction. Because action requires desire, desireless action is impossible. Others have claimed that this fact only suggests that K a's prohibition is against a subset of desires and not desire as a whole. These 'subset' positions, however, are not consistent with the equanimity requirement. The conclusion that K…Read more
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24Response to joydeep bagchee's "the bhagavadgītā : Philosophy versus historicismPhilosophy East and West 61 (4): 718-720. 2011.My thanks to Joydeep Bagchee for his review of my book in this issue of Philosophy East and West. Here I will respond to some of his objections, and offer some points of clarification. First, I want to say something about Bagchee's claim that the earlier papers in which I worked out some of my thoughts on the issue of desireless action are relevant to understanding the book. Bagchee seems to mean this as a criticism, since he says,Each chapter marks a new ingress into the problem. This only beco…Read more
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19Motivation in the Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi: CHRISTOPHER G. FRAMARINReligious Studies 44 (1): 43-61. 2008.One common interpretation of the orthodox Indian prohibition on desire is that it is a prohibition on phenomenologically salient desires. The Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi seem to support this view. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. The Vedāntins draw a distinction between counting some fact as a reason for acting and counting one's desire as a reason for acting, and prohibit the latter. The Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between desiring to avoid some state of affairs and believing tha…Read more
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12Motivation in the Manusm\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\d{r}$$\end{document}ti (review)Journal of Indian Philosophy 34 (5): 397-413. 2006.
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11The Moral Standing of Animals and Plants in the ManusmṛtiPhilosophy East and West 64 (1): 192-217. 2014.
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9The Householder as Support and Source of the Āśramas in the Mānava DharmaśāstraJournal of Indian Philosophy 49 (1): 1-22. 2021.Medhātithi reduces Manu’s descriptions of the householder as support and source of the āśramas to his performance of the five great sacrifices. Patrick Olivelle characterizes Medhātithi’s interpretation as “radical,” but a strong preliminary case might be made in its favor. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons to resist Medhātithi’s interpretation. The more plausible interpretation of these passages is also the most straightforward. The householder is the support of the other three āśramas…Read more
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2The Use of Lakṣaṇā in Indian ExegesisIn Morny Joy (ed.), After Appropriation: Explorations in Intercultural Philosophy and Religion, University of Calgary Press. pp. 239-256. 2011.
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