•  1140
    It is a widely held view in philosophy that propositions perform a plethora of different theoretical roles. Amongst other things, they are believed to be the semantic values of sentences in contexts, the objects of attitudes, the contents of illocutionary acts, and the referents of that-clauses. This assumption is often combined with the claim that propositions have their truth-values eternally. In this paper I aim to show that these two assumptions are incompatible: propositions cannot both ful…Read more
  •  811
    Centered communication
    Philosophical Studies 166 (S1): 205-223. 2013.
    According to an attractive account of belief, our beliefs have centered content. According to an attractive account of communication, we utter sentences to express our beliefs and share them with each other. However, the two accounts are in conflict. In this paper I explore the consequences of holding on to the claim that beliefs have centered content. If we do in fact express the centered content of our beliefs, the content of the belief the hearer acquires cannot in general be identical to the…Read more
  •  689
    Linguistic Structures and Economic Outcomes
    with Astghik Mavisakalyan
    Journal of Economics Surveys 32 (3): 916-939. 2017.
    Linguistic structures have recently started to attract attention from economists as determinants of economic phenomena. This paper provides the first comprehensive review of this nascent literature and its achievements so far. First, we explore the complex connections between language, culture, thought and behaviour. Then, we summarize the empirical evidence on the relationship between linguistic structures and economic and social outcomes. We follow up with a discussion of data, empirical desig…Read more
  •  664
    De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1): 50-76. 2022.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle cases, …Read more
  •  621
    Talking in the present, caring for the future: Language and environment
    with Astghik Mavisakalyan and Yashar Taverdi
    Journal of Comparative Economics 46 (4): 1370-1387. 2018.
    This paper identifies a new source that explains environmental behaviour: the presence of future tense marking in language. We predict that languages that grammatically mark the future affect speakers' intertemporal preferences and thereby reduce their willingness to address environmental problems. We first show that speakers of languages with future tense marking are less likely to adopt environmentally responsible behaviours and to support policies to prevent environmental damage. We then docu…Read more
  •  568
    What is Special about De Se Attitudes?
    In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, Routledge. pp. 464-481. 2021.
    De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.
  •  422
    Heaven can wait: future tense and religiosity
    with Astghik Mavisakalyan and Yashar Taverdi
    Journal of Population Economics (online): 1-28. 2021.
    This paper identifies a new source of differences in religiosity: the type of future tense marking in language. We argue that the rewards and punishments that incentivize religious behaviour are more effective for speakers of languages without inflectional future tense. Consistent with this prediction, we show that speakers of languages without inflectional future tense are more likely to be religious and to take up the short-term costs associated with religiosity. What is likely to drive this b…Read more
  •  373
    Being at the Centre: Self-location in Thought and Language
    In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford University Press. pp. 246-271. 2016.
    Self-locating attitudes and assertions provide a challenge to the received view of mental and linguistic intentionality. In this paper I try to show that the best way to meet this challenge is to adopt relativistic, centred possible worlds accounts for both belief and communication. First, I argue that self-locating beliefs support a centred account of belief. Second, I argue that self-locating utterances support a complementary centred account of communication. Together, these two claims motiva…Read more
  •  250
    Gendered Language and Gendered Violence
    with Astghik Mavisakalyan and Lewis Davis
    This study establishes the influence of sex-based grammatical gender on gendered violence. We demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between gendered language and the incidence of intimate partner violence in a cross-section of countries. Motivated by this evidence, we conduct an individual-level analysis exploiting the differences in the language structures spoken by individuals with a shared religious and ethnic background residing in the same country. We show that speaking a gen…Read more
  •  242
    A Puzzle About First-Person Imagination
    Philosophical Studies (8): 1-21. 2023.
    It is easy to imagine being someone else from the first-person point of view. Such imaginings give rise to a puzzle. In this paper I explain what the puzzle is and then consider several existing attempts of solving the puzzle. I argue that these attempts are unsuccessful. I propose a Lewisian account of first-person imagination and make the case that this account has the potential to solve the puzzle.
  •  198
    Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Arguments from Epistemic Misclassification
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2): 375-389. 2013.
    According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2…Read more
  •  172
    Indexical Beliefs and Communication: Against Stalnaker on Self‐Location
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3): 640-663. 2014.
    Beliefs are commonly analyzed as binary relations between subjects and propositions. Perry and Lewis have shown that the standard account has difficulties in handling self-locating beliefs. Robert Stalnaker has recently put forward a version of the standard account that is supposed to overcome this problem. Stalnaker's motivation for defending the propositional account of belief is that it comes with a simple and powerful propositional model of communication. In this paper I argue that Stalnaker…Read more
  •  81
    Material People in Logical Space
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3): 517-530. 2020.
    ABSTRACT This paper defends a controversial view about personal identity. It argues that it is possible to endorse both Phenomenalism and Materialism about persons. Phenomenalism is the view that personal identity is grounded in phenomenal consciousness. Materialism is the view that we are material objects. Many believe that the two views are incompatible. In this paper, I show that it is possible to accept both. I consider two objections against their combination—the argument from disembodiment…Read more