Clea F. Rees

I argue that lying is generally morally better than mere deliberate misleading because the latter involves the exploitation of a greater trust and more seriously abuses our willingness to fulfil epistemic and moral obligations to others. Whereas the liar relies on our figuring out and accepting only what is asserted, the mere deliberate misleader depends on our actively inferring meaning beyond what is said in the form of conversational implicatures as well. When others’ epistemic and moral obligations are determined by standard assumptions of communicative cooperation and no compelling moral reason justifies mere deliberate misleading instead, one had better lie.

In How We Get Along, J. David Velleman argues for two related theses: first, that ‘making sense’ of oneself to oneself and others is a constitutive aim of action; second, that this fact about action grounds normativity. Examining each thesis in turn, I argue against the first that an agent may deliberately act in ways which make sense in terms of neither her self-conception nor others' conceptions of her. Against the second thesis, I argue that some vices are such that the agents concerned would make more sense to neither themselves nor others if they were to reform, and, furthermore, that an agent may make more sense to herself and others by becoming more, rather than less, vicious. I conclude that both theses should be rejected.

Virtue ethics faces two challenges based in ‘dual-process’ models of cognition. The classic situationist worry is that we just do not have reliable motivations at all. One promising response invokes an alternative model of cognition which can accommodate evidence cited in support of dual-process models without positing distinct systems for automatic and deliberative processing. The approach appeals to the potential of automatization to habituate virtuous motivations. This response is threatened by implicit bias which raises the worry that we cannot avoid habituating reliably vicious motivations. I argue that the alternative model of cognition also offers the virtue ethicist a promising response to this second challenge. In particular, the virtue ethicist can respond to the implicitly biased by counselling the habituation of egalitarian virtue, rather than merely the control of anti-egalitarian vice. Research shows both the importance of automatized individual egalitarian commitments and the potential of habituation to automatize deliberatively endorsed egalitarian goals. However, individuals’ ability to sustain and implement their commitments depends crucially on hospitable environments. Communities which themselves embody egalitarian values and which encourage and support their members’ egalitarian commitments are therefore essential. As Aristotle said, individual virtue requires a virtuous community.

I argue that 'Empathy' is of considerable value in ethical theory and reasoning. In Part One, I explain the concept I refer to as 'Empathy', taking as my starting point Jonathan Bennett's article, 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn'. I argue that a focus on Empathy, rather than sympathy, can better explain our intuitive ethical evaluations of the characters Bennett considers. I briefly discuss various interpretations of the traditional distinction between reason and emotion. With respect to the ethical realm, I cast doubt on two of these---the distinctions between feeling and reasoning, and between reasons and emotions/feelings. Part Two further explains an Empathic ethical approach, considers various potential objections and compares some alternatives. I discuss 'feminine' theories, such as Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings', which focus on care and the ethical importance of emotional capacities. These are sometimes proposed as alternatives to theories based on values such as autonomy, justice or rights. I agree that the development, and exercise, of emotional capacities are essential to moral agency. I argue, however, that critical capacities are equally essential; and that theories which neglect their importance are deeply flawed. I then compare my view with Stephen Darwall's discussion of 'sympathetic concern' and Douglas Chisinar's claims about 'empathy'. I conclude the second part by summarising the concept of Empathy and inferring that an Empathic agent is an Empathically ethically autonomous agent. In Part Three, I explore this relation between Empathy and ethical autonomy. Traditional conceptions of autonomy regard the emotional as an irrelevance, if not a positive impediment. I argue that Empathic ethical autonomy avoids some of the problems faced by the traditional one, while nonetheless recognising its value. I begin with Thomas E. Hill, Jr.'s discussion of autonomy and compassion, and suggest that these can be better integrated by an Empathic approach. Finally, I consider the challenges Marilyn Friedman identifies for feminist ethical theories which try to acknowledge the value of autonomy while rejecting overly individualistic conceptions of the self. I suggest that developing an Empathic Ethical Theory may offer one promising way to meet these challenges