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Colin McLear

University of Nebraska, Lincoln
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 More details
  • University of Nebraska, Lincoln
    Department of Philosophy
    Associate Professor
Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 2013
Homepage
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America
0000-0003-2687-8412
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Immanuel Kant
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
Meta-Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
19th Century Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
17th/18th Century Philosophy
3 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Kant's Works
  • All publications (28)
  •  3133
    Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1): 79-110. 2015.
    I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions—viz. Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically int…Read more
    I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions—viz. Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically intuitions, do not require synthesis. I argue that there are deep reasons for thinking that Intellectualism is incompatible with Kant's view as expressed in the Transcendental Aesthetic. We can better see how Kant’s arguments in the first Critique may be integrated, I suggest, by examining his notion of the 'unity' [Einheit] of a representation. I articulate two distinct ways in which a representation may possess unity and claim that we can use these notions to integrate Kant’s arguments in the Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction without compromising the core claims of either Sensibilism or Intellectualism—that intuition is a form of objective representation independent of synthesis, and that the kind of objective representations that ground scientific knowledge of the world require synthesis by the categories.
    Kant: PerceptionKant: IntuitionKant: SpaceKant: SynthesisKant: Concepts
  •  2307
    The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate
    Philosophy Compass 9 (11): 769-790. 2014.
    One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy
    Kant: PerceptionKant: IntuitionKant: SynthesisKant: ConceptsConceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  •  1956
    Kant on Perceptual Content
    Mind 125 (497): 95-144. 2016.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acq…Read more
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy
    Kant: PerceptionKant: ConceptsKant: Transcendental ArgumentsNaive and Direct RealismKant: IntuitionI…Read more
    Kant: PerceptionKant: ConceptsKant: Transcendental ArgumentsNaive and Direct RealismKant: IntuitionIntentionalist Theories of PerceptionKant: Cognition and KnowledgeConceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  •  1826
    Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical‐Historical Commentary, by Henry Allison. Oxford University Press, 2015, 496 pp. ISBN 13: 978‐0‐19‐872485‐8 hb £75.00
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2): 546-554. 2017.
    Kant: CategoriesKant: Transcendental ArgumentsKant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessKant: Concept…Read more
    Kant: CategoriesKant: Transcendental ArgumentsKant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessKant: ConceptsKant: Intuition
  •  1707
    On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 35-104. 2020.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as …Read more
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
    Kant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessKant: The SelfKant: Theoretical JudgmentKant: FreedomKant: …Read more
    Kant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessKant: The SelfKant: Theoretical JudgmentKant: FreedomKant: Inference
  •  1629
    Fellow Creatures, by Christine Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 0198753853. 272 pp. $24.95
    European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 258-262. 2020.
    Objections to Kantian EthicsKantian Ethics, MiscKant: Ethics, MiscKant: Moral Psychology, Misc
  •  1521
    Kant: Philosophy of Mind
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
    Kant: Philosophy of Mind Immanuel Kant was one of the most important philosophers of the Enlightenment Period in Western European history. This encyclopedia article focuses on Kant’s views in the philosophy of mind, which undergird much of his epistemology and metaphysics. In particular, it focuses on metaphysical and epistemological doctrines forming the … Continue reading Kant: Philosophy of Mind →.
    Kant: Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  1240
    Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Conception of Freedom: A Developmental and Critical Analysis Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020 Pp. xxiii + 531 ISBN 9781107145115 (hbk), $140
    with Yoon Choi
    Kantian Review 27 (1): 159-165. 2022.
    Immanuel KantGerman Philosophy
  •  1189
    Rationality: What difference does it make?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1): 1-26. 2023.
    A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as ‘transformed’, in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesn't result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless significantly differentiates human beings from other animals.
    RationalityKant: The SelfKant: EthicsKant: Teleology, Misc
  •  1129
    Intuition and Presence
    In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. pp. 86-103. 2017.
    In this paper I explicate the notion of “presence” [Gegenwart] as it pertains to intuition. Specifically, I examine two central problems for the position that an empirical intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment. The first stems from Kant’s description of the faculty of imagination, while the second stems from Kant’s discussion of hallucination. I shall suggest that Kant’s writings indicate at least one possible means of reconciling our two problems with…Read more
    In this paper I explicate the notion of “presence” [Gegenwart] as it pertains to intuition. Specifically, I examine two central problems for the position that an empirical intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment. The first stems from Kant’s description of the faculty of imagination, while the second stems from Kant’s discussion of hallucination. I shall suggest that Kant’s writings indicate at least one possible means of reconciling our two problems with a conception of “presence” such that perceptual and hallucinatory states might be understood as different kinds of intuition. This may not be sufficient to secure the relationalist’s claim that intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment, but it does show that opposition to this claim will require further argument.
    Kant: SkepticismKant: ImaginationKant: Cognition and KnowledgeKant: PerceptionKant: Intuition
  •  1101
    “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject
    Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26): 1-38. 2020.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity…Read more
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the actual intellectual awareness of oneself in such apperception. I then defend this interpretation from a variety of objections.
    Kant: CategoriesKant: ConsciousnessKant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessKant: Concepts
  •  1038
    From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars
    Ethics 126 (3): 808-816. 2016.
    One of the better known of the many bons mots of the Sellarsian corpus concerns his definition of philosophy: it is the attempt to understand “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” When applied to Sellars’s philosophy in particular, one might be forgiven for doubting the possible success of such an endeavor. Richard Rorty once quipped of Sellars’s followers that they were either “left-wing” or “right-wing,” emphasizing on…Read more
    One of the better known of the many bons mots of the Sellarsian corpus concerns his definition of philosophy: it is the attempt to understand “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” When applied to Sellars’s philosophy in particular, one might be forgiven for doubting the possible success of such an endeavor. Richard Rorty once quipped of Sellars’s followers that they were either “left-wing” or “right-wing,” emphasizing one line of thought in Sellars’s work to the exclusion of the other. The two lines of thought to which Rorty referred were, first, Sellars’s conception of the normativity of all thought and language, famously captured by his evocative phrase “the space of reasons.” Second, and equally important to Sellars, was his “scientia mensura,” the notion ðshared with contemporaries such as Quine that “in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not” Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 [1956]: 41,303). The left-wing adherents to the normativity thesis included Rorty himself, along with John McDowell and Robert Brandom. Among the right-wing naturalists are such as Ruth Milliken, Jay Rosenberg, and Paul Churchland. Such a disparate group of philosophers suggests irreconcilable differences. Brandom himself reports in the introduction to his newest book, From Empiricism to Expressivism, that, “for a dismayingly long time, I did not really see how all the pieces of [Sellar's] work hung together, even in the broadest possible sense of the term”.
    Pragmatism about TruthKant: ModalityMoral Expressivism20th Century American Pragmatism, MiscNaturali…Read more
    Pragmatism about TruthKant: ModalityMoral Expressivism20th Century American Pragmatism, MiscNaturalism, MiscModal EmpiricismPragmatism, Misc
  •  1019
    Three Skeptics and the Critique: Review of Michael Forster's Kant and Skepticism
    with Andrew Chignell
    Philosophical Books 51 (4): 228-244. 2010.
    A long critical notice of Michael Forster's recent book, "Kant and Skepticism." We argue that Forster's characterization of Kant's response to skepticism is both textually dubious and philosophically flawed. -/- .
    History: SkepticismKant: SkepticismKant: Epistemology, Misc
  •  994
    Motion and the Affection Argument
    Synthese 195 (11): 4979-4995. 2018.
    In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant presents an argument for the centrality of &lt;motion&gt; to our concept &lt;matter&gt;. This argument has long been considered either irredeemably obscure or otherwise defective. In this paper I provide an interpretation which defends the argument’s validity and clarifies the sense in which it aims to show that &lt;motion&gt; is fundamental to our conception of matter.
    Kant: Metaphysics, MiscKant: Metaphysical Foundations of Natural ScienceKant: Philosophy of Science
  •  791
    The Mind's "I"
    European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 255-265. 2019.
    Critical notice of Béatrice Longuenesse's book *I, Me, Mine*.
    Self-Consciousness in PsychologyKant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessFirst-Person ContentsImmuni…Read more
    Self-Consciousness in PsychologyKant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessFirst-Person ContentsImmunity to Error through MisidentificationKant: The Self
  •  780
    Animals and Objectivity
    In John J. Callanan & Lucy Allais (eds.), Kant and Animals. pp. 42-65. 2020.
    Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's…Read more
    Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective.
    Kant: ConceptsKant: IntuitionKant: PerceptionKant: ConsciousnessKant: Synthesis
  •  743
    Comments on Stefanie Grüne's *Blinde Anschauung*
    Critique. 2014.
    Extended critical discussion of Stefanie Grüne's *Blinde Anschauung*
    Kant: ConceptsKant: PerceptionKant: IntuitionKant: Synthesis
  •  716
    Kant and the Demands of Reflection
    SGIR Review 2 (1): 42-59. 2019.
    From an author meets critics session on Melissa Merritt's *Kant on Reflection and Virtue*.
    Kant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, MiscKant: ConsciousnessKant: Assent
  •  714
    Getting Acquainted with Kant
    In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism, Palgrave. pp. 171-97. 2016.
    My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think much of the substanc…Read more
    My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think much of the substance of the debate concerning Kant’s views on the content of experience can be salvaged by reframing it in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. Below, in Section 2, I clarify the notion of ‘content’ I take to be at stake in the interpretive debate. Section 3 presents reasons for thinking that intuition cannot have content in the relevant sense. I then argue, in Section 4, that the debate be reframed in terms of dependence. We should distinguish between Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation (understood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the intellect, and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of objective representation are independent of any such acts (or the capacity for such acts). Finally, in Section 5, I further elucidate the cognitive role of intuition. I articulate a challenge which Kant understands alethic modal considerations to present for achieving cognition, and argue that a version of Sensibilism that construes intuition as a form of acquaintance is better positioned to answer this challenge than Intellectualism.
    Kant: IntuitionKant: PerceptionKant: SynthesisConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentKant: Cognition an…Read more
    Kant: IntuitionKant: PerceptionKant: SynthesisConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentKant: Cognition and Knowledge
  •  585
    Comments on Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality
    Critique. 2016.
    Extended critical discussion of Lucy Allais, *Manifest Reality*
    Kant: Transcendental IdealismKant: ConceptsKant: Intuition
  •  473
    Nicholas Stang, Kant's Modal Metaphysics
    Philosophical Review 127 (4): 523-528. 2018.
    Kant: ModalityMetaphysical Necessity
  •  337
    Kant on Animal Consciousness
    Philosophers' Imprint 11. 2011.
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual…Read more
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can actively endorse this attribution. Kant can consistently allow that animals have a point of view on the objective world which possesses a distinctive phenomenal character while denying what seems most important to him – viz. that animals have the capacity to take cognitive attitudes towards, and thus self-ascribe, their own representational states.
    Kant: ConceptsKant: ConsciousnessVarieties of RepresentationThe Experience of ObjectsConceptual and …Read more
    Kant: ConceptsKant: ConsciousnessVarieties of RepresentationThe Experience of ObjectsConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentKant: Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  251
    Kantian Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    Overview of the (non)conceptualism debate in Kant studies
    Kant: ConceptsKant: IntuitionKant: Perception
  •  136
    Markus Kohl, Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. 399pp (review)
    Philosophical Review 134 (2): 212-219. 2025.
    Control and ResponsibilityFree Will and ResponsibilityKant: Freedom
  •  90
    Review of Lanier Anderson, The Poverty of Conceptual Truth
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2015.
    Kant: The Synthetic A PrioriKant: ConceptsKant: The A PrioriKant: Cognition and Knowledge
  •  85
    Waxman on Intuition and Apperception
    Critique. 2018.
    A critical discussion of Waxman's recent book, Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind
    Kant: CategoriesKant: IntuitionKant: Apperception and Self-ConsciousnessKant: Concepts
  •  4
    Kant’s Fundamental Assumptions (edited book)
    with Colin Marshall
    In the past two decades, much work on Kant has aimed to delimit and evaluate the bedrock assumptions of Kant's mature Critical philosophy. This volume brings together leading Kant scholars to address this issue in conversation with each other, articulating and interrogating Kant's critical assumptions.
    Kant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, MiscKant: Ethics, MiscKant: Aesthetics, MiscKant: Teleology, Mis…Read more
    Kant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, MiscKant: Ethics, MiscKant: Aesthetics, MiscKant: Teleology, MiscKant: Social, Political and Religious Thought, Misc
  •  1
    Kant's Order of Reason: On Rational Agency and Control
    The aim of Kant's Order of Reason is to give an account of Kant's conception of rational agency that clarifies and explains both the scope and nature of such activity, and elucidates the centrality of Kant's account of rational determination for his mature critical philosophy. As I see it, the core Kantian insight concerning rational determination is that the capacity for rationality is based in and derived from the capacity for exercising a very specific kind of causality in the world–namely, f…Read more
    The aim of Kant's Order of Reason is to give an account of Kant's conception of rational agency that clarifies and explains both the scope and nature of such activity, and elucidates the centrality of Kant's account of rational determination for his mature critical philosophy. As I see it, the core Kantian insight concerning rational determination is that the capacity for rationality is based in and derived from the capacity for exercising a very specific kind of causality in the world–namely, free, or controlled, causality The book consists of three parts. In the first I provide a historically contextualized but nevertheless rigorous metaphysical framework for understanding Kant's conception of mental activity, his theory of freedom, and its importance for understanding his conception of the difference between rational and non-rational forms of activity. I then argue that Kant has a control-centered or "enkratic" account of rational activity and agency. According to this view, control is the central and essential aspect of all rational activity, and a rational being is one that can exercise her diverse powers, or use her diverse intellectual faculties, in a manner that is under her own control. Building on this structure, in part two I show how Kant applies his conception of controlled activity to the various forms of activity of which the rational mind is capable, in increasing order of complexity (i.e. attention, conception, judgment, inference, and comprehension). I then put this account to work with respect to longstanding disputes regarding self-consciousness, reason, evil, and alienation.
    Kant: The SelfKant: FreedomKant: TimeKant: CausationKant: Theoretical and Practical ReasonKant: Asse…Read more
    Kant: The SelfKant: FreedomKant: TimeKant: CausationKant: Theoretical and Practical ReasonKant: Assent
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