•  213
    Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity and Evolvability
    Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution and Cognition (KLI) 2 (1): 62-73. 2007.
    There is an argument that has recently been deployed in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of cognitive modules; an argument that draws from some ideas and concepts of evolutionary and of developmental biology. In a nutshell, the argument concludes that a mind that is massively composed of cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular (henceforth, c-modular) is more evolvable than a mind that is not c-modular (or that is scarcely c-modular), since a cogn…Read more
  •  114
    Innatismo y biología: hacia un concepto biológico de lo innato (Innateness and Biology: Towards a Biological Concept of Innateness)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (2): 167-182. 2010.
    Aquí argumento que algunas propuestas recientes de caracterizar una noción de lo innato teóricamente útil usando conceptos de la biología padecen serios problemas conceptuales. También defiendo una propuesta propia, de inspiración biológica, la cual pretende capturar las formas en que se usa el término 'innato' en algunas disciplinas cognitivas.
  •  87
    Sosa's responses to dreaming skepticism
    Critica 42 (125): 3-25. 2010.
    Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what appears t…Read more
  •  48
    Most cognitive scientists nowadays tend to think that at least some of the mind’s capacities are the product of biological evolution, yet important conceptual problems remain for all scientists in order to be able to speak coherently of mental or cognitive systems as having evolved naturally. Two of these important problems concern the articulation of adequate, interesting, and empirically useful concepts of homology and variation as applied to cognitive systems. However, systems in cognitive sc…Read more
  •  29
    This is the introduction of the Synthese Topical Collection Epistemological Issues in Neurodivergence and Atypical Cognition written by the guest editors. In order to justify the relevance of the topic, a minimum context is given on the notions of neurodivergence as well as some brief remarks on the neurodiversity advocacy movement. This serves as a basis to establish the importance of increasing the scope of epistemology to include issues that do not fit in the descriptions of typical subjects …Read more
  •  25
    Biología e innatismo: Algunos comentarios críticos
    Critica 35 (104): 3-30. 2003.
    En el presente artículo argumento que algunos de los descubrimientos empíricos relativamente recientes en la biología del desarrollo nos llevan a abandonar ciertos conceptos de lo innato, en particular, aquellos que llamaremos 'internistas'. También examino la adecuación de tres caracterizaciones de lo innato propuestas recientemente que toman en cuenta los descubrimientos empíricos antes mencionados y pretenden recoger un núcleo importante de las connotaciones y afirmaciones asociadas a lo inna…Read more
  •  19
    Disociaciones cognoscitivas y la evolucionabilidad de la mente
    Análisis Filosófico 29 (1): 73-103. 2009.
    En las ciencias cognoscitivas, existe una teoría con respecto a la arquitectura computacional de la mente conocida como el modularismo masivo. Esta teoría sostiene que la mente está en su mayoría constituida por mecanismos que son cognoscitivamente modulares. Algunos de los defensores de esta teoría proponen un argumento cuya conclusión es que es muy probable que mecanismos que son cognoscitivamente muy modulares sean más evolucionables que aquellos mecanismos que no son cognoscitivamente modula…Read more
  •  18
  •  15
    Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity, and Evolvability
    Biological Theory 2 (1): 62-73. 2007.
    I examine an argument that has recently appeared in the cognitive science literature in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly composed of Fodorian-type cognitive modules; an argument that concludes that a mind that is massively composed of classical cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular is more evolvable than a mind that is not cognitively modular, since a cognitive mechanism that is cognitively modular is likely to be biologically modular, and biologically modular characters are…Read more
  •  13
    Se pretende mostrar la contradicción existente entre el carácter plural e interdisciplinar de la bioética y la figura del bioeticista o experto. Las éticas aplicadas, de las que la bioética es una rama muy desarrollada, surgen a finales del siglo XX para confrontar los retos de las nuevas tecnología.
  •  10
    Descartes: la imaginación y el mundo físico
    Dianoia 41 (41): 65. 1995.
  •  8
    Descartes: Ideas and the Mark of the Mental
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 3 (1): 21-53. 2000.
    In this paper I argue that an adequate and coherent account of Descartes’ concepts of mental representation, ideas, clarity and distinctness, obscurity and confusion, and material falsity requires that one takes Descartes seriously whenever he makes a distinction between what an idea appears to represent and what it actually represents, and that one understands an idea’s representing a thing in terms of the objective existence in the mind of the essence of that thing. The paper also contains a l…Read more
  •  8
    Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry
    Philosophical Explorations 27 (1): 21-40. 2023.
    Here we defend the view that one ought to categorize and classify at least some mental disorders as clusters of interrelated dysfunctions of (usually, several) cognitive capacities – that is, the kinds of capacities that are postulated in cognitive science; capacities that are understood as entities that are primarily individuated in cognitive-functional terms (CF-systems); systems that have a set of peculiar properties in their manner of operation when processing information or representations.…Read more
  •  7
    ¿Es Sexto Empírico un protagórico?
    Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 24 (1): 71-90. 2003.
    En los Esbozos Pirrónicos, Sexto Empírico adelanta un argumento similar al sueño de Descartes, que parece comprometer a Sexto con una especie de relativismo protagórico. En este artículo examino este argumento en el contexto de otros pasajes de Sexto y propongo una interpretación que muestra que el escepticismo que uno puede trazar desde este argumento es tan radical como el de Descartes, pero nunca podrá considerarse como un argumento relativista. Muestro que Sexto comete un error crucial al de…Read more
  •  5
    Descartes: Ideas and the Mark of the Mental
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 3 (1): 21-53. 2000.
  •  3
    En este ensayo presento brevemente la propuesta de un concepto de homología funcional, junto con sus criterios empíricos. Argumento que dicho concepto es necesario para la articulación de una ciencia cognitiva evolutiva rigurosa y completa. Luego considero la pregunta sobre cuál de los dos principales conceptos de función que han sido desarrollados por filósofos de la biología —a saber, el análisis sistémico o el seleccionista— es el que encaja de mejor manera con mi concepto de homología funcio…Read more
  •  3
    In this paper I present a proposal to characterize in a precise manner the notions of domain specificity and of a bias in connection with rules of inference, as such notions are used in the psychology of human reasoning, and argue —against many cognitive psychologists— that there are no strong con..
  •  1
  •  1
    El fundamento de la imagen de Dios en el hombre
    Anuario Filosófico 34 (71): 633-654. 2001.
    The doctrine of the Image of God which is to be found in humankind is usually based by the Scholastic tradition in the human intellect and will. Bañez, a commentator of St. Thomas Aquinas, takes the further step of basing this Image in the personal act of being. In this way the Image of God as found in the created human being is never lost. The Image of God in the "recreated" human being (in the order of grace) can be lost, however, due to the vicious use of one's freedom
  • Paralelismo, convergencia y homología profunda en la biología: una propuesta conceptual
    Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía E Historia de la Ciencia 8 57--69. 2017.
  • Descartes y Suárez: sobre la falsedad no judicativa
    Analogía Filosófica 12 (2): 125-150. 1998.
  • Ideas innatas, esencias y verdades eternas en Descartes
    Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 23 (2): 273-294. 1997.