• No Abstract
  • McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action
    Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (2): 183-207. 2010.
    Within philosophy there is not yet an integrative account of unreflective skillful action. As a starting point, contributions would be required from philosophers from both the analytic and continental traditions. Starting from the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, shared Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian common ground is identified. McDowell and Dreyfus agree about the importance of embodied skills, situation-specific discernment and responsiveness to relevant affordances. This sheds light on the embodied and…Read more
  • Marx and Kant on Capitalist Exploitation
    Kantian Review 22 (4): 641-659. 2017.
  • Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?
    Philosophical Issues 20 (1): 333-367. 2010.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intenti…Read more
  • Hallucinations for disjunctivists
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2): 281-293. 2010.
    In this paper, I examine the so-called disjunctive views on hallucinations. I argue that neither of the options open to the disjunctivist is capable of accommodating basic phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences and the explanatory demands behind the classical argument from hallucination. A positive characterization of the hallucinatory case is not attractive to a disjunctivist once she is disposed to accept certain commonalities with veridical experiences. Negative disjunctivism …Read more
  • In this paper I take issue with Allison's ‘two aspect’ view of Kant's transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. Unlike those of Allison's critics, who criticize him, and by implication Kant, based on some form of the ‘two world’ view, I argue that, even Allison's methodological, more moderate interpretation, nevertheless includes an excessive commitment to the role of things-in-themselves in Kant's theoretical philosophy, a commitment which is both unnecessary and …Read more
  • Kant and the early moderns
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2). 2010.
  • Extended simples and qualitative heterogeneity
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235): 325-331. 2009.
    The problem of qualitative heterogeneity is to explain how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation across its spatial or temporal axes, given that it lacks both spatial and temporal parts. I discuss how friends of extended simples should address the problem of qualitative heterogeneity. I present a series of arguments designed to show that rather than appealing to fundamental distributional properties one should appeal to tiny and short-lived tropes. Along the way, issues relevant to …Read more
  • The Metaphysics of Rule-Following
    Philosophical Studies 155 (3): 345-369. 2011.
    This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes …Read more
  • Leibniz's philosophy of mind
    Mark Kulstad
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  • The debate on how to interpret Kant's transcendental idealism has been prominent for several decades now. In his book Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism (2004) Kenneth R. Westphal introduces and defends his version of the metaphysical dual-aspect reading. But his real aim lies deeper: to provide a sound transcendental proof for (unqualified) realism, based on Kant's work, without resorting to transcendental idealism. In this sense his aim is similar to that of Peter F. Strawson – although We…Read more
  • Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitiona…Read more
  • This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recog…Read more
  • Thomas Reid's theory of perception – Ryan Nichols (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240): 643-645. 2010.
    No Abstract
  • On the looks of things
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2): 260-284. 2010.
    In recent publications, Michael Tye and Alva Noë have claimed that there is a sense in which a tilted plate looks round and another sense in which it looks elliptical. This paper argues that their proposal faces decisive objections. On Tye and Noë's account of ordinary, veridical perception, appearances are in constant conflict. As a characterization of ordinary visual experience, this cannot be correct. I examine various responses to this criticism, and conclude that they all fail. I then argue…Read more
  • When Transmission Fails
    Philosophical Review 119 (4): 497-529. 2010.
    The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so isn’t a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue that these deductions are instances of transmission failure. That is, they argue that these deductions cannot transmit justification to their conclusions. I contend, however, that the notoriety of these deductions is undeserved. My stra…Read more
  • Explanation in psychiatry
    Philosophy Compass 5 (7): 602-610. 2010.
    Philosophy of psychiatry has boomed in the last few years. We are now seeing a growing literature on the nature of psychiatric explanation, including work that makes contact with longstanding disputes in the philosophy of science as well as more specific work on mental disorders. This paper looks at some recent work on both representing and explaining mental illness. An emerging picture sees explanation of mental disorder as first constructing causal-statistical networks that represent disease p…Read more
  • Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption
    Mona Simion
    Philosophical Studies 1-16. forthcoming.
    One very popular assumption in the epistemological literature is that belief and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic norm. This paper challenges this claim. Extant arguments in defence of the view are scrutinized and found to rest on value-theoretic inaccuracies. First, the belief-assertion parallel is shown to lack the needed normative strength. Second, I argue that the claim that assertion inherits the norm of belief in virtue of being an expression thereof rests on a failed i…Read more
  • Malebranche and Leibniz on the best of all possible worlds
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1): 28-48. 2010.
    In this article I explore Leibniz's claim in the Theodicy that on the essential points Malebranche's theodicy "reduces to" his own view. This judgment may seem to be warranted given that both thinkers emphasize that evils are justified by the fact that they follow from the simple and uniform laws that govern that world which is worthy of divine creation. However, I argue that Leibniz's theodicy differs in several crucial respects from Malebranche's. I begin with a qualified endorsement of Charle…Read more
  • Naive realism and experiential evidence
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 77-109. 2010.
    I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs
  • General-elimination harmony and the meaning of the logical constants
    Stephen Read
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5): 557-76. 2010.
    Inferentialism claims that expressions are meaningful by virtue of rules governing their use. In particular, logical expressions are autonomous if given meaning by their introduction-rules, rules specifying the grounds for assertion of propositions containing them. If the elimination-rules do no more, and no less, than is justified by the introduction-rules, the rules satisfy what Prawitz, following Lorenzen, called an inversion principle. This connection between rules leads to a general form of…Read more
  • Temporality in queer theory and continental philosophy
    Philosophy Compass 5 (2): 136-146. 2010.
    The connections between the fields of queer theory and continental philosophy are strange and strained: simultaneously difficult and all too easy to ferret out, there is no easy narrative for how the two fields interconnect. Both sides of the relation seem either to disavow or simply repress any relation to the other. For example, despite the impact of Foucault's History of Sexuality, Volume One on early queer theory, current work in queer of color critique challenges the politics and epistemolo…Read more
  • A Simple View of Consciousness
    Adam Pautz
    In Bealer and Koons (ed.), The Waning of Materialism, Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66. 2009.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
  • Imagination is where the Action is
    Journal of Philosophy 108 (2): 55-77. 2011.
    Imaginative representations are crucial to the generation of action--both pretense and plain action. But well-known theories of imagination on offer in the literature [1] fail to describe how perceptually-formatted imaginings (mental images) and motor imaginings function in the generation of action and [2] fail to recognize the important fact that spatially rich imagining can be integrated into one's perceptual manifold. In this paper, I present a theory of imagining that shows how spatially ric…Read more
  • Action-oriented Perception
    European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3): 430-446. 2012.
    Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. F…Read more
  • Apriority, reason, and induction in Hume
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (3): 313-343. 2010.
    In what follows, I argue that Hume works with a notion of the a priori that, though unfamiliar today, was standard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On this notion of the a priori, to know (consider, prove) something a priori is to know (consider, prove) it from the grounds that make it true. I will refer to this as the "from-grounds" notion of the a priori, and to the now-familiar and dominant notion—on which to know something a priori is to know it with a justification that is indep…Read more
  • Re-enchanting the world: The role of imagination in perception
    K. Lennon
    Philosophy 85 (3): 375-389. 2010.
    This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins 'the imaginary texture of the real'. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here it will be suggested, followi…Read more
  • Propositions united
    Dialectica 64 (2): 289-301. 2010.
    Gaskin's book The Unity of the Proposition is very rich in material. I will focus only on its central thesis: Gaskin holds that Bradley's regress (more precisely, one particular version of it) is not only innocent, but in fact philosophically significant because it plays a crucial role in solving what Gaskin calls the problem of the unity of the proposition . In what follows, I first explain what that problem is meant to be ( section 1 ), then I present and criticise Gaskin's proposal about how …Read more
  • I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD does not establish the objective validity of the cate…Read more