•  20
    Not So Simple
    Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 1-16. 2023.
    In a recent series of articles, Beall has developed the view that FDE is the formal system most deserving of the honorific “Logic”. The Simple Argument for this view is a cost-benefit analysis: the view that FDE is Logic has no drawbacks and it has some benefits when compared with any of its rivals. In this paper, I argue that both premises of the Simple Argument are mistaken. I use this as an opportunity to further reflect on how such arguments can be bolstered to provide more substantial and p…Read more
  •  109
    Simple Semantics for Logics of Indeterminate Epistemic Closure
    In Igor Sedlár (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2021, College Publications. pp. 37-56. 2022.
    According to Jago (2014a), logical omniscience is really part of a deeper paradox. Jago develops an epistemic logic with principles of indeterminate closure to solve this paradox, but his official semantics is difficult to navigate, it is motivated in part by substantive metaphysics, and the logic is not axiomatized. In this paper, I simplify this epistemic logic by adapting the hyperintensional semantic framework of Sedlár (2021). My first goal is metaphysical neutrality. The solution to the ep…Read more
  •  8
    The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 823-826. 2022.
    The semantic tradition in logic descends from Tarski's seminal work on truth and logical consequence. In the introduction to this volume, Sagi and Woods remind us that this tradition prominently uses model theory to study languages and their interpretations. Tarski's model-theoretic definition of logical consequence is the prime example of this approach, seeking as it does to reduce logical properties to a class of operations on classical, iterative (ZF) sets. Sagi and Woods explain with admirab…Read more
  •  40
  •  43
    In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial
    Episteme 18 (2): 282-297. 2021.
    This paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Mi…Read more
  •  120
    Why logical pluralism?
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 20): 4947-4968. 2019.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The present paper aims…Read more
  •  13
    The Interpretation of Partitioned Frame Semantics
    Dissertation, University of Connecticut. 2009.
    The advocate of modal logic or relevant logic has traditionally argued that her preferred system offers the best regimentation of the theory of entailment. Essential to the projects of modal and relevant logic is the importation of non-truth-functional expressive resources into the object language on which the logic is defined. The most elegant technique for giving the semantics of such languages is that of frame semantics, a variation on which features the device of partitioned frames that divi…Read more
  •  71
    A Note on Contraction-Free Logic for Validity
    with Zach Weber
    Topoi 34 (1): 63-74. 2015.
    This note motivates a logic for a theory that can express its own notion of logical consequence—a ‘syntactically closed’ theory of naive validity. The main issue for such a logic is Curry’s paradox, which is averted by the failure of contraction. The logic features two related, but different, implication connectives. A Hilbert system is proposed that is complete and non-trivial
  •  50
    Spandrels of Truth, by Jc Beall (review)
    Mind 120 (478): 503-507. 2011.
    A review of Jc Beall's "Spandrels of Truth"
  •  142
    Foundations of Logical Consequence (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field of philosophical logic. The essay…Read more
  •  172
    According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and ha…Read more
  •  32
    Hybridized Paracomplete and Paraconsistent Logics
    Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1): 281-325. 2017.
    This paper contributes to the study of paracompleteness and paraconsistency. We present two logics that address the following questions in novel ways. How can the paracomplete theorist characterize the formulas that defy excluded middle while maintaining that not all formulas are of this kind? How can the paraconsistent theorist characterize the formulas that obey explosion while still maintaining that there are some formulas not of this kind?
  •  86
    True, false, paranormal and 'designated'?: A reply to Jenkins
    with Aaron Cotnoir
    Analysis 68 (3). 2008.
    Jenkins (2007) charges that the language advanced in Beall (2007) is either expressively impoverished, or inconsistent. We argue that Jenkins’ objections are based on unreasonably strong constraints on formal theories of truth. Our primary concern is not to defend the ‘paranormal’ framework advanced in Beall, but to respond to a common – and implausible – ‘revenge’-style charge directed at a certain class of formal theories of truth and paradox.
  •  1
    Logical Consequence: Its nature, structure, and application
    In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Recent work in philosophical logic has taken interesting and unexpected turns. It has seen not only a proliferation of logical systems, but new applications of a wide range of different formal theories to philosophical questions. As a result, philosophers have been forced to revisit the nature and foundation of core logical concepts, chief amongst which is the concept of logical consequence. This essay sets the contributions of the volume in context and identifies how they advance important deba…Read more