•  30
    Fairness, Individuality, and Free Riding
    Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4): 940-959. 2022.
    According to most contemporary theorists, free riding on the cooperative contributions of others is unfair. At the same time, obligations to contribute to cooperative schemes can compel conformity with conventional practices, and can do so to a degree that poses a real threat to individuality. This paper exposes this tension between fairness and individuality, and proposes a way to resolve it. The resolution depends on an alternative approach to understanding fairness—one that appeals to the rel…Read more
  •  67
    On Disgust (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2): 523-526. 2007.
  •  27
    The Environmental Case against Employmentism
    Tandf: Ethics, Policy and Environment 23 (1): 70-84. 2020.
    Since materially opulent lifestyles are a significant cause of environmental degradation, environmentalists often call for us to live more simply. This call is typically focused on consumption. But our environmental footprint is a function of our paid work as well as our purchases. Consequently, environmentalists should also urge us to work less. Defending this claim is the project of this paper. Reducing our economic productivity, I argue, can often be expected to make both the world and our ch…Read more
  •  48
    Economic Envy
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2): 113-126. 2013.
    Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions…Read more
  •  44
    Comparative Pride
    Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275): 315-331. 2019.
    Comparative pride—that is, pride in how one compares to others in some respect—is often thought to be warranted. In this paper, I argue that this common position is mistaken. The paper begins with an analysis of how things seem when a person feels pride. Pride, I claim, presents some aspect of the self with which one identifies as being worthy. Moreover, in some cases, it presents this aspect of the self as something one is responsible for. I then go on to argue that when the focus of one's prid…Read more
  •  8
    Equality and Proportionality
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2): 179-201. 2007.
    The idea that all people are moral equals enjoys broad support. Practically speaking, there is no doubt that this is a great moral victory. Inegalitarian views are often morally arbitrary, and many have been used to support self-serving and deeply harmful actions and policies. Coming, as it does, on the heels of ideas of racial, ethnic, religious, and gender-based superiority, there is no question that the world is a far better place for our commitment to the idea that all (normal adult) humans …Read more
  •  56
    Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of Principle
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2): 174-189. 2009.
    abstract Most critics of species egalitarianism point to its counter‐intuitive implications in particular cases. But this argumentative strategy is vulnerable to the response that our intuitions should give way in the face of arguments showing that species egalitarianism is required by our deepest, most fundamental moral principles. In this article, I develop an argument against deontological versions of species egalitarianism on its own terms. Appealing to the fundamental moral ideal of proport…Read more
  •  11
    Trading Quality for Quantity
    Journal of Philosophical Research 32 211-233. 2007.
    This paper deals with problems that vagueness raises for choices involving evaluative tradeoffs. I focus on a species of such choices, which I call ‘qualitative barrier cases.’ These are cases in which a qualitatively significant tradeoff in one evaluative dimension for a given improvement in another dimension could not make an option better all things considered, but a merely quantitative tradeoff for the given improvement might. Trouble arises, however, when one of the options constitutes a bo…Read more
  • When Hard Choices Become Easy
    American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4): 323-330. 2004.
    We sometimes must choose between options that are neither better than, worse than, nor equally good as one another. An analysis of such cases reveals that how much reason there is to choose any particular option can depend on how good the alternatives are. This suggests the existence of a previously unrecognized class of practical reasons – reasons that arise from how the value of an option compares to the values of the alternatives. Several implications of these comparative value-based reasons …Read more
  •  49
    Trading Quality for Quantity
    Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (1). 2007.
    This paper deals with problems that vagueness raises for choices involving evaluative tradeoffs. I focus on a species of such choices, which I call ‘qualitative barrier cases.’ These are cases in which a qualitatively significant tradeoff in one evaluative dimension for a given improvement in another dimension could not make an option better all things considered, but a merely quantitative tradeoff for the given improvement might. Trouble arises, however, when one of the options constitutes a bo…Read more
  •  71
    Equality and proportionality
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2): 179-201. 2007.
    Contemporary moral egalitarians hold that all people have equal moral standing and that we deserve this standing in virtue of satisfying some descriptive criterion. These two claims appear to be in tension, however, as none of the proposed criteria are attributes that all people possess equally. Many egalitarians have hoped to eliminate this tension by holding that the descriptive criterion of moral standing is a "range property" – that is, a property one either possesses fully or not at all. I …Read more
  • Tragedies without Commons
    Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (1): 81-94. 2011.
    Commons problems are, understandably enough, typically thought to be problems about commons. In this paper, however, I argue that what generates some prominent examples of commons problems is not open access to a good. Instead, what generates some commons problems is a conflict of values that have different structures. After making this case, I show how the existence of such problems can motivate a version of the Precautionary Principle and a (qualified) rejection of cost-benefit analysis.
  •  58
    De-moralizing disgustingness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2). 2003.
    Understanding disgustingness is philosophically important partly because claims about disgustingness play a prominent role in moral discourse and practice. It is also important because disgustingness has been used to illustrate the promise of "neo-sentimentalism." Recently developed by moral philosophers such as David Wiggins, John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson, neo-sentimentalism holds that for a thing to be disgusting is for it to be "appropriate" to respond to it w…Read more
  •  67
    Assessing Grading
    Public Affairs Quarterly 21 (3): 275-294. 2007.
    This paper begins with a description of common grading practices at universities in the U.S., and analyzes the unfairness, injustice, and harm they produce. It then proposes a solution to these problems in the form of an alternative grading system: institutions should adopt a grading system that assesses students’ performance relative to the performance of their peers. That is, institutions should abolish the practice of attempting to assign grades that correspond to an absolute standard of intr…Read more
  •  18
    When Hard Choices Become Easy
    American Journal of Philosophy 41 (4): 232-330. 2004.
    By analyzing cases in which we must choose between options whose values are not precisely comparable, this paper presents the case for the existence of a previously unrecognized class of practical reasons – reasons that arise from how the value of an option compares to the values of the alternatives. Several implications of these comparative value-based reasons are discussed – including the context-dependence of one option’s being ‘rationally preferable to’ an alternative, and the fact that, eve…Read more
  •  37
    Materialism and economics
    Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1). 2010.
    Chrisoula Andreou argues that even if our happiness is determined by our material standard of living, our standard of living could be lowered without lowering our happiness. In this response, I show how this claim can be challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, how justified we are in believing her claim depends on how we conceive of the 'we' it refers to. Empirically, there is economic evidence in tension with each of the several interpretations her position admits of.…Read more
  •  56
    A Thoreauvian Account of Prudential Value
    Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3): 419-435. 2014.
    This article develops and defends an account of prudential value that is inspired by ideas found in Thoreau’s Walden. The core claim is that prudential value consists in responding appropriately to those things that make the world better, and avoiding those things that make it worse. The core argument is that this is our aim in so far as we are evaluative creatures, and that our evaluative nature is essential to us in the context of inquiring into our good. I also illustrate how the account can …Read more
  •  49
    Nonconsequentialist Precaution
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4): 785-797. 2015.
    How cautious should regulators be? A standard answer is consequentialist: regulators should be just cautious enough to maximize expected social value. This paper charts the prospects of a nonconsequentialist - and more precautionary - alternative. More specifically, it argues that a contractualism focused on ex ante consent can motivate the following regulatory criterion: regulators should permit a socially beneficial risky activity only if no one can be expected to be made worse off by it. Broa…Read more
  •  206
    Consequentialism, Climate Harm and Individual Obligations
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1): 177-190. 2015.
    Does the decision to relax by taking a drive rather than by taking a walk cause harm? In particular, do the additional carbon emissions caused by such a decision make anyone worse off? Recently several philosophers have argued that the answer is no, and on this basis have gone on to claim that act-consequentialism cannot provide a moral reason for individuals to voluntarily reduce their emissions. The reasoning typically consists of two steps. First, the effect of individual emissions on the wea…Read more
  •  15
    Editor’s Introduction
    Binghamton Journal of Philosophy 1 (1): 1-2. 2013.