Clifford Sosis

A theory of rationality is a theory that evaluates instances of reasoning as rational, irrational, or (ir)rational to some degree. Theories can be categorized as rule-based or consequentialist. Rule-based theories say that rational reasoning accords with certain rules (e.g., of logic or probability). Consequentialist theories say that rational reasoning tends to produce good consequences. For instance, the reliabilist takes rationality to be reasoning that tends to produce mostly true beliefs. The pragmatist takes it to be reasoning that tends to produce mostly useful beliefs. This article reviews some of the features and the challenges of rule-based, reliabilist, and pragmatist theories of rationality.

Several influential psychologists have attempted to estimate to what extent human happiness levels are directly controlled by genes by comparing the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart. If we discover that the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart tend to be closer than the happiness levels of fraternal twins raised apart, this is taken as evidence that average happiness levels are largely controlled by genes. However, if it turns out that identical twins' happiness levels tend to be substantially different, as different as fraternal twins raised apart, it has been argued that this implies that the environment largely determines happiness levels. I contend that this interpretation of the data rests on a set of questionable, closely related assumptions: a) that pairs of identical twins raised apart are raised in substantially different environments; b) that genetically identical twins aren't identical in other pertinent ways; and c) that average levels of affect that are correlated with certain sets of genes in the environments the twin studies were conducted in will be correlated with those genes in other relevant environments because those genes govern average affect levels. In this paper, I will show that these assumptions are false and explain how to properly go about investigating the contingent causal links between genes and happiness. In the end, I argue that there is no good evidence that our genes delimit our hedonic potential and that the fact that this misinterpretation of the data has been widely disseminated is potentially harmful to human well-being.

In the natural world there are things we call 'syndromes'. Depression is an example of a syndrome. There are many forms of depression, but generally, people with depression suffer from a subset of several unpleasant symptoms, such as lethargy, guilt and suicidal ideation. It appears that there is a pleasant syndrome: There are people who are enjoying a subset of the properties we tend to associate with well-being. These symptoms include, but are not necessarily limited to, above average emotional health, mental health, physical health, personal success and professional success. According to any plausible view of reference, I argue, the term 'well-being' refers to this syndrome; thus well-being is this syndrome. Generally speaking, people with some forms of depression have a chemical imbalance. This is the nature of depression. It explains why depressed people are depressed. It is a contingent fact we discover empirically. I argue that the nature of well-being is a fact we discover empirically as well. Traditionally, those who have attempted to investigate the nature of well-being have struggled to provide an intuitively plausible account of well-being. As in the case of depression, I argue that intuition reveals nothing about the nature of well-being. Science has revealed that the symptoms of well-being are usually caused, in part, by a state similar to what hedonists identify with well-being. This state'having many pleasant emotions, moods and attitudes and few unpleasant emotions, moods and attitudes'is called a 'positive affect balance'. A thorough meta-analysis of two hundred and twenty five papers (that's two hundred and ninety three samples consisting of over a quarter million people) suggests that a positive affect balance causes the symptoms of well-being (Diener, Lyubomirsky and King, 2005). Thus, I claim, a positive affect balance is the nature of 'well-being'. It explains why well off people are doing well. This is the Hedonic Engine Theory of Well-Being in a nutshell. The Hedonic Engine Theory of Well-Being has several advantages over traditional accounts