Kwasi Wiredu’s interpreted view of the Akan concept of mind (adwene), complemented with David Lewis’s version of the ability reply, offers an alternative African statement of the ability reply, and, at the very least, in a novel way turns the negative ability reply into a positive reply to Frank Jackson’s formulation of the knowledge argument. For Wiredu the mind is not taken as a distinct substance, but rather as a cognitive ability; while for Lewis together with Paul Snowdon’s capacity thesis …
Read moreKwasi Wiredu’s interpreted view of the Akan concept of mind (adwene), complemented with David Lewis’s version of the ability reply, offers an alternative African statement of the ability reply, and, at the very least, in a novel way turns the negative ability reply into a positive reply to Frank Jackson’s formulation of the knowledge argument. For Wiredu the mind is not taken as a distinct substance, but rather as a cognitive ability; while for Lewis together with Paul Snowdon’s capacity thesis challenge; an ability as ‘knowledge-how’ is understood as subjective experience, so subjective experience as a cognitive faculty of the mind, adds substantive knowledge. Essentially, adwene demonstrates an integral aspect of support to the conclusion of Jackson’s knowledge argument, where the mind is a cognitive capacity. Thus such support allows an African perspective to shine new light on the knowledge argument, an enduring problem in philosophy of mind.
